Syria is in a weak, yet changing situation in 2025, after the Assad regime collapsed in late 2024. Despite the fact that the military campaign against ISIS has provided quantifiable benefits most prominently an 80 percent increase in attacks and a 97 percent decrease in fatalities, there is a rising agreement that tactical triumph is not replacing political and social revival.
The dependency on counter-terror raids such as over 75 US-led attacks on the remnants of ISIS in the central desert have broken up operational networks and maintained structural factors of radicalization.
Societies of Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and the eastern Homs remain underdeveloped, displaced, and distrusted at the institutional level. The individuals who are now an internal displaced (IDP), returnees, and former combatants are a delicate layer of demography that needs to be reintegrated and not spied on. Analysts concur that community resilience in post-ISIS Syria should be in the center of the agenda in case the country is to gain lasting peace and political stability.
Inclusive governance and addressing local divides
The introduction of the interim government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa signifies the end of decades of dictatorship. But the way to legitimacy is very thin and unstable. The ethnic, sectarian and tribal cleavages have been solidified over years of war and the Constitutional Declaration to be signed in January of 2025 though ambitious in its intentions to advance the rights of minorities and decentralization encounters significant obstacles in its implementation.
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is predominantly composed of Kurdish elements, has remained a powerful force in northeast Syria and they are still insisting on the legally guaranteed autonomy, language rights and institutional approval. An interim government and SDF March 2025 agreement on integration has never been fully practicalized. The situation is still tense in such cities as Qamishli and Hasakah, where ethnic and sectarian violence episodes demonstrate the discrepancy between the policy and the reality.
Reconciliation efforts have been sabotaged in the southern and coastal areas where complaints of revenge against former loyalists of the regime and ethnic minorities have been alleged. Such trends have the potential to recreate the same complaints that enabled ISIS and other extremist organizations to establish themselves in disenfranchised groups in the past.
Constructing inclusive political architecture
More than transitional charters will be needed to have true political inclusion. Local governments, power-sharing, and community councils should be supported by legal protection and funding. Deliberative processes that include tribal elders, religious leaders and representative youth can provide good examples but need to be scaled critically. Any wrong move might unwillingly re-centralize power or further alienate the locals.
The place of women in the government is a sensitive matter. Although this is a rhetorical obligation, there is a limited women representation in local councils and national decision making bodies. In certain areas that are conservative, and where the culture of patriarchy is still firmly embedded, some progress has been made in efforts by UN Women and local NGOs to train women leaders in Raqqa and Daraa, despite opposition.
Socioeconomic recovery and investing in local capacity
In 2025, the Syrian economy would still be facing high unemployment rates, deteriorated infrastructure and little investor confidence. In the former, ISIS used economic desperation to enlist soldiers and seize territory which may recur unless economic grievances are resolved. Reconstruction is still very uneven with many rural and peripheral regions, which have suffered most in the conflict, receiving little help.
Other international players like the world bank, UNDP, and the European commission have encouraged the use of coordinated reconstruction frameworks focusing on basic services like water, electricity, education and health services. Delivery has however been stalled by donor fatigue and geopolitical competition. The Reconstruction and Recovery Commission of the interim government has issued transparency guiding principles, yet corruption is still shrouding procurements and aid disbursements.
Localized job training, microfinance support of entrepreneurs, and reintegration programs of former fighters and returnees are regarded as necessary in restoring social contracting. Though, such efforts need long-term support, particularly in governorates like Idlib and Hama, where informal economies and warlordism remain.
Supporting youth and countering radicalization
The young generation in Syria-most of whom have reached adult age in times of war is both a challenge and an opportunity. Decades of broken education, mental trauma and economic marginalization have placed millions of people at the mercy of extremist rhetoric. Psychosocial support has started to be given in rehabilitation programs in camps such as al-Hol, although the size is not sufficient.
The reform of the national curriculum, which will start at the beginning of 2025, is supposed to contribute to the development of civic values and critical thinking, and the introduction of modules on conflict resolution. Implementation is however not even and ideological backlash is still high in regions where Islamist feeling is deep rooted. UNESCO-supported, local partner initiatives like establishing peace education centers in Aleppo, Latakia and Qamishli are a move in the right direction to invest in a shared national identity, but the process demands long-term investment and retraining of teachers.
Security sector reform and social cohesion
One of the most urgent tasks of the Syrian state is the integration of the different militia, tribal forces and security units into a consistent national structure. In the absence of centralized control and responsibility, the spread of military formations may once again bring the banditry that has been strong in ISIS.
In June 2025, the government initiated a demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) program on a nationwide basis through the technical assistance of the African Union and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. The program aims at resettling 15,000 combatants and integrating them into re-organized police and military forces. Opposition however has been noted in areas where local militias are both a security and an economic source and thus a politically sensitive issue to integrate.
There is an attempt to work towards ethnically balanced recruitment and command structure but hampered by history-based mistrust. There are also suggestions of monitoring bodies to monitor adherence to anti-discrimination norms, the authority of which is also controversial.
Healing social wounds and restoring trust
In addition to physical security, there is the more serious issue of rebuilding social unity in Syria. The social fabric of the country has been tearing apart under the impact of widespread trauma, intercommunal violence, and forced migration on a large scale. Homs and Daraa are piloting truth and reconciliation programs, following South African and Colombian models of truth and reconciliation. This revolves around community storytelling and victim recognition and memorialization activities but lack of full participation due to opposition by former combatants and local elites makes this difficult.
Conflict-affected children, especially those born in ISIS-controlled territories or brought up in extremist indoctrination camps- are in need of special psychosocial and educational services. In 2025, UNICEF-coordinated efforts will seek to reintegrate such children by providing special schools and foster care facilities, although space is also a limitation.
Regional dynamics, international support, and long-term outlook
The stability of post-ISIS Syria is not determined solely within its borders. Regional powers such as Iraq, Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon are invested in Syria’s transition due to shared security concerns and refugee dynamics. Joint border surveillance systems, intelligence-sharing platforms, and counter-terror financing task forces have been launched through the Regional Security Compact signed in April 2025.
The international community has also linked financial support to benchmarks in governance, human rights, and institutional reform. While this conditionality has encouraged transparency, it has also slowed disbursements and strained relations with factions who view external actors as overly intrusive.
Syria’s integration into global counter-terror efforts
Syria’s invitation to join the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS was formalized in May 2025. Membership offers access to funding, training, and political support, but also carries expectations for compliance with international norms. Syrian officials have described this as a “strategic realignment” designed to consolidate gains and reinforce new political legitimacy.
By positioning itself within multilateral structures, Syria signals a move away from ideological isolation and toward pragmatic engagement. However, the success of this pivot depends on the durability of internal reforms and the credibility of inclusive governance.
Syria’s post-ISIS trajectory underscores the necessity of looking beyond military victory. Counter-terror raids, while vital in disrupting networks, cannot substitute for trust, opportunity, and cohesion. Building community resilience in post-ISIS Syria is a multidimensional process—one grounded in shared institutions, equal representation, and dignified recovery. Whether Syria can transform its deep fractures into a foundation for peace will define not just the end of conflict, but the beginning of a nation reimagined.
