The Trump administration’s dramatic removal of Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro delivered an early geopolitical shock as the world entered 2026. Many US analysts quickly framed the move as a strategic victory over China, arguing that Washington had undercut Beijing’s long-standing efforts to secure Venezuelan oil.
But the reality is far more complicated. While China had backed both Maduro and his predecessor Hugo Chávez to gain preferential access to energy resources, that relationship had become increasingly burdensome. Rather than suffering a decisive loss, Beijing may have found a convenient exit — with Washington now inheriting Venezuela’s deepest problems.
Why was China sticking with a failing partner?
China’s relationship with Venezuela had stopped delivering the returns Beijing originally envisioned. The expected levels of exported oil were not achieved, and the Venezuelan economy kept deteriorating. However, China stuck to the agreement since there was no easy means to walk away without facing direct economic and reputation losses.
Pinned to Maduro, China found itself committed to a government that was unpopular and rapidly becoming illegitimate, while to abandon him might mean forgoing his country’s oil and repayment of a loan. Staying the course was the least bad option — until Washington changed the equation.
Has the US given China a strategic escape route?
By toppling Maduro, the Trump administration effectively relieved Beijing of responsibility for Venezuela’s political and economic collapse. China can now argue that whatever follows is a US-owned problem.
At the same time, Beijing can position itself as a more cautious and responsible actor in Latin America, all while potentially maintaining access to Venezuelan oil. From China’s perspective, that combination is surprisingly advantageous.
Why won’t Venezuela’s oil boom materialize quickly?
A major misconception is the implication that Venezuela’s vast petroleum reserves necessarily equate to energy supremacy. However, petroleum extraction is much more challenging than one would expect. The oil reserves in Venezuela are heavy oil, which is costly to extract. Though China has refineries that are qualified to process this oil, its production levels have consistently underperformed expectations.
How badly has Venezuela’s oil sector declined?
When China began signing oil-backed loan agreements with Venezuela in the mid-2000s, the country produced roughly two million barrels of crude per day. Given Venezuela’s enormous reserves, Beijing anticipated rapid growth.
Instead, mismanagement — particularly by the military-run state oil company PDVSA — and falling global oil prices sent production into free fall. By late 2025, Venezuela’s strongest output hovered around 900,000 barrels per day.
On its best day, Venezuela produced less than a quarter of China’s daily crude output — and less than one-fifth of Texas’s production. Venezuelan oil accounts for just 4–8 percent of China’s oil imports, and oil itself represents only about 18 percent of China’s overall energy consumption.
Was Venezuelan oil ever critical to China’s energy security?
Not really. While sanctioned Venezuelan oil was cheap — and China had little incentive to walk away from oil it had already paid for via loans — the relationship was never an energy game-changer. It was a marginal benefit, not a strategic dependency.
Can US oil companies fix what China could not?
President Donald Trump has suggested that major US oil firms can quickly rehabilitate Venezuela’s broken energy infrastructure. On January 3, he declared that American companies would invest billions, repair facilities, and restore production.
That optimism overlooks reality. Reviving Venezuela’s oil sector to pre-Chávez levels would likely take one to two decades, even under ideal conditions. China already attempted this approach, pouring billions of dollars into the sector and deploying its own experienced oil firms — without success.
How much has China already invested — and lost?
The true scale of China’s investment in Venezuela remains murky due to opaque financial arrangements. The best estimates suggest roughly $60 billion in government-to-government loans and about $100 billion when all Chinese investments are counted.
Crucially, Venezuela has largely repaid those loans through oil shipments, albeit at depressed volumes and rock-bottom prices. Today, Caracas likely owes Beijing only $10–15 billion in remaining oil deliveries.
From that perspective, China may be walking away having already recovered most of its investment — and shedding a declining asset at an opportune moment.
Is China avoiding a long-term political quagmire?
Venezuela’s future remains deeply uncertain. Its economy is heavily oil-dependent, and its political legitimacy is fractured following disputed elections. Until Maduro’s ouster, China bore the diplomatic cost of backing a leader widely seen as having lost his mandate. That association undermined Beijing’s claim to be Latin America’s preferred economic partner. Now, the United States owns the problem — and China can step back.
How is Beijing using the narrative to its advantage?
China has seized the moment to reinforce its long-standing portrayal of the United States as a disruptive and hypocritical force in global affairs.
President Xi Jinping condemned what he called “unilateral and bullying acts,” while state media labeled Washington a violator of international law. Xinhua even published a cartoon depicting Lady Liberty trampling “national sovereignty” amid burning oil barrels. For Beijing, the propaganda value alone may outweigh the remaining oil it risks losing.
Why isn’t China pushing back more forcefully?
Beijing has largely avoided spending political capital to confront Washington over Venezuela. Instead, it is maintaining diplomatic ties, voicing limited objections, and watching how events unfold. Some Chinese observers believe the US is walking into a costly quagmire — one that will drain resources and attention for decades.
Does Beijing see Venezuela as America’s next Afghanistan?
Prominent Chinese commentator Hu Xijin has argued that Venezuela could prove even more expensive than Afghanistan for the United States. In his view, arresting Maduro amounts to Washington promising to deliver lasting democratic prosperity — a commitment that history suggests will be enormously costly.
China, having already spent around $100 billion attempting to stabilize Venezuela, understands that burden all too well.
What is the worst-case — and best-case — scenario for China?
The worst-case outcome for Beijing is losing the remaining oil shipments. But even that scenario looks manageable if China has already recouped most of its investment.
The best-case scenario is even better: Trump has indicated he intends to keep Venezuelan oil flowing to current buyers, including China. If US firms rebuild Venezuela’s oil sector and China continues to receive shipments, Beijing could finish recovering its remaining balance without bearing reconstruction costs.
Who is really carrying the burden now?
In that scenario, China offloads a declining asset while preserving upside potential. Washington, meanwhile, assumes responsibility for stabilizing a fractured state, rebuilding a broken oil industry, and managing regional fallout. The strategic irony is stark: the United States may end up carrying the same albatross China just set down — at a far higher cost.
