Just one year into Donald Trump’s second term, US counter-terrorism policy has undergone a sweeping transformation. The administration has dramatically expanded the definition of who qualifies as a terrorist, rapidly growing the official list of designated groups and reshaping how Washington justifies the use of force abroad.
The changes mark a sharp departure from decades of US practice and are unfolding largely without the backing of America’s traditional allies.
How Fast Has the Terrorist List Grown?
Since early 2025, the Trump administration has added 26 new groups to the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list—an unprecedented expansion. In most years since the list was created in 1997, the US added only one or two organisations annually. The past 12 months alone represent the largest single-year increase on record.
At its peak during the fight against the Islamic State in the mid-2010s, the FTO list contained around 60 groups. Today, that number exceeds 90, raising concerns that US authorities may struggle to prioritise the most dangerous threats.
What Does an FTO Designation Actually Do?
Being labelled an FTO carries severe legal and financial consequences. It is a felony for anyone to provide “material support” to a designated group, meaning US citizens can face prison time for transferring funds to a member of an FTO.
Banks are required to freeze assets linked to designated organisations, while alleged associates can be denied entry into the US or deported. Terrorist designation also triggers extensive work by law enforcement, intelligence agencies, the military, and financial institutions to monitor, disrupt, and counter listed groups.
Critics argue that dramatically expanding the list risks overwhelming those systems.
Are Genuine Terror Threats Being Crowded Out?
Even as the list balloons, traditional terrorist organisations continue to plan and carry out attacks. In December 2025, a Bondi massacre in Sydney targeted Jewish people celebrating Hanukkah. In 2024, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps was linked to a plot to assassinate Israel’s ambassador in Mexico.
Analysts warn that an inflated terrorist list may dilute attention and resources at a time when real and active threats remain.
Are Drug Cartels Really Terrorist Organisations?
Perhaps the most controversial shift came in February 2025, when the Trump administration designated 15 criminal groups—largely drug cartels and gangs—as terrorist organisations. These included Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel and lesser-known groups such as Gran Grif in Haiti and Los Lobos in Ecuador.
These organisations are primarily profit-driven criminal networks rather than ideologically motivated groups using violence to achieve political aims, the traditional definition of terrorism under US law.
This has puzzled experts, especially since the US already has powerful legal tools for targeting criminal organisations, including the Kingpin Act, which freezes cartel assets and bans financial transactions.
Does Counter-Terrorism Work Against Criminal Groups?
Critics argue that applying counter-terrorism frameworks to criminal networks stretches US resources and risks backfiring. Research increasingly shows that counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism tactics, when used against gangs or cartels, often increase violence rather than suppress it.
Despite this, the Trump administration has used terrorist designations to justify a campaign of missile strikes against alleged cartel-linked targets.
How Did This Lead to Missile Strikes and Regime Change?
Since September 2, 2025, the US has carried out at least 35 missile strikes against boats it claims were linked to Tren de Aragua, a group Trump designated as an FTO. These strikes have killed approximately 120 people.
Notably, the US does not claim the vessels were carrying weapons or explosives, but rather drugs. Drug trafficking, however, is almost never a capital offence under US law.
The counter-terrorism framing was also used to justify the January 3 military operation that resulted in the capture of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro. Trump claimed Maduro led the Cartel de los Soles, which was designated as a terrorist organisation in 2025.
Yet just two days after Maduro’s capture, the US justice department dropped the claim that the cartel existed, revising its indictment to accuse Maduro of overseeing a corrupt patronage system that enabled drug trafficking.
Is This an Unprecedented Use of Terror Laws?
The US has carried out regime change before, most notably in Panama in 1989, when it removed dictator Manuel Noriega after indicting him on drug charges.
What is new, analysts say, is the sustained use of counter-terrorism law, rhetoric, and lethal military force against drug traffickers abroad. Applied at this scale and duration, it represents a significant escalation in how the US defines and wages its “war on terror.”
Are US Allies Still on Board?
For decades, US terrorist designations set the global standard, with allies frequently mirroring Washington’s lists. That pattern has broken down since 2025.
While the US has surged ahead in designating new terrorist groups, most allies have declined to follow Washington in labelling criminal organisations as terrorists. A handful of Trump-aligned Latin American governments, such as Argentina, have followed suit. Canada also listed seven cartels, a move widely seen as linked to trade negotiations with the US.
However, countries that traditionally aligned closely with US counter-terrorism policy—including the UK and Australia—have resisted expanding their terrorist lists to cover organised crime.
Why Are Allies Prioritising Different Threats?
Many US allies have moved in a different direction, focusing instead on far-right extremism. In 2025, the UK added two white supremacist networks to its terrorist list, alongside the pro-Palestinian group Palestine Action.
By contrast, none of the 26 new FTOs designated by the Trump administration are far-right organisations, highlighting a growing divergence in threat perception.
What Does This Decoupling Mean for Global Security?
The split over counter-terrorism mirrors broader tensions between the US and its allies, evident in disputes ranging from Greenland to trade and defence policy.
When governments cannot agree on who the primary security threats are, cooperation becomes harder. For intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and militaries tasked with preventing violence, that divergence may prove as destabilising as the threats they are meant to confront.
