On December 25, 2025, US Africa Command said in a statement that, at the direction of the President of the United States and in coordination with Nigerian authorities, US forces conducted precision strikes against ISIS camps in Nigeria’s Sokoto State. Initial assessments revealed multiple killed ISIS operatives.
These strikes demonstrate a major tenet in effective counterterrorism efforts: success is contingent on, not opposed to, cooperation between efforts exercised in partnership with sovereign states as opposed to direct or independent interventions. In this manner, Nigeria maintained control over the mission, which benefited from the strengths brought by the United States.
At the direction of the President of the United States and the Secretary of War, and in coordination with Nigerian authorities, U.S. Africa Command conducted strikes against ISIS terrorists in Nigeria on Dec. 25, 2025, in Sokoto State.
— U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) (@USAfricaCommand) December 26, 2025
Why is Africa becoming the new frontline for ISIS?
As ISIS has been gradually removed from its former centers of power in the Middle East, it has seen a movement of its center of gravity to Africa. This has been facilitated by a European pull-out of forces from a portion of West Africa, including a withdrawal of the French military and a British Army pull-out of forces from Mali because of a collapse of a Wagner Group security structure.
In such an environment, terrorist organizations have taken advantage of poor governance, porous borders, and drug economies. Within such an environment, the growing US-Nigerian counter terrorism cooperation arrangement must be viewed not just as an agreement between the two countries but as a force towards regional stability within West Africa.
Why is Nigeria central to regional security?
Nigeria is at the center of the security systems framework for the whole of West Africa. When a stable Nigeria exists, countries within the region have lower levels of transnational violence, fewer displacements, and fewer chances for jihadist movements. When instability occurs within Nigeria, however, transnational trafficking, arms, and militants follow.
This makes Nigeria a pivotal partner in countering ISIS expansion in the Sahel and coastal West Africa. Supporting Nigeria’s security capacity is therefore inseparable from safeguarding regional stability.
What role does the United States play in Africa’s security landscape?
Under the leadership of President Donald Trump, the United States has emerged as an important actor in the provision of security on the African continent, ranging from the efforts to stop conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to security operations in the Horn of Africa.
In the case of Nigeria, the role of the US involves enablement rather than occupation or substitution. The US has the capacity to save time and lives through intelligence, surveillance capabilities, and precision strike options while the Nigerians are in charge of their land.
How does the Responsibility to Protect apply in this case?
A Responsibility to Protect (R2P) strategy is based on one simple yet powerful idea: that states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from mass violence, and that responsible partners internationally will have a role to play when invited to intervene provided it is done in a lawful, proportional, and precise manner.
A case in point is the role of Nigeria in the fight against terrorism in its own country. The support being offered by the US, in the areas of intelligence sharing as well as the use of limited kinetic capabilities, fits into the paradigm of supporting the state’s capacity rather than threatening sovereignty.
Why are terrorism and organised crime now inseparable?
In West Africa and Sahel, Jihadist groups have become well-established in many criminal economies, and drug trafficking in particular. ISIS-affiliated groups may not necessarily need to be involved in drug trade themselves. Rather, they act as a form of extortionist tax authority, earning money as a toll and protection fee for their domination of territory through which the drug trade already goes.
This model allows extremist groups to generate steady income without the logistical burden of managing entire trafficking networks.
What do international watchdogs warn about terror financing?
The Financial Action Task Force has indicated that terrorist groups use their operations to raise finances through criminal activities, including drug smuggling. The control of routes, border posts, and informal markets can offer steady sources of funding.
Likewise, the UN Office on Drugs & Crime has pointed to the Sahel as one of the foremost expanding-trafficking routes worldwide, seeing increases in seized shipments of cocaine & cannabis resin. Where there is drug-trafficking activity, there is likely to be corruption & a breakdown in state legitimacy.
How should counter-terrorism strategies adapt to this reality?
The implication for both Washington and Abuja is clear: counter-terrorism should work to remove not just fighters, but the financial systems that sustain extremist violence. Taking out operatives without collapsing revenue streams allows networks to regenerate.
The aim should be to make it more difficult for terrorist groups to pay fighters, move supplies, procure weapons, and recover from losses.
Can intelligence be turned into real disruption on the ground?
Firstly, it is necessary to improve the intelligence-disruption pipeline for illicit logistics. If extremist groups are making money through the taxation of transit, then the mission must include routes, storage depots, transportation middlemen, and fund couriers.
Blending the Nigerian ground intelligence capabilities together with the analysis power of the US can help in the location of high-value nodes and support Nigerian-led operations aimed at seizing Commodities, disrupting Staging Areas, and clearing violent Gatekeepers off Strategic Corridors.
Why is counter-terror finance as important as battlefield success?
Financial warfare should be addressed at an equal level of urgency with combat operations. Terrorists are able to capitalize on cash economies and IVTSs due to the nature of financial structures.
Increased collaboration between the US government and the government of Nigeria on financial intelligence, investigation, or targeted actions against facilitators of the financing of terrorism would weaken terrorist operations. When the facilitators or financiers see consequences for their actions, violence becomes difficult to perpetrate.
How can civilian protection strengthen legitimacy?
Nigeria’s security problem is not dependent on religious and ethnic considerations. Terrorism is most served by tales of a future inevitability of sectarian strife. A successful anti-terrorism coalition must therefore focus foremost on civilian security and aim instead at those who employ force and coercion.
Precision matters far more than tactics. It has become a necessary ingredient for legitimacy. Transparency on assessments of harm to civilians and shared after-action reviews can ensure that even lawful operations are not touted as extremist propaganda.
What model does the US–Nigeria alliance offer for the future?
The partnership now has a real chance to show what a more modern counter-terrorism model can look like: one that respects sovereignty, minimizes harm through precision, and targets the criminal economies that allow extremist groups to survive.
But if the alliance evolves from striking camps to dismantling cash-flows, it can enhance West Africa’s resilience against future waves of violent extremism. That, if anything, is what a Responsibility to Protect approach should look like in practice: protect lives today, while dismantling the systems that threaten lives tomorrow.
