A dramatic escalation in foreign intervention in the long-standing struggle against jihadist attacks in the country was represented by the Christmas Day strikes launched by the U.S. military in northwest Nigeria. Though the conflict in sustainability in West Africa’s security has long had the conflict in Nigeria at its heart, the fact that the strikes occurred in Sokoto, rather than in the more established zones in the northeast, indicated a shift in external perceptions of the threat dynamics at play in the country.
From a point where many researchers observing the jihadist groups found the strike locations surprising, there now appears to be basis to suggest that the operation was anything but random. The operation seems to have taken into account the measurable shift in the jihadist group’s activities, especially the fast-rising increase in the establishment of fundamentalist affiliates that are remodelling Nigeria into a more widespread platform for counter-terrorism efforts globally.
How has Nigeria’s jihadist threat evolved since 2018?
Data available in the GRID on incidents throughout the period from 2018 to 2025 indicates a steep increase in jihadist activities in the country. The most interesting aspect about this increase is the heightened pace settled by ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA), the most recognized ISIS affiliate in the country.
In 2018, ISIS-WA was attributed to only 18 documented attacks. However, within the first half of 2025, the group carried out 93 attacks, an increase of close to 416 percent. This is because ISIS-WA has managed to entrench their territorial control, especially within Borno and, to some extent, Yobe State, and thus managed to maintain their attack levels, despite the years of military pressure.
Why does Boko Haram remain a central destabilizing force?
Boko Haram, despite the shift in its prominence over the years, still represents a serious threat to the stability of Nigeria. In the seven-year data series, Boko Haram represents the group that records the most incidents of jihadist terrorism, with a total of 757 incidents. It is evident that these two groups have instilled a measure of endemic violence in northeastern Nigeria that has drained its local security forces.
“The survival of both of these militant groups highlights the challenge: while the structure of leadership has been eroded in the case of the struggle against insurgency, the ideology/logistics/socioeconomic foundations of jihadist violence have not been destroyed.
Who is Lakurawa, and why has it alarmed security analysts?
The most worrying of these is the emergence of Lakurawa, suspected to be an affiliate of ISIS-Sahel. The terrorist group was not visible on GRID until 2024, with only five incidents reported after it infiltrated Nigeria’s porous northern border with Niger. However, by 2025, incidents linked to Lakurawa were at 32, rising by an impressive 540 percent annually.
This sudden escalation indicates an highly successful mobilization effort and the danger posed to the regions of Nigeria that are located in the Sahel area. The quick changeover from a presence that was insignificant to a level that can be termed a high-frequency attacker could be the reason why Lakurawa became the main targets of the U.S. Christmas Day strikes.
Is the center of jihadist violence shifting away from Borno?
Over a decade, Borno State has been the hotspot of jihadist attacks in Nigeria, constituting 1,076 incidents inGRID mapping records. Yet, the rise of ISIS affiliates in northwest Nigeria has introduced a conflict pathway.
At 28, jihadist incidents in Sokoto, where U.S. strikes have taken place, are lower than in both the northeast regions, where Boko Haram is based, and in adjacent Katsina, where there have been 25 incidents, as well as 21 in neighboring Zamfara.
Instead of an orchestrated national attack, this can be attributed to poorly managed border security, lack of state presence in rural areas, and the rising influence of Sahel-based jihadist groups. It is, in effect, a two-pronged push on the Nigerian state, both from the northeast and the northwest.
Why was Sokoto chosen instead of traditional insurgent hotspots?
However, the fact that the target was Sokoto, and not an existing hotspot such as Borno, raises the question of the objective here. According to the data provided by the GRID system, since 2018, jihadist-related incidents have been responsible for the vast majority of terrorism-related violence in the states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. In the northwest, the main driver of violence has always been banditry, kidnapping, and communal conflict.
Targeting Sokoto, therefore, may well have symbolic as well as strategic importance. This becomes clear by taking note of the contextualization by US President Donald Trump that their operation was retribution for the murder of Christians. This indicates that the Nigerian President, Bola Tinubu, has deliberately chosen to avoid sensationalizing any kind of sectarian imperative to avoid the internationalization of their security concerns.
Is the U.S. signaling more than counterterrorism intent?
Aside from the overriding need to counter terrorism, the U.S. attack may also represent a reflection of other strategic considerations. Across Nigeria’s northern borders, in Niger, Mali, as well as Burkina Faso, there has been an increasing presence of Russia’s “Afrikanskiy korpus,” a kind of successor to the “Wagner Group.” Its forces possess advanced aerial warfare competence, which sometimes eclipses the military capacity of local forces in their struggle against jihadist opposition, including in the case of Groupement jihadist Islamique Macanaou.
For Washington, Nigeria might be an integral partner, whose stability is not only paramount in halting Sahelian jihadism but also, by extension, in circumscribing Russian influence into West Africa. It would serve two TAMs—one of deterrence of terrorist spread into Sokoto, while also reinstating American credibility as an appropriate security partner within an increasingly intensely contested space.
