Syria’s military has taken control of major territories in the north of the country, and this is the biggest concession the Kurds have made in terms of autonomy since the Syrian Civil War began. This particular move, having displaced the Kurdish military forces, who have been in charge for over a decade, highlights the vulnerability of power-sharing agreements in the post-war setup and the existing tensions between Syria and the SDF.
These developments also put the United States and its allies on an ever tough spot, as they are trying to balance their long-term engagement as allies of the SDF militarily against ISIS by backing their newly formed political ally, President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government, as the Syrian Assad regime collapsed in late 2024.
Strategic Gains: Why Tabqa and the Euphrates Matter
Syrian state media announced on Saturday that government forces had seized control of Tabqa, a profoundly important northern city, as well as Tabqa Dam and what was known as Freedom Dam (previously named Baath Dam) west of Raqqa. These facilities are important beyond simple symbolic value, representing a means of controlling the flow of water in the Euphrates and power in northern and central Syria.
Euphrates River basin has always represented one of the most hotly contested areas in Syria. The control of dams, bridges, or oil fields in the basin has a direct correlation to leverage on power supply, agriculture, as well as trade. Prior to its latest territorial gain, it was dominated by the SDF in large measure, including its oil fields that represented more than 60% of Syria’s pre-civil war total domestic production.
From Accommodation to Coercion: The Collapse of the March 2025 Deal
The army’s advance follows the breakdown of a March 2025 agreement intended to integrate Kurdish forces into Syria’s national military and administrative structures. That deal was designed as a cornerstone of Sharaa’s pledge to reunify the country after nearly 14 years of war, which has killed an estimated over 500,000 people and displaced more than half of Syria’s pre-war population.
Progress stalled almost immediately. Kurdish leaders accused Damascus of dragging its feet on guarantees of local governance, language rights, and protection for SDF commanders, while the government complained that the SDF was entrenching parallel institutions and refusing to fully submit to state authority.
Last week, government troops pushed Kurdish fighters out of two neighborhoods in Aleppo, and on Saturday seized an additional area east of the city—moves widely seen as a shift from negotiation to pressure.
Kurdish Autonomy Under Strain Despite Symbolic Concessions
Ironically, the military escalation came in the aftermath of President Sharaa signing a decree recognizing the Kurdish language as a national language and granting official status to the Kurdish minority in Syria—an unprecedented step in Syrian history. While this move, symbolically, was greeted, the Kurdish officials deemed it insufficient as compensation for the loss of territorial control and security autonomy.
For the SDF, autonomy has never been a cultural affair only. From 2012 until today, Kurdish-led authorities have administered large swathes of northern and eastern Syria, complete with their own military and police, courts, and educational system. At its height, the autonomous administration controlled territory housing nearly 3 million people, including large Arab-majority areas.
Clashes Along the Euphrates and the Breakdown of Trust
In the days leading up to the fall of Tabqa, Syrian troops massed west of the Euphrates and demanded that SDF forces redeploy east of the river. The two sides clashed repeatedly over strategic military posts and oilfields, raising fears of a broader confrontation.
Early Saturday, SDF fighters withdrew from some areas as what they described as a “gesture of goodwill.” However, they accused Syrian forces of violating the agreement by advancing further east into towns and oil installations not covered by the deal.
“The government has violated the recent agreements and betrayed our forces,”
the SDF said in a statement, as clashes erupted south of Tabqa. Damascus, in turn, accused the SDF of reneging on its commitments and demanded a full withdrawal east of the river.
Infrastructure Warfare: Blown Bridges and Escalating Risks
Syrian state media reported on Sunday that Kurdish-led forces destroyed two key bridges over the Euphrates in the Raqqa region, including the Alrashid Bridge inside Raqqa city. The destruction of bridges signals a dangerous escalation, potentially hindering civilian movement, humanitarian access, and future reconstruction.
Such tactics reflect a broader pattern in Syria’s conflict, where infrastructure has often been weaponized. The country’s civil war has already destroyed or damaged more than half of its bridges, compounding economic collapse and humanitarian suffering.
Oilfields and Energy: Damascus Reclaims Economic Leverage
The Syrian Petroleum Company announced that government troops had captured the Rasafa and Sufyan oilfields, which it said could now be brought back online. While Syria’s oil production has fallen from around 380,000 barrels per day before 2011 to well under 100,000, control of even modest fields provides vital revenue for a state struggling under sanctions and reconstruction costs estimated at $250–400 billion.
For Damascus, reclaiming energy assets is central to restoring state authority and reducing dependence on external patrons.
The US Dilemma: From SDF Ally to Mediator
The advance came despite US calls for restraint. General Brad Cooper, head of US Central Command, urged Syrian troops to halt offensive operations between Aleppo and Tabqa, roughly 160 kilometers apart. US-led coalition aircraft flew over flashpoint towns and released warning flares, signaling concern without direct intervention.
Washington’s position is increasingly delicate. The US spent years backing the SDF as its primary partner in defeating Islamic State, which lost its territorial “caliphate” in 2019. At the same time, the US has now extended political support to President Sharaa, whose rebel coalition overthrew Assad.
To de-escalate tensions, US envoy Tom Barrack traveled to Erbil to meet SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and Iraqi Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani, highlighting the regional stakes of the crisis.
Arab Tribes, Sectarian Violence, and the Risk of Wider Conflict
Kurdish authorities continue to control Arab-majority areas in eastern Syria that contain some of the country’s largest oil and gas reserves. Arab tribal leaders in these regions have warned they may take up arms against the SDF if ordered by Damascus—a development that could ignite a multi-sided conflict.
Kurdish fears have also been sharpened by sectarian violence elsewhere in Syria. In 2025 alone, nearly 1,500 Alawites were killed by government-aligned forces in the west, while hundreds of Druze were killed in southern Syria, some reportedly in execution-style attacks. These incidents have deepened distrust of Sharaa’s Islamist-led administration.
A Fragile Reunification Project
President Sharaa has vowed to reunify Syria after more than a decade of fragmentation. Yet the northern offensive illustrates the limits of reconciliation when trust is low and power is uneven.
The fall of Tabqa and surrounding areas may strengthen Damascus militarily and economically, but it risks alienating Kurdish authorities and reigniting instability in a region that was once a rare pocket of relative calm.
As Syria enters its post-Assad phase, the question is no longer whether the state will reassert control—but at what cost, and whether reunification achieved through coercion can produce lasting peace.
