In December, as the conflict between Sudan’s army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) intensified, the British government publicly urged accountability, expressing alarm at the scale of civilian deaths and destruction. Yet internal reports and leaked documents reveal that the UK rejected more ambitious plans designed to prevent atrocities — even as violence surged in Darfur and beyond.
This discrepancy has raised questions about whether Britain’s public words match its private actions.
A Diplomatic Image Under Scrutiny
The UK’s growing credibility gap has become a concern in the region.
“When people believe your words and actions diverge, they stop treating you as a broker and start treating you as an interest manager,”
said Sudanese analyst Amgad Fareid Eltayeb. This judgment now colors how London’s actions in the wider Horn of Africa are viewed.
Sudan: Accused of Enabling the RSF
Analysts argue that the UK’s policy in Sudan reflects a cautious approach — one that prioritizes limited engagement over strong intervention. Reports indicate that Britain chose what internal documents called the “least ambitious” strategy to end the war, even as RSF violence escalated, particularly in Darfur and el-Fasher.
Eltayeb says the UK’s diplomatic posture has helped shape the international framing of the war, and he points to alleged UAE support for RSF as part of a broader strategy to “whitewash RSF atrocities.” Although these claims are denied by Abu Dhabi, they have intensified scrutiny of the UK’s role.
The UK Foreign Office responded to Al Jazeera by insisting the crisis is the worst in decades and that it is working with partners to end the violence, support ceasefire agreements, and push for a transition to civilian rule.
Somalia vs Somaliland: A Policy Contradiction
Moving east, the UK publicly supports Somalia’s territorial integrity — while simultaneously holding a commercial stake in Somaliland’s strategic port of Berbera, despite not recognizing Somaliland’s government.
The UK co-owns Berbera port through its development finance arm, British International Investment (BII), in partnership with UAE-based DP World and Somaliland’s authorities. This has created an image of Britain doing business with a region it officially considers part of Somalia.
Berbera Port: Strategic Asset or Political Tool?
Berbera sits near one of the world’s most important maritime corridors linking the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. A UK Foreign Office impact assessment described the port as a “strategic gateway” and potential alternative trade route for Ethiopia.
Historian Matthew Benson-Strohmayer of LSE noted that Berbera has long been treated as strategic infrastructure rather than a political community. It has served as a British coaling station, a Soviet naval base during the Cold War, and now a commercial hub shaped by Gulf and Western interests.
Sudan’s War and the Somaliland Connection
The war in Sudan has spilled across borders, and observers have suggested that Berbera may be part of an alleged UAE logistics network used to supply RSF — claims that have been repeatedly denied by the UAE. Critics argue that Britain’s commercial involvement in Berbera creates a contradiction: London publicly calls for accountability in Sudan while remaining financially tied to a port linked to a party accused of supporting the RSF.
Analyst Abdalftah Hamed Ali described this as a
“gap between principle and practice,”
saying that even if the UK disputes these links, the perception problem remains.
Diplomatic Recognition and Political Risks
The diplomatic spotlight on Somaliland has intensified after Israel became the first country to recognize Somaliland’s independence — a move condemned by Mogadishu and rejected by most of the international community.
This highlights how economic engagement is increasingly political. Ali argues that ports like Berbera are not neutral assets; they are part of a security and influence network. Investment in ports and trade routes can be interpreted as strengthening one authority over another, even if that was not the intention.
A Dual-Track Policy
Ali describes Britain’s approach as “dual-track”: officially supporting Somalia’s sovereignty while working with Somaliland’s de facto government because it is stable and functional.
Benson-Strohmayer explained that Somaliland’s economic independence has historically relied on revenues from Berbera port, creating a “revenue complex” where fiscal control shapes political legitimacy. Large external investments risk changing this balance and weakening local accountability.
The Cost of Ambiguity
Benson-Strohmayer argues that Britain’s ambiguous policy enables it to gain strategic access without taking a clear political stance. But over time, this risks undermining stability in both Somalia and Somaliland.
Critics say that the UK’s decisions in Sudan and Somaliland reflect a broader approach: preserve access and influence while avoiding the diplomatic costs of taking strong positions. Ali warns that in a region like the Horn of Africa — where alliances overlap with conflict economies and regional rivalries — mixed signals can quickly become a liability.
