The Trump administration has consistently referenced last year’s American bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities as a success story in military strikes. In this mission, American Air Force B-2 stealth bombers successfully released 14 Massive Ordnance Penetrators, which are some of the biggest bombs in the world in terms of conventional weapons, on Iranian nuclear facilities without losing a single aircraft or American serviceman. Several fighter jets, along with refueling tankers, were employed in this mission, which clearly indicates American unmatched capability in conducting precision strikes from afar.
Now, with President Donald Trump publicly warning Iran of his plans for further military attacks in the region—as this time in favor of the anti-government uprisings—the important question today has not been could the US attack Iran, but where, when, and at what price.
Would a new strike resemble last year’s nuclear attacks?
“Military strategists emphasize that a new attack will not consist of one-off nuclear strikes, such as were launched last summer,”
notes Michael Macaulay of Jane’s Strategic Weapons. Those strikes were against isolated command centers that were not near concentrations of civilians.
“An attack that could be labeled as Aid to Protesters will inevitably involve internal security apparatuses rather than nuclear development or capabilities,”
he writes.
This represents a radical increase in the stakes. Iran’s instruments of repression, the IRGC, Basij, and national police, operate out of command centers situated in the heart of the city. Attacking them could result in the killing of bystanders, possibly undermining the protest movement that the United States aims to support.
Can the US strike Iran’s security forces without killing civilians?
This poses the fundamental challenge to US planners. Experts argue that even “surgical” attacks risk having negative repercussions in Iran’s densely populated areas. Also, command centers, where communications and intelligence functions occur, tend to be located in areas housing civilians.
Carl Schuster, a former US Navy captain turned defense commentator, points to a lack of precision in targeting:
“Any civilian casualties, even if accidental, are likely to turn the US quickly from a well-wisher of Iranian protestors to a foreign aggressor.”
“Whatever the US does, it has to be very precise with no non-IRGC casualties,”
Schuster said. Civilian deaths, he warned, would fracture opposition unity and hand Tehran a powerful propaganda weapon.
Could civilian casualties strengthen the Iranian regime?
History suggests they could. Iranian authorities have long framed domestic dissent as the product of foreign interference. US airstrikes that harm civilians would reinforce this narrative, allowing Tehran to portray protesters as accomplices to foreign violence.
Even Iranians deeply opposed to the regime may reject external military intervention. Analysts caution that bombing campaigns rarely translate into popular legitimacy, especially when they revive memories of past US interventions in the Middle East.
Rather than weakening the regime, poorly calibrated strikes could rally nationalist sentiment, isolate protesters, and justify harsher repression.
What targets might Washington consider instead?
Despite the risks, analysts say the US has a wide menu of potential targets—if it chooses restraint over spectacle.
Could Iran’s leadership be targeted?
Direct assassination of senior Iranian leaders is unlikely, analysts say, but symbolic pressure remains an option. While Iran has dispersed and hardened leadership locations following past Israeli strikes, their homes, offices, and logistical hubs remain vulnerable.
“The military value is small,”
said analyst Peter Layton,
“but it is theater—sending a message rather than changing the battlefield.”
Such strikes would be politically charged, offering visible action without necessarily degrading Iran’s coercive machinery.
Could economic targets hurt the IRGC more effectively?
Another option is financial warfare through kinetic means. The IRGC controls a vast commercial empire spanning construction, energy, telecommunications, shipping, and manufacturing.
Australian government estimates cited by Layton suggest the IRGC controls between one-third and two-thirds of Iran’s GDP, either directly or through front companies. Carefully chosen strikes on facilities tied to IRGC business interests could damage elite revenue streams without hitting civilian neighbourhoods.
“The idea is to make IRGC leaders worry about their own survival and wealth,”
Schuster said, noting that the organisation is not ideologically suicidal.
What weapons would the US likely use?
Unlike last summer’s bunker-busting operation, a new campaign would probably rely on stand-off weapons rather than crewed bombing runs.
Would cruise missiles play a central role?
Yes. Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from US destroyers and submarines remain one of Washington’s most flexible tools. They allow precision strikes from hundreds of kilometres away, reducing risks to pilots and enabling rapid escalation—or de-escalation.
Schuster said regional IRGC headquarters and bases would be well within Tomahawk range.
Could drones replace piloted aircraft?
Analysts believe drones would feature prominently. Armed drones allow prolonged surveillance, target confirmation, and rapid strike execution. By contrast, sending crewed aircraft into Iranian airspace would be considered unnecessarily risky, especially given Iran’s layered air-defence systems.
“It’s unlikely we’ll see crewed aircraft dropping short-range ordnance,”
Layton said, noting the high political cost of losing a pilot.
How does US force posture limit immediate action?
As of this week, the US does not have an aircraft carrier positioned close to Iran. The USS Abraham Lincoln is operating in the South China Sea, limiting immediate carrier-based strike options.
Carrier strike groups offer flexibility, sustained sortie generation, and layered defence. Their absence means any rapid strike would need to rely on:
- Gulf-based airfields
- Long-range bombers flying from the continental US
- Missile-capable naval assets already in theatre
During last summer’s strikes, B-2 bombers flew nonstop from Missouri, refuelling mid-air. Similar tanker movements would likely precede any new operation.
What signals would indicate an imminent US strike?
Analysts say key indicators would include:
- Increased deployment of aerial refuelling tankers
- Forward movement of strike aircraft such as B-1 bombers or F-15E Strike Eagles
- Heightened naval missile readiness in the Gulf
Such movements would be difficult to conceal and would likely trigger immediate Iranian counter-measures.
Is “military theater” driving strategy?
Both analysts agree that spectacle matters to the Trump administration. Layton described the White House’s preference for short, dramatic, media-dominant operations that minimise US casualties.
One such option, he suggested, would be strikes on Iranian oil facilities in the Persian Gulf.
“They’re the easiest and safest targets,”
Layton said. Such strikes would damage Iran’s economy, create dramatic visuals, and attract global media attention—while avoiding urban combat.
Would oil strikes escalate the conflict?
Almost certainly. Attacking oil infrastructure risks retaliation against Gulf shipping, regional energy assets, or US partners. It could also spike global oil prices, drawing in international actors who have little appetite for another Middle Eastern escalation. In that sense, the most visually dramatic options may also be the most strategically destabilising.
A strike without a strategy?
Ultimately, analysts warn that any US strike on Iran—however precise—cannot substitute for a coherent political strategy. Military action framed as support for protesters risks blurring lines between solidarity and intervention, especially if civilians are harmed.
The question facing Washington is not just what it can hit, but whether hitting it helps. Without a clear endgame, even the most advanced weapons risk becoming instruments of escalation rather than leverage. In Iran, as in past conflicts, firepower may be abundant—but legitimacy remains scarce.
