Germany’s ambition to build what it calls “Europe’s strongest conventional army” marks one of the most profound shifts in the country’s postwar identity. For decades, Berlin defined itself as a civilian power, reluctant to lead militarily and heavily dependent on NATO—especially the United States—for security. That posture is now being dismantled, driven by war in Ukraine, fear of Russian expansion, and a dramatic collapse of trust in Washington.
At the start of this year, German men turning 18 began receiving a mandatory military fitness questionnaire, the first step enabled by a law passed last month. While military service remains voluntary for now, the legislation gives the government the legal authority to reintroduce conscription if recruitment targets are not met—something that would have been politically unthinkable just a few years ago.
What Does “Europe’s Strongest Army” Actually Mean?
When Chancellor Friedrich Merz told parliament that the Bundeswehr must become “Europe’s strongest conventional army,” he was referring to scale, readiness, and combat capability—not nuclear weapons.
As of November, Germany had 184,000 active-duty troops, an increase of about 2,500 personnel since May. While modest in absolute terms, it marks the fastest sustained growth in years. Germany has committed under NATO planning targets to reach 260,000 active personnel by 2035 and to double its reservist force to 200,000, bringing total available manpower close to half a million—comparable to Cold War levels.
“This is the biggest the Bundeswehr has been in a very long time,”
said Timo Graf of the Bundeswehr Centre of Military History and Social Sciences.
“And it is already the strongest force Germany has had since 2021.”
How Is Germany Trying to Attract Recruits?
To rebuild manpower quickly, Berlin is leaning heavily on incentives rather than coercion. New recruits are being offered 23-month voluntary contracts with salaries starting at around €2,600 per month, along with free housing and healthcare. After taxes and deductions, young soldiers can take home roughly €2,300, a highly competitive income for 18- to 23-year-olds in Germany.
“These conditions are designed to make the Bundeswehr economically attractive,”
Graf explained.
“For many young people, this is more income than entry-level civilian jobs.”
If voluntary enlistment fails, however, the new law gives the government the authority to activate compulsory service, reviving a system abolished in 2011.
Why Is Russia Central to Germany’s Shift?
From Berlin’s perspective, Russia is the primary catalyst. Since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, German threat perceptions have changed dramatically.
Germany plans to spend €108 billion ($125bn) on defence in 2025, equivalent to 2.5% of GDP—more than double its €48bn defence budget in 2021. By 2030, Berlin aims to push defence spending to 3.5% of GDP, far exceeding NATO’s 2% benchmark.
Public opinion has followed policy. Support for increased defence spending rose from 58% to 65% in a single year, according to Bundeswehr-linked polling.
A December Politbarometer survey found that 80% of Germans believe Russian President Vladimir Putin is not serious about peace in Ukraine, while intelligence warnings that Russia could target NATO territory by 2029 have become a widely cited reference point in public debate. “We’ve been sleepwalking,”
Graf said.
“Europe’s future is at stake.”
Why Has Trust in the United States Collapsed?
Russia is only half the story. The other half is Germany’s rapidly eroding faith in the United States. A ZDF poll conducted in June 2025 found that 73% of Germans no longer believe the US will guarantee Europe’s security through NATO. By December, that figure had climbed to 84%. Nearly 90% now view US political influence in Europe as harmful.
Much of this shift is tied to President Donald Trump’s return to office and his administration’s openly hostile rhetoric toward the EU. Trump’s National Security Strategy last November accused Europe of facing “civilisational erasure” due to migration, regulation, and liberal values—language widely seen in Berlin as echoing far-right narratives.
“They’ve realised Trump has no interest in helping Germany at all,”
said retired US General Ben Hodges, former commander of US forces in Europe.
“It was a giant middle finger to Europe.”
Is Germany Preparing for a Post-American NATO?
The loss of trust in Washington is reshaping German strategic thinking. Polls now show that 60% of Germans no longer trust the US nuclear deterrent, and three-quarters support replacing it with an Anglo-French nuclear umbrella.
Support for a European army—long controversial in Germany—has surged by 10 percentage points to 57%, according to Bundeswehr polling. “People who value NATO are converging around the idea of a European NATO,” Graf explained.
“They still value NATO—but not American reliability.”
Why Didn’t Earlier Promises Deliver?
This is not Germany’s first pledge to rebuild its military. Former Chancellor Olaf Scholz made similar promises in 2022, announcing a one-off €100bn special defence fund after Russia invaded Ukraine.
Yet progress was slow. Bureaucracy, procurement delays, and political caution meant much of the money only began flowing in 2024. Cultural resistance also played a role.
“For years, the Bundeswehr was not seen as a respectable career,”
said Minna Alander of the Center for European Policy Analysis.
“It became niche and politically polarised.”
Historical memory weighed heavily. For older generations, military assertiveness remained inseparable from Nazi Germany and fears of war with Russia—especially without US backing.
What Has Changed Under Merz?
Merz entered office with a markedly different tone, criticising both Moscow and Washington and calling for strategic independence from the US. Parliament has since suspended constitutional debt limits, enabling permanent increases in defence spending, and approved nearly $60bn in new procurement contracts last month alone.
Germany is also expanding its forward presence in Eastern Europe, including plans for a brigade in Lithuania to defend the Suwalki Gap, a vulnerable corridor between Belarus and Russia’s Kaliningrad enclave—though recruitment and equipment remain works in progress.
Can Germany Actually Deliver?
Despite the political momentum, analysts warn that rebuilding an army takes time. Industrial capacity, training pipelines, and logistics cannot be transformed overnight. Russia-friendly disinformation is already exploiting public sensitivity around conscription, experts say.
“Germany is a prime target for narratives about sending children to die,”
warned Victoria Vdovychenko of Cambridge University’s Centre for Geopolitics.
She also cautioned against overreliance on European coordination alone.
“We never rely on European processes to save us,”
she said.
“We know it’s our people who will be at the forefront.”
