The outer space, which was the preserve of scientific exploration and civil communications, has turned into a military battlefield. This move gained momentum in the 2020s, with governments in Eurasia adopting the area of space as a platform of military actions and national security.
Russia and China are some of the major players who have already laid hands on space in their military doctrines by 2025. The modern military infrastructure is composed of surveillance, early warning equipment, navigation, and communication satellites. The strategy that Eurasia is adopting is the creation of space-based anti-satellite weapons and ground-based anti-satellite weapons, expansion of reconnaissance capabilities, and acquisition of space-based command and control capabilities.
This space militarisation presents new forms of threats to international security. The risk of escalation due to satellite disruption, interference, or kinetic destruction is increasing and the impacts could spread to civilian communities who depend on satellite services. The necessity of global norms and cooperation is growing as space becomes more contested.
Eurasian powers’ strategic ambitions in space
Russia has made a strategic focus on space based military capabilities. Moscow gave an indicator of willingness to protect its assets and confront challengers in space with the launch of the so-called Peresvet laser complex that was able to shoot down the enemy satellites. Hypersonic missiles, anti-satellites tests like the Nudol system, all add to the A2/AD doctrine of Russia.
Russian military planners have put satellite constellations that are important to command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) protection as their priority in 2025. The space capabilities included in air and missile defence demonstrate the attention of Russia to the technological superiority of NATO. These initiatives show there is a definite strategic orientation towards space-based deterrent and denial.
China’s dual-use infrastructure and space expansion
The investments made by China in the form of the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force highlight the key role played by the military in the national space planning. The last few years have witnessed the creation of co-orbital satellites that can conduct proximity operations including docking and possible sabotage, and the demonstration of kinetic anti-satellite missiles.
By 2025, China is still seeking aggressive lunar and deep-space missions, publicly presented as peace-building, but with an obvious military potential. The BeiDou navigation system is a competitor to the U.S GPS providing China with secure communication and targeting. Dual-use infrastructure will improve the Chinese ability to spread influence throughout Asia and defend interests in strategic areas both at sea and on land.
Eurasia’s regional states and emerging space capabilities
The space environment of Eurasia is exceptionally vulnerable to Kazakhstan because of the Baikonur Cosmodrome, which is rented by Russia. By 2025, the Baikonur is still among the most active launch sites globally, being used to launch military and civilian missions of Russian and joint projects.
In addition to Kazakhstan, other Central Asian nations have signed satellite technology cooperation agreements especially within the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt and road space elements of China. These partnerships boost surveillance and data gathering capabilities in the region, which are indirect facilitators of the wider military structure in the continent.
Multilateral frameworks and resource-sharing initiatives
Regional organisations like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) have started discussing the idea of coordinated space policy development. This dialogue, though initially mainly political, is an indication that in the long term they plan to plan the space strategy between the Eurasian partners.
Although not every state in Central Asia has independent launch and weapon capabilities, its airspace and infrastructure, and geographic position make it an important stakeholder in the space ambitions of Eurasia. These states might be used as a logistical or technological hub in military movements in space in the future as the geopolitical fault lines become entrenched.
Implications for global security and space governance
There are multiple threats that the further militarisation of space presents. Any action of interfering with the satellite systems either deliberately or by mistake might affect world communication, navigation, and monitoring. The space environment is vulnerable particularly with the introduction of small satellites and availing the space to private practitioners, which has a probability of miscalculation.
The situation of conflict regarding space assets might soon run beyond the scope of its purpose. As an example, anti-satellite weapons would cause orbital debris that would pose a risk to commercial satellites and critical infrastructure. This phenomenon, the Kessler Syndrome as it is also called, may make some orbital regions unusable for decades.
Legal limitations of current international frameworks
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 also bans the deployment of mass destruction weapons in space as well as encourages peaceful exploration. But it is not specific on traditional weapons and enforcement mechanisms. The restrictions of the treaty are more pronounced as Eurasia and other forces are strengthening their military activities in space.
Even with recurring attempts by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), there is no official document in existence to prohibit the weaponisation of space. New treaty proposals have not been unanimously agreed on because there are differences in the verification and strategic advantage. The fact that most space technology has dual purposes makes it hard to control without limiting the right use by the civilian community.
Escalating competition and the strategic relevance of Eurasia
The physical size of Eurasia and the infrastructure of launch space presents physical benefits in reaching the low Earth and geostationary orbit. The Vostochny and Baikonur launch facilities in Russia, along with the increasing inland spaceports in China, mean that the Eurasian states will be able to independently scale to space.
Also, testing and launching are easier due to the comparatively less saturated airspace and regulatory conditions in Central Asia. Such a combination of good geography and state-funded investment makes Eurasia superior to the existing space race in the world today.
Growing involvement of private and state-backed actors
With the growth of state-sponsored programs, the involvement of the Eurasian private-sector in space also starts to increase. Quasi-private corporations in Russia and China have begun cooperating with the national defence industry on dual-use technologies. This replicates the trends in the United States but with other regulatory and political systems.
Galaxy Space in China and the S7 Space in Russia is coming up to be a major force in 2025. Their participation in satellite networks and surveillance technologies increases the control of the state, as well as diversifying the ecosystem, combining business practicality with strategic supervision.
The outer space has become a mirror of the changing trends of geopolitics on the ground and it is Eurasia that has become a primary participant in the militarisation. It is the building blocks of military supremacy in space, as Russia through its combat-ready space systems, and China through its blistering development of the dual-purpose platforms. These trends come at a time of norm defiance and they pose severe questions as to the future of space security, risk management, and peaceful exploitation of space.
It is time to engage the world in a new dialogue, to invest in surveillance mechanisms, and to develop the political determination to develop new legal tools that can govern this new type of competition. With the atmosphere on the Earth growing more militarised, the costs are higher than strategic competition; the stability and sustainability of one of the last frontiers of humanity.
