Reza Pahlavi, the exiled former crown prince of Iran, has made an effort to present himself as a symbol of hopes for a change of government among opposition groups. On Friday, he addressed a gathering of people in Washington, stating that demonstrators inside Iran are risking their lives and betting on U.S. President Donald Trump’s intervention on their behalf.
But the truth is more complicated. Trump has continually threatened military intervention if Iran kills protesters, but he has also been holding back on taking action. On the other hand, some of the most important U.S. allies and even some of the United States’ top leaders have been questioning the effectiveness of airstrikes in knocking the regime off balance.
The statements made by the Pahlavi couple were intended to reassure the protesters as well as the global community of their views regarding the fact that change through foreign backing is possible. However, the ending of the statements indicates the precarious nature of the Iran opposition’s leadership. They have been so dependent on “outside power” as an alternative to gaining power through mass movement.
Why Pahlavi’s message matters
Pahlavi’s speech is significant not because of its novelty, but because it reflects a wider strategy among Iranian opposition groups: the belief that only external pressure can topple the Islamic Republic. His appearance at a major Washington venue underscores how the opposition has turned the U.S. into a political theater of legitimacy, attempting to use American influence as a substitute for Iranian political organizing.
This strategy is inherently risky. It requires Iranians to continue protesting despite brutal repression while depending on a foreign leader whose own political survival depends on domestic calculations, not the fate of Iran.
The unfulfilled promise of intervention
Trump has continued to promise that action will be taken in response to Iran killing protesters and that assistance will soon be on the way. However, there has not been any significant military action taken, which has led to confusion.
U.S. officials say a military strike remains “on the table.” The Pentagon has relocated forces and assets within the region, including carrier groups and strike capability, as a means of having them prepared should a strike order come. However, having the capability ready to strike and having a desire to strike are clearly different.
The major Middle Eastern allies such as Israel and Gulf countries have raised questions regarding whether a strike would be capable of destabilizing Iran’s government. Behind closed doors, their viewpoint is that a strike would help the government of Iran achieve a sense of oneness with its people through nationalistic resistance.
This is a very important point: foreign intervention may not weaken the regime, but it can actually give it a new reason for repression and consolidation. It can use foreign strikes as a reason for the protest movements being a Western plot, and this will weaken the protest movements and strengthen the hardliners.
What Pahlavi is asking for, and why it matters
Pahlavi asked for targeted strikes on the “architecture of repression,” specifically mentioning command-and-control centers linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). He argued that without military intervention, the regime will remain in power and the protests will be crushed.
He also called for international actions such as restoring internet access and freezing assets of Iranian officials. These demands reflect the realities of modern protests: digital communications and financial pressure are essential tools for opposition movements.
Yet these measures have limitations. Restoring internet access would require either the Iranian regime’s cooperation or a highly sophisticated external operation. Asset freezes, while symbolically powerful, are not guaranteed to destabilize a regime that has built its survival strategy on a parallel economy and illicit financial networks.
The death toll and the limits of verified data
Pahlavi reported that 12,000 Iranian citizens have been murdered in the riots. It has not been possible to confirm this report, and such figures are grossly exaggerated. Casualty reports have not come from the Iranian government, and there has been an internet blackout that has prevented verification.
According to estimates from human rights agencies and independent observers, the death toll is in the low thousands. For instance, estimates from certain international monitoring organizations put the death toll at 3,000 to 5,000. Even then, it is one of the deadliest suppressions in Iran since the 1979 revolution.
The differences in the number of casualties are relevant inasmuch as they illustrate how the story of the opposition might be exaggerated. A large number of casualties could serve as a reason for foreign intervention, but instead, could raise questions of integrity.
Why Trump’s hesitation may be strategic, not moral
Trump’s unwillingness to attack Iran can also be for strategic purposes rather than moral hesitation. The airstrikes may result in rocket attacks on US military presences in that area or on a US ally, such as Israel. The Iranian government has a history of asymmetric attacks, which have targeted US military installations and proxy wars in Iraq and Syria.
Another factor is the possibility that a strike may not lead to the desired outcome. The Iranian regime has shown an incredible level of resilience in the wake of past pressures from the United States. It took Iran many decades to withstand sanctions, covert operations, and threats by the US military. The IRGC has over the years deeply rooted itself in the Iranian politics and economic system, which may not be destroyed by outside intervention.
The risk of “victory” becoming worse than defeat
Even if the regime were to collapse, Israel and other allies would still face a dangerous uncertainty. Several scenarios could follow a sudden collapse:
- IRGC consolidation: Hard-liners could seize control and accelerate nuclear ambitions, seeing the chaos as a reason to build a stronger deterrent.
- Fragmentation: Iran could split into regional fiefdoms, leading to unpredictable control over nuclear assets and armed groups.
- Foreign-backed proxy rule: The regime could be replaced by a new leadership backed by foreign powers, creating a new form of domination rather than democracy.
- Temporary reforms: A moderate government could emerge, but without broad legitimacy, it may be unable to stabilize the country.
This is why Israeli and U.S. allies have cautioned against rushing into military action. A “regime change” can easily become a regime collapse, with no clear successor. In such a case, the strategic costs could far outweigh the benefits.
Pahlavi’s “Cyrus Accords” and the fantasy of normalization
Pahlavi proposed a “Cyrus Accords,” modeled on the Abraham Accords, to restore ties between Iran and regional countries such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. This idea reflects the opposition’s desire to envision a future Iran aligned with the region and the West.
But it also reveals a critical flaw: it assumes a level of political cohesion and stability that may not exist after a regime collapse. Iran’s deep ideological and political divisions make a rapid normalization unlikely.
Moreover, the opposition’s reliance on foreign intervention risks repeating the same mistakes that fueled the 1979 revolution: foreign-backed political shifts often lead to backlash and distrust.
Why Pahlavi’s optimism may be misplaced
When asked about his legitimacy and whether he has popular support inside Iran, Pahlavi pointed to protesters chanting his name. But the reality is that his influence inside Iran remains limited. The opposition movement is fragmented, and the majority of Iranians have not expressed strong support for a return to monarchy.
This disconnect raises a serious question: who will lead Iran after the regime falls? Without a clear, credible internal leadership, external intervention may only replace one unstable system with another.
