The growing level of security presence of China in Africa represents a larger engagement of achieving economical interests, political cooperation, and consolidating its position as a world power. This is a strategy that is a combination of military collaboration, non-governmental security activities, and diplomacy networks that focus on stability. China has emerged as the largest exporter of arms to Sub-Saharan Africa by the year 2025 which is supported by the fact that almost 2,000 African military officers are being trained every year. These changes are characterized by an increasing military-to-military involvement in the continent.
To a large extent, this security outreach is connected to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the grand program of infrastructure and investment of China, which has its global character. Since 2013 BRI has spread out to more than 40 countries of Africa and has to protect physical assets, staff, and supply chain. The weak political structures of many nations such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya and Mali have increased the necessity of China to incorporate security planning in its foreign economic strategies. Chinese firms have had to spend close to 20 billion dollars in Africa alone due to conflict and instability as estimated in 2025.
Integrating security into the Belt and Road framework
Even though it was originally packaged as an economic project, the BRI does have security elements within it. The Chinese imports of energy and the commercial export activities depend largely on the maritime and overland transportation channels. The main maritime chokepoints of the Indian Ocean and the coast of the East African region need routine monitoring and defense, which pushes China to extend its military potential beyond national territories.
People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been central to this strategy especially in escort operations to discourage piracy activities and protect shipping lanes. As of 2025, PLAN has had 47 task forces in the Gulf of Aden, which focuses on regular naval participation towards economic security.
Military doctrine shift and global reach
Examples of military reforms in China are the modernization of its doctrine to enable it to engage in limited combat operations in foreign lands and extraterritorial operations. This progress gives Beijing a chance to defend its growing activity in Africa due to its obligation to protect the BRI initiatives. These arrangements are also indicative of a larger strategic agenda of destabilizing the traditional Western hegemony in the global security structures.
Djibouti as a cornerstone of maritime and regional security
In 2017, when China opened its first foreign military base in the African country of Djibouti, its involvement in African security changed its momentum. The base, which is located close to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, offers logistical and intelligence collection and capabilities of quick deployment throughout the Horn of Africa and the maritime approaches.
In 2025, Djibouti can also be used as a site of joint drills, surveillance missions, and liaison with regional allies in addition to being a naval post. The location near the presence of other bases of the United States, France and Japan makes the region a strategic theatre of multipolar military presence. The fact that China can operate long term out of this base, makes its status as a serious security stakeholder in Africa.
The expanding role of private Chinese security
China is increasingly turning to the services of the private military and security companies (PMSCs) to offer security services in the unstable areas of Africa. These are agencies that are closely associated with Chinese state-owned corporations and diplomatic offices and provide services that vary in scope of protection of a site and convoy security to diplomatic missions. Their development is a practical reaction to the legal restrictions imposed on the formal use of the military and it enables China to keep an adaptable security presence that does not imply an excessive militarization.
Such businesses are usually run without much people control, increasing the issue of governance and transparency. Their actions confuse the distinction between business and geopolitics, raising concerns regarding sovereignty and the presence of foreign security actors in the internal African affairs.
Accountability and legal ambiguity
Chinese PMSCs, unlike their Western counterparts, are also operating in a less regulated global environment, and in most cases, without formal agreements or host country requirements. This is a legal gray area that makes it difficult to hold anyone accountable in cases of civilian causation or law abuse. As China keeps proliferating this model, African policy-makers should look into mechanisms of checking and controlling to ensure that local regulating bodies are not compromised.
Framing engagement through peacekeeping and counter-terrorism
China has established itself as an ally in the peacekeeping and counter-terrorism policies in Africa. Within the Beijing Action Plan 2025-2027 of the China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China has committed to supporting African peacekeeping operation forces in terms of training, equipment and intelligence sharing.
The cooperation of Beijing is in line with the peace and security architecture of the African Union (APSA) that targets the areas that are involved in terrorism and insurgency, including the Sahel, Horn of Africa and central Africa. The counter-terrorism assistance provided by China funds the local capacity building in addition to overall narratives of stability in the region.
International collaboration and strategic narratives
China is undertaking active activities with the Interpol and Afripol, which improves its international counter-terrorism image. Such alliances usually aim at interfering with illegal arms channels and human trafficking paths. It is through these avenues that China is gearing up its form of governance that focuses on regime stability, technological monitoring, and state-centric security unlike the democratization-driven models that the Western powers prefer.
The bilateral and multilateral training programs that are preferred in China also demonstrate the attempt to mould the future security staff in Africa to its own operational ideologies. Although such programs are usually embraced by the host states, it helps in a slow transformation of Africa security culture to centralized and state-oriented ones.
Evaluating the impacts and concerns surrounding China’s role
The aspects of sovereignty, non-interference, and practical advantages have made African governments mostly embrace the security agenda of China. Chinese weapons tend to be cheaper and less conditional than Western ones, which are appealing to the states with weak budgets or bad relationships with conventional donors.
Such ties are buttressed by high level diplomatic interactions and alliances, which often bundle security cooperation with infrastructural development, access to natural resources and technological transfers. To most leaders, China presents a holistic development-security alliance that does not require normative restrictions as provided by liberal.
Civil society concerns and democratic limitations
Even though officially supported, the role of China is a concern among civil society organizations and political reform supporters. The sale of surveillance technologies and crowd-control systems to at least 22 African countries raises eyebrows due to the strengthening of dictatorial practices.
Human rights organizations caution that security aid by China can unwillingly bolster the regimes which commit political oppression or vote rigging. This aspect of involvement threatens to sabotage the pursuit of open governance and all inclusive political structures.
According to the argument of the Western analysts, the expanding military and commercial security presence of China is a threat to the security systems that are being spearheaded by the United States and Europe. The regional security is slowly rebalancing as the African states decide between who to partner with.
China’s security footprint in Africa has transformed from a modest peacekeeping role into a multifaceted network involving military deployment, private security companies, and counter-terror cooperation. This evolution reflects not only China’s economic imperatives but also its long-term ambition to shape the global order through persistent engagement.
The strategic intertwining of security with development, combined with nuanced diplomatic relationships, positions China as an enduring actor in African affairs. Yet, as this role deepens, the continent’s future security trajectory will depend on how African societies reconcile external support with internal accountability, and whether emerging partnerships ultimately serve the public good.
