The process that Libya faces in its battle with terrorism in 2025 displays maturity as well as limitations in this aspect. As much as the country registers significant military successes in the battlefields, its political system is disintegrated and this leaves major territories exposed to extremist consolidation.
With EU and UN security missions in place, the Government of National Unity (GNU) has increased its capacity against terrorism this year. The intelligence-based operations have killed operational cells in Tripoli, Sabha, and Sirte to interrupt Islamic State sources linked financing channels and disrupted.
The use of international surveillance technology and precision drone attacks by Libya is a change of departure on reactive methods of containment to preemptive types of containment. The results of these shifts are tangible as the number of attacks in urban areas has decreased due to such shifts, especially in Tripoli, where the bombs are observed to be down by almost 40 percent compared to 2024.
Political division as a persistent obstacle
Despite the tactical victories, the national security structure has been weakened by the east-west fracture line along the Libyan political landscape. The security vacuum in the major transit belts like Jufra and Kufra is perpetuated by the rivalry between GNU forces and the Libyan National Army (LNA) under Khalifa Haftar.
In January 2025, the UN Security Council reported that, in the absence of a common control, there is a risk of incidence of the extremist groups again, especially in the tribal territory where the militias have unrestrained authority. Counter-terrorism sustainability is also hampered by a lack of agreement regarding military integration into the fight against terrorism and judicial power.
The human toll of Mediterranean crossings
While Libya’s state institutions hail their successes against terrorism, the coastline tells a more tragic story. The frequency and deadliness of migrant shipwrecks have drawn renewed scrutiny from international watchdogs and human rights advocates.
Migrant fatalities rise sharply in mid-2025
In July 2025, a wooden vessel carrying over 70 migrants sank off Tobruk, claiming at least 18 lives and leaving more than 50 unaccounted for. According to the IOM, the Libyan route has already accounted for over 750 deaths this year, reinforcing its status as the world’s most dangerous migration path.
Egypt, Sudan, Nigeria and Chad are the major sources of victims. The departure is arranged to leave Sabratha and Garabulli with the help of local militias that make money out of the smuggling business. Even before they are loaded in overcrowded boats that lack the support of the basic navigation facilities, migrants are subjected to exploitation, abuse and exposure.
Coastal security and EU-Libya coordination
Italian and Maltese, joined by other European partners, have engaged in building up Libya coast guard capacity by furnishing it with patrol boats, surveillance equipment and training. Such works have allowed to intercept more than 10,000 migrants since January, doubts however exist on how to treat those sent back.
Most of the people that are intercepted are detained in detention facilities where there have been reported cases of overcrowding, maltreatment, and inhumane settings. Human Rights Watch and Medecins Sans Frontieres have criticized both the lack of legal channels through which asylum seekers can pursue their issue and the fact that the EU contributes to a practice that in effect becomes that of forced returns.
Overlapping crisis economies and the insurgency nexus
Terrorism and human trafficking are two sides of the same coin in Libya and this is not a coincidence, rather it is a structure. The smuggling routes are profitable with funds that reinforced the armed groups and strengthened the parallel economies that remained out of the reach of the state.
Criminal syndicates bridging trafficking and terrorism
Staging grounds and supply routes rely on territories controlled by militia in the south of Libya. Through logistical convenience, these groups deal in arms, people and contraband and in many ways share profits with extremist groups or in some cases, directly involve them in operations.
Security analysts confirm that profits from the $1.5 billion human smuggling industry are funneled into jihadist campaigns, arms purchases, and the political protection of warlords. In places like Sebha and Murzuq, syndicates operate with near impunity, exploiting Libya’s weak central enforcement capacity.
Institutional weaknesses and lack of reform
The judiciary remains overwhelmed and fragmented. Courts in both eastern and western Libya lack digital infrastructure, trained personnel, and enforcement arms to prosecute smuggling bosses or corrupt security personnel.
Despite multiple international workshops and reform pledges since 2021, progress on unifying police oversight or vetting security officers has been minimal. This legal vacuum fuels impunity and discourages local cooperation with anti-smuggling initiatives, further entrenching lawlessness.
Media narratives and shifting public perception
The way Libya’s dual crises are portrayed—one of security triumph and one of human suffering—has sparked significant debate inside and outside the country. Public opinion reflects deep divisions about the state’s priorities and its capacity to act justly.
Security celebrations versus humanitarian backlash
This person has spoken on the topic and summarized the situation accordingly: Radio Genoa recently noted the contrast between the Libyan government’s celebratory broadcast of captured militants and seized weapons, and the public mourning over the Tobruk shipwreck that occurred days later.
While some domestic voices applauded the crackdown on insurgents, others criticized the optics of triumph when hundreds continue to die in Libyan waters. The post underscores a broader question facing Libya: Can it win the war on terror while ignoring the humanitarian consequences of its own policies?
Policy dilemmas and future implications
The juxtaposition of progress and tragedy in Libya points to a deeper problem. Security gains without structural reform or human rights protection are fragile. International support must evolve to reflect this complexity.
Security versus humanitarian imperatives
Current Libyan policy, supported by EU frameworks, emphasizes containment over resolution. Surveillance, patrols, interception only deal with the symptoms of irregular migration and terrorism and do nothing to curb the cause. Desperation still fuels poverty, conflict and institutional failure over the borders of Libya.
Investment in rule of law, education and employment is the only way migrants will cease requesting transit, and this is the only way to cease use of human trafficking to exploit their misery. Correspondingly, lack of political unity and legal institutions of the civil society will simply mean that insurgency will always be a looming name that will surface the next time the guard drops.
Outlook for regional diplomacy and intervention
In North and Northern Europe diplomatic players have been upping the tempo to stabilize Libya with varying success. Egypt has been in constant support of eastern political movements, Tunisia and Algeria are both ambivalent. Elections and national dialogue are advocated by the African Union and the UN but internal politics paralyze.
External aid is abundant in money and effort thus cooperating with coast guard modernization, border fencing, and intelligence coordination but ultimately lasting effects will depend on whether Libya can unify the institutions on its territory as well as the grievances of the armed actors driving both migration and violence.
Libya is full of contradictions in 2025. The dismantling of terrorist networks may signal state strength, but the endless funerals from failed sea crossings point to systemic neglect. As long as trafficking syndicates profit from despair and institutions fail to protect the vulnerable, the country’s trajectory will remain uncertain. The next test for Libya is not tactical—it is moral, institutional, and enduring.
