A call for a European army consisting of 100,000 soldiers and a complete revamp of political processes involved in defense policy has reignited debate about the future of its military within the European Union. Delivering his speech on security in Sweden, European Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius argued that Europe’s dispersed defense system is no longer capable of defending itself from Russian aggression, increased tensions within the Arctic region, and decreased U.S. security commitments in Europe.
“Would the United States be militarily stronger if they had 50 armies at the state level instead of a single federal army?”
Kubilius asked rhetorically.
“If our answer is ‘no,’ then — what are we waiting for?”
His comments underscore a growing frustration among EU policymakers about the bloc’s reliance on national defense budgets rather than a unified strategic approach.
Why a “big bang” defense approach is proposed
Kubilius insists that incremental funding increases for current EU defense initiatives, such as the European Defense Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), are insufficient. He identifies three pillars of European defense readiness:
- Increased production capacity – ensuring Europe can rapidly manufacture advanced weapons, vehicles, and munitions.
- Prepared and organized institutions – capable of rapid deployment and interoperable command structures.
- Political will to deter or fight – the capacity to make swift, collective decisions in crisis.
The lack of political cohesion among the EU’s 27 member states, he argues, has created what Josep Borrell, former EU High Representative, called “bonsai armies”: small, underfunded national forces unable to project power collectively.
Will EU countries agree to spend big on this?
Financial viability is the biggest challenge. The present level of military outlays by the EU is disparate. In 2025, only three out of its members, namely Poland, Greece, and Estonia, satisfied the 2% GDP requirement set by NATO. Other countries such as Belgium, Spain, and Italy already allocate lower than 1.3% of their GDP for this purpose. Establishing an EU army of 100,000 personnel will entail huge costs.
Kubilius said that instead of pursuing redundant national programs, the available budgets of each country must be oriented to one European force. However, public opinion in many EU member states is still skeptical about deeper military integration. According to a Eurobarometer survey last 2024, only 42% of EU citizens support an all-out integrated EU military, while 48% want to depend on NATO and national forces. Of course, resistance remains firm in neutral or pacifist countries like Ireland, Austria, and Finland, where conscription and military spending are very limited.
How would a European Security Council work?
To address the persistent lack of political will, Kubilius proposes establishing a European Security Council (ESC). Modeled in part on the UN Security Council, the ESC would consist of:
- 10–12 key members, including permanent seats for major EU powers (France, Germany) and rotational members, including the member state holding the EU Council presidency.
- Inclusion of the European Commission and Council presidents, ensuring institutional oversight.
- A proposed seat for the United Kingdom, despite Brexit, acknowledging its strategic influence in European security.
The council is to deliberate and decide swiftly on defense crises, excluding unanimous vote conditions that delay the EU’s action on various issues. Kubilius believes that without such a body, Europe remains reactive, not proactive, with very heavy reliance on NATO and the United States.
Previous proposals and obstacles
The concept of a permanent European military force has long been on the table. Kubilius notes that Jean-Claude Juncker, Emmanuel Macron, and Angela Merkel floated a similar proposal a decade ago. Nonetheless, differences in political sentiment, financial limitations, and sovereignty concerns have continued to impede progress.
- France has traditionally advocated for EU military autonomy, partly as a hedge against US unpredictability.
- Germany has been more cautious, balancing its pacifist post-WWII culture with NATO obligations.
- Smaller states worry that their voices would be drowned in a 100,000-strong army dominated by France and Germany.
Initiatives like PESCO and the European Intervention Initiative have shown some level of progress but are limited in terms of scope and are generally used for joint training, research, andapid deployment activities as opposed to having an integrated operational unit.
Russia, the US, and external pressures
Kubilius describes the imperative of Russian aggression in Ukraine, the Baltic States’ borders with NATO, and US shifts in priorities. He pointed to US interests in Greenland and other regions of military significance, beyond Europe, indicating Europe must no longer depend on US security protection.
Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has revealed a Russian militaey expenditure rise of at least 15% since 2021. This has largely focused on advanced missiles, hypersonics, and quick reaction forces on the borders close to the EU. The capabilities within Eastern Europe have stretched NATO defenses, and a policy of European independence has gained momentum.
Could a European army operate effectively?
Even if funding and political agreement were achieved, challenges remain:
- Language barriers and interoperability – EU forces would need standardized training and command structures across militaries with different languages, doctrines, and technologies.
- Legal and constitutional limitations – many member states have restrictions on deploying troops outside their borders.
- Defense industry competition – France, Germany, and Italy all have national arms industries; pooling procurement could provoke domestic political backlash.
Kubilius’ proposal, however, emphasizes strategic benefits: a united European military could deter external aggression, reduce dependence on the US, and enhance crisis response in Africa, the Middle East, or the Arctic.
Will EU countries agree to unite on this?
The greatest challenge to political integration will be the cohesion among the European political leaders. Although the eastern European countries such as Poland and the Baltic States will support and advocate for a strong form of military integration against the Russian threat, others may oppose the move either due to the potential for escalations or for the result of overextension of the
Some analysts have found a middle ground to include tiered participation, in which willing member states form part of the standing force, while the remaining member states can be autonomous but can contribute to broader defense plans. Another is to have an expansion of PESCO projects to form a quasi-standing force rather than working with a direct deployment of 100,000-strong forces.
Budget realities: who will pay?
The allocation of finances for a permanent EU force will require a significant resource shift, which may be achieved through national defense spending or EU contributions or a combination of both sources. In a 2024 RAND study, a new force of 100,000 troops with full capabilities could require initial outlays of between €50-70 billion, along with ongoing spending of between €15-20 billion a year.
A country with a smaller military expenditure budget can refuse to contribute, citing that the EU contributions must be voluntary and based on gross domestic product. Finally, any transparency can result in it being politically difficult for governments to commit massive sums when there are shortfalls in areas like medical, educational, and other infrastructure sectors.
Kubilius’ “big bang” vision reflects growing frustration with fragmented European defense amid Russian aggression and perceived US disengagement. While ambitious, it faces significant political, financial, and operational hurdles.
The debate raises critical questions:
- Can EU member states overcome sovereignty concerns to create a truly unified military?
- Will citizens and parliaments support the massive financial commitment required?
- Can a European Security Council reconcile the need for rapid decision-making with democratic legitimacy?
As European security politics are in a state of flux, it might trigger debate about a permanent EU army, but if it happens, it still has yet to be seen. Reforms through small steps, increased joint exercises, or more interoperability might represent a starting point—but it might still be “the age of bonsai armies” until a more profound impetus.
