In 2025, the Sahel spanning Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger remains deeply unstable. Violent extremism, weak governance, and post-conflict fragility fuel insecurity. The failure to enforce peace deals, address ethnic tensions, and build strong institutions has enabled jihadist networks to expand across borders, threatening both regional stability and international security.
The Global Terrorism Index 2025 indicates that in 2024, more than a half of all deaths directly linked to terrorism will be in the Sahel. The attacks previously confined to the North of Mali, now extend to the south of the gulf of Guinea and spill over into Togo, Benin and Cote d Ivoire. This geographic spread is an indication of expansion of instability with extremist groups taking advantage of post-conflict gaps and lack of state legitimacy.
Security services are either ineffective or non-existent in most of the affected regions, where the armed actors usually take their place because they impose their governmental system. This shift of the post-conflict weakness to perpetual violence is an indication of the constraints of peacekeeping and state-building in the absence of long-term local presence and inclusive governance structures.
Mali Peace Process Failures And Governance Crisis
Mali is still a classic example of what happens when a peace process is not fulfilled. The Algiers Agreement of 2015 aimed to focus on eliminating decades-old tensions between the Malian state and the Tuareg-led separatists has occasional implementation and general disappointment. The major provisions on political autonomy, integration in security and local development are not addressed.
Scheduled national elections that were delayed and the military rule that has lasted long after the military took over in 2021 have further derailed the constitutional order. In 2024, the transitional government extended the elections again due to the security concerns. In the meantime, extremist organizations seized the opening and grew their presence and influence.
Security Vacuum After Peacekeeper Withdrawal
This was a pivotal change when the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was forced to leave the country in December 2023 by the transitional government of Mali. EU training missions too left in early 2024, and were soon filled by non-state armed groups and foreign security contractors.
By the middle of 2025, both Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) were undertaking mass attacks including a lethal raid into a joint military base, which killed over 40 soldiers, on the Burkina Faso border. Having a diminished state and a discontinuous chain of command, the state apparatus Mali is still weak to regain control over large territories in the north and the central part of the country.
Tuareg Grievances And Militancy’s Ethnic Layer
Ethnic identity is central and has contributed to the instability that is currently experienced. The Tuareg groups of Mali in the north and some parts of Niger have constantly complained about political isolation, underdevelopment and cultural marginalization. Even though the Algiers Agreement had taken into consideration some of these concerns, it did not succeed in laying down political solutions and economic investment that would last.
By 2025, the Tuareg dissatisfaction is still one of the most important recruitment tools of nationalist and jihadist groups. The state is accused by its local leaders of breaking the oath of regional autonomy and inclusive governance. This resentment has been increased by the continued use of the state security forces without commensurate development programs.
Jihadist Co-Optation Of Local Conflicts
Extremist organizations have tactfully organized themselves within the intercommunal struggles, providing security, services and another kind of justice where the state is either non-existent or predatory. JNIM and ISSP take advantage of these complaints to establish themselves as legitimate parties, as they both promote jihadist interests and domestic political interests.
What comes out is a thinner and thinner boundary between ethnic insurrection and religious militancy. The displacement, targeted killings, and retributive violence of civilians in the cross fire are usually carried out. Clashes among various ethnic groups most notably Fulan vs Dogon have soared in frequency making the task of peacebuilding more challenging as well as profoundly affecting mistrust cycles.
Regional Spillover And Expanding Conflict Zones
The regional aspect of the conflict is quickly changing. Burkina Faso and Niger, which are already burdened with internal instability, have experienced increasing penetration by jihadist cells that are based in Mali. The lack of state authority in the peripheral regions and frequent coups have interfered with the national reactions.
Strategic Border Insecurity
Open borders also make it easier to transport fighters, weapons and illegal goods. At the beginning of 2025, terrorists targeted the Nigerian town of Dosso and Burkina Faso province of Est at the same time, which highlights coordinated forces. Border posts are still poorly equipped and regional cooperation systems, though exist in theory, are poor in implementation.
Repeated calls have been made by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to have coordinated security policies. Nevertheless, internal political instability in the member states has not allowed common operations. These restrictions allow the extreme sects to translocate their activities with impunity on the poorly controlled borders.
Humanitarian Fallout And Civilian Impact
The humanitarian crisis is escalating based on the security crisis. As indicated by the UN Office West Africa and Sahel (UNOWAS), over 29 million individuals will need immediate humanitarian support in 2025. The number of displaced people remains to increase especially women and children, as the flows of refugees are overwhelming the host communities and the humanitarian capacity in Chad, Mauritania, and the coastal West Africa.
Massive school shutdowns, hunger, and health facility attacks worsen societies. Failure of basic services would have long term development gaps, which would strengthen the conditions that lead to extremism.
UN And African Union Mission Challenges
The termination of MINUSMA showed the cracks in the model of international peacekeeping. Operational difficulties- starting with insufficient mandates and inter-mission competition had already reduced the influence of MINUSMA. After the withdrawal, there were few other mechanisms that were effective to replace the gap.
Even the counterterrorism efforts of the African Union, such as the G5 Sahel Joint Force have their restrictions. Mission capabilities have been deterred by financial deficits, political dissection, and logistical ties. The governments have grown to depend on the services of the military contractors and this has been a source of concern with regard to accountability and sustainability.
Shifting International Alliances
In 2025, the geopolitical aspects of the crisis become even stronger. Russia, which wants to establish an influence in the region following the collapse of the Wagner Group, has come forward with new military and diplomatic initiatives. At the same time, China has also made higher investment in its economy and security especially in the uranium sector of Niger. Such changes make western intervention a difficult task, with traditional sources of support being challenged by potential rivals of global interests.
Perspectives On Humanitarian And Security Implications
The changing crisis has grim repercussions on human rights, development and stability in the region. The civil society groups complain of rampant violations by the state and non-state actors. The use of arbitrary arrests, extra judicial killings, and attacks on civilians seems to be more and more a reality with no one to hold them accountable, or the impunity prevented by political interference.
Experts and actors argue that there is a necessity of combined measures. The sustainable responses should deal with governance reforms, decentralization, social services services and climate adaptation and security measures. The environment of Sahel, which is characterized by a shortage of resources and desertification, contributes to displacement and competition, another pressure on vulnerable systems.
Without credible state-building efforts that empower local actors and foster inclusive political participation, current trends are likely to worsen. Development partners continue to stress the importance of balancing counterterrorism with human rights protections, local legitimacy, and long-term capacity building.
The Future Of Stability In The Sahel
The Sahel remains a case study in how unresolved political grievances, fragile governance, and external power shifts intersect to sustain chronic insecurity. Peace agreements that exclude key stakeholders, security models overly reliant on foreign forces, and development programs lacking local ownership have proven insufficient to halt the spread of violence.
By 2025, the need for renewed, regionally led solutions backed by realistic international support has never been more urgent. The future of the Sahel will depend not only on countering extremism but on addressing the structural inequalities and institutional weaknesses that allow it to thrive. As conflict zones expand and geopolitical interests converge, the stakes for global security and humanitarian resilience will grow accordingly.
