Long after a fight to control Tripoli exploded in 2019, Libya’s rival factions have persisted in relying on foreign fighters. Analysts say that although these soldiers aren’t highly visual, their continued presence hinders the country’s reconciliation and consolidation. Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the Libyan National Army leader based in Benghazi, depends on Russian paramilitary forces for support and security. Haftar is dedicated to seizing Tripoli, where the country’s internationally acknowledged Government of National Accord (GNA) is based.
Turkey supports and covers the GNA, and has also deployed Syrian fighters near the national capital.
“Both sides have spent their foreign backers for their assistance, permitting them to build a permanent existence in Libya at little cost,”
noted researcher Wolfram Lacher of the Science and Politics Foundation (SWP) at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. This helps Russia and Turkey, who want to ensure a strategic foothold in Libya.
Foreign Forces Less Visible
Libyan civilians historically have been opposed to the presence of foreign troops. It did not manage anxieties when Russian forces threatened Sirte shortly after the cease-fire, shelling a residential area and settling civilians’ homes. In a southern suburb of Misrata, Syrian soldiers also inhabited the houses of displaced people, fueling anxieties with neighbours. In Sirte, Russian forces in 2021 shifted from areas they occupied to an air base in Qardhabiya. In Sirte and Jufra, Russian mercenaries once routinely showed up in stores and restaurants,
sometimes holding weapons. But such expeditions have become far less frequent.
The formal Turkish military existence is confined to a few military bases between Misrata and
the Tunisian border. It is now “extremely rare” to see Turkish service personnel off their bases. Foreign forces are being called to limit their interactions with locals to gain approval.
Libya is a nucleus for Russian paramilitary deployments in Sub-Saharan Africa and perhaps for
maritime power headland in the Mediterranean. To serve those purposes, keeping a low profile appears to be the right approach. The Kremlin has achieved a modicum of favour. Haftar’s forces effectively determine open resistance to Russia’s presence.
The engagement of these foreign governments makes it hard for those Libyans who want a
genuine Libyan resolution to succeed. The obstinance of Libya’s rival governments also deepens the country’s political deadlock, hinders methods of holding elections and risks further fluctuation.
