In recent weeks, there has been considerable concern in the U.S. military and intelligence communities over the President Trump government’s dramatic halt of almost all US aid programmes around the world. This halt has also impacted US counter-terrorism agendas, which support African governments in detecting, investigating, and confronting extremist threats. Much of this aid is concentrated on handling threats posed by bodies such as al-Shabaab that have international ambitions.

Trump and those around him have an idealistic anathema to most foreign assistance programmes and notice their halt as a comfortable victory to extend the chronology of the government working decisively to cut government spending. Yet, while some worries regarding the influence on counter-terrorism are fair, the White House is highly likely to habilitate funding to agendas which service US interests, following reexaminations.

Consider, for instance, Trump’s post on social media earlier this month of a video portraying an American air strike hitting al-Shabaab terrorists in northern Somalia. Trump honoured that raid as transmitting “the message to ISIS and all others who would attack Americans: ‘WE WILL FIND YOU, AND WE WILL KILL YOU’”. The president believes aggressive action against terrorists is a standard of presidential leadership and does not want his stature to be harmed in the way Joe Biden was after the August 2021 US departure from Afghanistan.

Trump’s appetite for a more aggressive posture towards non-state dangers is further highlighted by his path towards the Mexican drug monopolies. American Air Force intelligence collection planes are now increasingly engaged near the boundary. He has also firmly indicated at a CIA secret action movement to launch raids on the cartels without Mexican government permission.

The Trump government acknowledges the threat that parties such as ISIS, al-Qaeda, and al-Shabaab present to the US. Furthermore, administrators also recognise that being noticed as soft on counter-terrorism issues, particularly if a subsequent raid on US interests arises, is politically tainted. Moderately short investments in backing international counter-terrorism strategies therefore convey fair value in security, financial, and domestic political periods. 

Many administrators within the government who are answerable for counter-terrorism — such as Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, CIA Director John Ratcliffe and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, — will also acknowledge the second-and third-order importance of counter-terrorism funding in places such as Somalia, Kenya, and the Philippines. 

These investments authorise host government security and intelligence agents in ways that then promote gratitude towards the US, not to say a willingness to launch risky procedures at their own expenditure. As a result, US victory is more secured when Trump lobbies countries on other matters, such as asking they abandon a proposed deal with China.

The president understands that skimping on international counter-terrorism funding will preserve little money while creating outsize security and strategic expenses.