Meanwhile, Iran has been experiencing popular unrest since the eruption of protests, and it appears that Israel has maintained a rather reserved attitude. This is particularly ironic since Iran, known as the Islamic Republic, has been dealing with its most significant domestic unrest in many years, but Israeli leaders, instead of speaking out, remain rather mute.
Ministers in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government were rumored to have been ordered not to comment, and the Prime Minister’s comments were merely a simple expression of solidarity with Iran’s citizens.
On one level, this silence is puzzling. Netanyahu has spent many years making exactly this point about Iran’s ruling system, portraying it as a fragile, illegitimate, and repressive one which exists by right of gun and oppression rather than popular mandate. Such widespread protests inside Iran could be seen as proving exactly this point. There is, however, a deliberateness behind Israel’s silence which needs to be taken into consideration here.
Why Israel’s support could backfire
Public Israeli encouragement of Iranian protesters would almost certainly be counterproductive. Tehran’s leadership has long framed domestic dissent as the product of foreign conspiracies, particularly those involving Israel and the United States. Any overt Israeli messaging would hand the regime precisely the narrative it seeks: that the protests are not organic expressions of economic despair and political frustration, but externally orchestrated subversion.
The Iranian security apparatus has always relied on such stories to legitimize its extreme brutality. When the Green Movement protests took place in 2009, the government there alleged that the protesters somehow acted on behalf of the West.
This also happened during the 2017/2018 protests and the fuel price protests of 2019, in which the security forces killed between 300 and 1,500 persons in mere days, according to investigations conducted by Amnesty International and Reuters. Israeli involvement, even if it’s verbal, will help the Iranian government claim that its mass arrests and execution sprees are defensive measures.
From Israel’s perspective, the costs of speaking out would be immediate and tangible, while the benefits would be symbolic at best.
The limits of Israeli influence inside Iran
There is also a deeper reality that has to be taken into account: The Israeli government has no capacity whatsoever to influence the Iranian balance of power. Compared to the American case, Iran is not a country for which the Israeli government has any economic clout, and there is no Israeli diplomatic infrastructure to affect the decision-making process in Iran’s elite. The Israeli spying capacities, although very strong, have nothing to do with social engineering.
Israeli leaders are fully cognizant of the fact that revolutions are never achieved as a result of foreign approbation. The collapse of regimes, whether it was the Soviet Union or the regimes in the Arab Spring, has, every time, been the result of internal dynamics and economic collapse, and certainly not as a function of foreign pressure. A Israeli leadership “cheering for the Iranian crowd” would be a strategically meaningless act.
Washington, not Jerusalem, holds the decisive cards
If regime change in Iran actually occurs, it will almost certainly depend on U.S. intentions rather than Israeli ones. Netanyahu knows this better than most. For more than a decade, he has invested so much of his political capital in trying to get the U.S. to confront Iran aggressively, through military, economic, and diplomatic means.
This is also the history that explains the Israeli caution in the contemporary situation. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is overly responsive to criticism that he is attempting to lead the United States into another war in the Middle East. His Iran nuclear deal speech at Congress in 2015, without coordination with the Obama Administration, did immense harm to the bipartisan Israeli relationship and to Israeli-American relations, leaving deep wounds that have not healed to date. Israeli activism would bring back memories of such episodes.
Avoiding premature escalation with Tehran
Another important consideration for the Israeli silence is the concern of possible escalation. Iran may mistakenly understand Israeli threats as a plan for a strike. Iran, faced with internal pressures, may act pre-emptively, either by missiles, cyber-attacks, and possibly by its agents in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Houthis in Yemen.
Israeli defence officials assess that Hezbollah’s arsenal alone has more than 150,000 rockets and missiles, of which several thousand are precision-guided weapons that can strike strategic targets. Israel is loath to contemplate a two-front war before it has fully prepared its defensive posture, be it missile defence systems or civilian defence preparedness.
In this context, Israel has reportedly sent calming signals to Iran through indirect channels, including Russian intermediaries. These messages are designed to reduce the risk that Tehran concludes—wrongly—that an Israeli strike is imminent.
Quiet coordination with the United States
Public silence does not mean public passivity. In the shadows, the Government of Israel is actively involved.
“Israel’s military and intelligence chiefs and other top officials hold more meetings than usual with American counterparts to discuss possible scenarios in which Iran could retaliate against the United States.”
These would be triggered by Iran’s response to possible actions by the United States, which could be an escalation of sanctions, cyberattacks, or limited military strikes.
Spillover effects are of particular interest to Israel. U.S. military bases throughout the Middle East house scores of thousands of American service members and contractors. An Iranian counterattack aimed at these sites could very well bring Israel into a conflict situation involuntarily. This is because Israel will have to react to the potential threat even if it is not the central focus of the conflict.
Netanyahu’s long-standing calculus on regime change
It is worth recalling that shortly before the unrest erupted, Netanyahu met with U.S. President Donald Trump and reportedly sought a green light for military action against Iran. Israeli officials have increasingly alarmed Washington with intelligence assessments claiming that Iran has accelerated its missile development and shortened the time required to produce weapons-grade nuclear material.
From Israel’s perspective, regime change in Tehran would be the optimal outcome. It could remove the ideological driver behind Iran’s hostility, weaken support for militant groups across the region, and potentially eliminate the need for Israel to consider unilateral military action against nuclear facilities—a scenario Israeli strategists regard as risky, costly, and uncertain.
The dangers of a weakened but surviving regime
Yet even Israeli officials acknowledge that regime change is not a panacea. One possibility is that a weakened Iranian leadership might seek to stabilise itself through a new nuclear agreement with the United States. Trump, facing global economic pressures and wary of prolonged conflict, could be tempted to strike a deal that freezes parts of Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief.
Israel would likely oppose such an agreement, arguing that it would legitimise a repressive regime and provide economic breathing room without dismantling Iran’s long-term capabilities. Israeli analysts point to the experience of the 2015 nuclear deal, after which Iran expanded its regional influence while remaining just a few technical steps away from nuclear weapons capability.
Worse scenarios: fragmentation and radicalisation
Other scenarios are even more troubling. Internal instability could empower the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which controls large segments of Iran’s economy and military-industrial complex. In a crisis, the IRGC might tighten its grip, suppress civilian institutions, and pursue a rapid nuclear breakout as a deterrent against foreign intervention.
Alternatively, Iran could fracture. A fragmented state with competing power centres would raise terrifying questions about control over ballistic missiles, chemical stockpiles, and nuclear infrastructure. Israeli security officials privately acknowledge that a chaotic Iran could, in some respects, be more dangerous than a stable adversary.
A strategy defined by what Israel wants to avoid
Ultimately, Israel’s current approach reflects not confidence, but uncertainty. Netanyahu may believe he is closer than ever to witnessing the collapse of Iran’s ruling system. Yet Israel lacks a coherent, detailed plan for “the day after.” There is no clear strategy for engaging a post-theocratic Iran, managing nuclear risks, or navigating regional realignments.
In the absence of such planning, Israel’s priority is damage control. The most serious risk is being drawn into a large-scale regional war under unfavourable conditions—at a time when the United States is increasingly focused on Asia, domestic politics, and protecting its own forces rather than underwriting allies’ security.
Silence, in this context, is not indecision. It is a calculated attempt to let events unfold without accelerating them. Whether that restraint proves wise—or merely delays a confrontation Israel believes is inevitable—remains an open question, one whose answer may reshape the Middle East for years to come.
