The security interaction of China in Africa has taken a new turn in the last ten years, unlike the traditional focus on peace keeping and economic diplomacy by the nation. The change is indicative of the strategic will of Beijing to ensure that its overseas investments are safeguarded in the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and play a bigger role in the world security system.
The construction of the first Chinese naval base in Djibouti in 2017 is still a landmark in this change. Since its establishment as a logistical base to assist in the anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, the facility has served as a foundation to the continued power projection policy by China. It functions as a fueling station as well as as a supply station to the naval ships and as a stage to monitor, give out intelligence to the region and deployment.
Intelligence tests indicate that by the year 2025 the scope of the activities of the base has grown more beyond the work of humanitarian missions and anti-piracy missions and now incorporates sophisticated radar and troop rotation workstations. The Chinese officials themselves publicly assert that the base is a contributor to peace and stability in the region of Africa but simply put the international community believes that it is a strategic move towards strategic permanence in the continent especially considering that Djibouti is strategically located along important global shipping routes as well as the U.S. military bases.
Private security companies and Beijing’s risk management strategy
Alongside the formal military missions, Chinese PSCs have become crucial participants of the Chinese foreign risk management policy. These organizations are usually manned by ex-military staff and are hired to implement security to infrastructure, guard corporate property, and also escort convoys where there is a high-risk of attack.
PSCs enable China to have a larger security presence without the interference of the state, and in politically sensitive situations generate plausible deniability. The gray line between state proxies and private contractors has however caused analyst controversy in that some analysts have been debating on whether these actors are genuine security providers, or pseudo-mercenary agents pursuing national interests under a corporate disguise.
Expanding reach across unstable regions
It is projected that by the year 2025, the Chinese PSCs are becoming more noticeable in the volatile areas of Africa especially the East African coast, Sahel and some parts of Central Africa. These regions tend to suffer because of insurgencies and terrorist activity, but are also at strategic points where the BRI infrastructure rail and pipeline system and ports link the inland zone of resources to the maritime trade routes.
Their security services cannot be done without Chinese firms working in politically unstable states. However, they act with minimal regulation and this is a matter of concern in the regard of legal responsibility and human rights practices. Some African governments have embraced the increased security potential although they have a problem keeping an eye on the foreign contractors that may result in a clash of sovereignty and a diplomatic clash.
Counter-terrorism narratives and China-Africa defense cooperation
The security activities of China in Africa are more in line with the regional counter-terrorism agendas. The diplomatic communication of Beijing focuses on the diplomatic vision of partnership as a way of stabilizing the situation, promoting the initiatives by Africans against the work of extremist movements in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. The story is close to most governments that consider China as an alternative to Western models of intervention.
This cooperation is based on joint training programs, arms transfer, and peacekeeping contributions. In Mali, South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo, Chinese peacekeepers serve under UN mandate and at the same time facilitate bilateral security discussions. These initiatives project China as a good stake holder in the region who is interested in regional peace and development.
Realpolitik beneath the rhetoric
Although the rhetoric used in counter-terrorism is cooperative, analysts worry that the rhetoric of counter-terrorism in China tends to be confusing with its economic needs. Defense of BRI corridors and energy supply chains often determine the location and distribution of security resources in China. As an example, the Chinese activities in northern Mozambique were aggravated by the attacks around the liquefied natural gas fields where Chinese investors were investing.
Such practicality of security and business portrays the two-fold role of Chinese presence in Africa: stability and protection of the investment. It is also an indicator of gradual normalisation of the role that China plays in international security, that is the combination of military, economic and diplomatic instruments into one unified foreign policy structure.
Strategic implications for Africa and global power dynamics
The increasing security presence of China has far reaching implications on the geopolitics of Africa. A combination of hard and soft power military bases, and security contractors with development financing, has re-defined conventional dependencies. The African governments now have a more multipolar environment, as they have to balance Chinese interaction with the established relations with the United States and the European Union.
Western policymakers are beginning to perceive the activities of China more as a matter of strategic rivalry. The U.S. spies on the new Dual-purpose infrastructure projects in China due to the fear that the seemingly civilian investments could have military or spy purposes. The European Union, in its turn, has to struggle with the issue of how to exercise its influence in light of the further involvement of China in the security and development systems of Africa.
African agency and adaptation
To the African states, China has become an opportunity and complexity. The non-interference, mutual benefit no-strings approach to Beijing security aid has been popular among the leaders aiming at diversified partnerships. Nevertheless, there is a danger of reduced domestic supervision because of the reliance on Chinese protection services, as well as the risk to long-term sovereignty, unless it is regulated by effective regulatory frameworks.
Regional entities such as the African Union are increasingly becoming the intermediaries between the warring external players, and are trying to balance the priorities of external assistance with security priorities in the continent. It might be the future of the security architecture in Africa whether the local institutions can assimilate the increased role of China in the wider stability efforts.
From peacekeeping partner to global security stakeholder
The way that China has been transforming its global interests by evolving into a full-scale security player in Africa is indicative of a strategic redefinition of what China has always aimed to be as a global player; a peacekeeper. The overlap between state military resources, the private security services, and counter-terrorist alliances highlights a multidimensional response to the protection of the Chinese interests in the foreign world.
This integrated model is still growing in 2025 with more BRI projects getting operational maturity in Africa. The economic development, infrastructural security and regional relationships make China be both a stabilizer and a destabilizer of the emerging security order in the continent.
Questions are being raised regarding the long term consequences of increased presence of Beijing in regard to African sovereignty, transparency and global governance. The final outcome of the involvement of China in Africa will be a resilient or dependent relationship, and this will depend on how African institutions and international actors will negotiate the terms of this broader relationship, one that is increasingly ambiguous about the line between peacekeeping and projection of power.
