Iraq’s future stability may depend less on who governs than on whether power is allowed to change hands. As Baghdad navigates the formation of a new government after elections, the debate is increasingly framed around personalities. Yet Iraq’s history suggests that the real risk lies not in who becomes prime minister, but in how long any one leader stays in office.
Can Iraq form a new government without concentrating power?
On December 29, Iraq’s newly elected parliament convened for the first time since the Federal Supreme Court ratified the November 11 election results. The session launched negotiations to form a new government in a fragmented legislature where no bloc holds a majority.
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Sudani emerged with the largest share of seats—46 out of 329—but Iraq’s system does not reward plurality alone. The next prime minister will be chosen through bargaining among the dominant Shiite factions, making Sudani’s bid for a second term uncertain. These negotiations will determine not only the next cabinet, but the balance of power shaping Iraq’s political and security trajectory.
Is Sudani really different from Iraq’s past strongmen?
In Washington and other capitals, Sudani is often contrasted with Nouri al-Maliki, the only post-2003 Iraqi leader to serve two terms. Sudani is viewed as technocratic, pragmatic, and less polarizing—an appealing figure in a country weary of upheaval.
This comparison, however, risks obscuring deeper structural realities. Iraq’s problem has rarely been individual temperament alone. Weak institutional checks, politicized state resources, and a system that rewards control over compromise mean that even competent leaders can undermine governance if they remain in power too long.
Does stability come from leadership continuity or political competition?
The core issue is not whether Sudani resembles al-Maliki, but whether Iraq’s system still allows meaningful competition. For stability to last, political losers must believe they can return to power through elections and negotiation, rather than through militias, street pressure, or foreign backing.
In Iraq, political contestability is not merely democratic—it is a security requirement. When competition narrows, violence and fragmentation tend to follow.
Why do second terms change the rules of governance in Iraq?
Since 2003, Iraqi politics have been competitive but largely unconstrained. Ministries and agencies function not only as policy instruments but as tools for coalition management, distributing jobs, contracts, and security posts to preserve alliances.
First-term prime ministers usually operate under tight limits imposed by quota-sharing deals. Cabinets are often incomplete at formation, ministries are divided among rival blocs, and premiers prioritize de-escalation over consolidation. This was evident during the tenures of Adel Abdul Mahdi and Mustafa al-Kadhimi, both of whom governed with fractured authority.
Second terms, however, alter incentives. Leaders who expect to remain in power gain motivation to entrench loyalists, neutralize rivals, and reshape oversight institutions to protect their position.
How does administrative capture quietly take hold?
State capture in Iraq rarely arrives through dramatic declarations. Instead, it unfolds incrementally through legal and bureaucratic means.
The process typically begins with appointments in the security services, intelligence agencies, and financial ministries—institutions that control force, information, and spending. It expands through opaque procurement practices, emergency contracting, and selective audits. Over time, oversight bodies and courts may enforce rules unevenly, scrutinizing opponents while shielding allies. This gradual erosion is often justified as efficiency or stability, masking its long-term damage.
What happens when loyalty replaces competence?
Administrative capture weakens the state’s crisis response capacity. Intelligence becomes politicized, leadership positions reward allegiance over expertise, and procurement favors networks rather than readiness.
The result is a hollowed-out system that appears strong at the top but fails under pressure. Iraq has experienced this before. In 2014, security forces collapsed in the face of the Islamic State despite appearing formidable on paper. Investigations later pointed to corruption, patronage, and politicized command structures. Stability built on such foundations is illusory.
Is Iraq repeating the mistakes of al-Maliki’s second term?
Al-Maliki’s second term marked a turning point, not because of personality alone, but because institutions failed to restrain power once it became personalized. The consequences were catastrophic for national unity.
Supporters of Sudani highlight his managerial discipline and service-delivery focus, and even critics acknowledge his ability to navigate competing pressures. Yet Iraq’s system exerts powerful structural incentives that no leader can escape indefinitely.
Sudani’s backing comes from the Shiite Coordination Framework—a coalition driven more by bargaining than cohesion, including factions aligned with Iran. Should he secure a second term, pressures to use state power for political protection and coalition maintenance would almost certainly intensify.
Could coalition politics accelerate state capture?
Even if Sudani remains constrained by coalition partners, those same partners may demand appointments, contracts, and selective enforcement to strengthen their networks. The skills that make Sudani an effective coalition manager—compromise, avoidance of confrontation, transactional politics—could inadvertently deepen institutional capture.
In this sense, a second term may not centralize power solely in Sudani’s hands, but disperse it across entrenched political networks embedded within the state.
What role should the United States play?
Washington’s influence in Iraq is limited, and overt intervention often backfires by fueling nationalism or empowering spoilers. A strategy centered on personalities risks repeating past mistakes.
Instead, US policy should prioritize institutional resilience: strengthening oversight bodies, protecting judicial independence, supporting electoral competition, and discouraging the personalization of power—without endorsing or opposing specific candidates.
Is stability without accountability sustainable?
Iraq’s history shows that calm can coexist with institutional decay. The costs of that decay only become visible during the next crisis. The central question is not whether Sudani resembles al-Maliki, but whether a second term would narrow political competition and weaken already fragile institutions. Stability built without accountability is merely borrowed time—and Iraq has paid that debt before.
