The presence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran has gradually evolved in the United Kingdom to develop a hidden web of influence that has presented exclusive and unending threats to British national security by 2025.
These are networks, which include sleeper cells and digitally groomed operatives, but are not a conventional terrorist organization but rather an asymmetrical threat that is in the vein of ideology, anonymity, and plausible deniability.
Intelligence agencies and security analysts in the United Kingdom are currently facing a different type of irregular warfare, one that does not necessarily seek to make headlines through its singular acts, but instead seeks to achieve long-term, low-level destabilization in diverse British communities and institutions.
The IRGC’s Mosaic Of Threats
The operational structure employed by the IRGC diverges sharply from conventional terror cells. Instead of vertical command chains, it uses dispersed, ideological networks often invisible to routine counterterrorism protocols.
Online grooming and recruitment dynamics
Since 2022, IRGC-linked operatives have intensified their use of digital platforms to identify and radicalize individuals in the UK. These targets often include men of Middle Eastern and Eastern European descent who express political disillusionment or alienation from Western society. Recruits are drawn in through online chats, encrypted messaging, and religious or ideological forums where the IRGC cultivates anti-Western sentiment.
This method forms part of a broader “mosaic” network approachfragmented, decentralized cells working with minimal communication between them. This structure allows Tehran to disassociate from direct operational responsibility while preserving influence through shared doctrine. Intelligence interception becomes exponentially more difficult under such conditions, since operatives are often lone actors or loosely affiliated duos rather than members of a larger, hierarchical group.
Diverse operative profiles and roles
Unlike state agents operating abroad under diplomatic cover, many of these operatives are not Iranian nationals. They may include dual nationals, third-country immigrants, or naturalized UK citizens ideologically aligned with Tehran. Some are motivated by coercion or blackmail, while others act willingly under the guise of political purpose or communal vengeance.
Their tasks are varied. Surveillance of Iranian dissident groups in London, intimidation of Jewish and Israeli-affiliated targets, and logistical preparation for potential attacks are common roles. A 2024 MI5 report confirmed that a major plot involving explosive devices comparable in scale to the 2005 London bombings was disrupted, underscoring the strategic ambition of these operations.
Counterterrorism Response Challenges
UK intelligence agencies, particularly MI5, face unprecedented obstacles in tracking and neutralizing this network due to its deliberately amorphous structure and ideological entrenchment.
Fragmentation and operational ambiguity
Whereas al-Qaeda or ISIS-style networks depended on command orders and visible hierarchies, the IRGC relies on a flat structure designed to blur lines of accountability. This severely limits the efficacy of surveillance, asset infiltration, and even data tracking, as no central communications hub exists to monitor.
The mosaic cells function semi-independently, with shared goals but few traceable links. A community-based model, where informal relationships and religious spaces are leveraged for coordination, means that even a successful disruption of one cell has minimal effect on the wider system. Intelligence officials liken it to “cutting one head off a hydra.”
Resourcing and strategic prioritization
British authorities have blocked at least 20 Iran-backed plots since 2022, and this cannot be done without vast resource mobilization. Every cell should remain a single risk, which requires a high level of surveillance, development of laws, and preventive measures in detention. The strain on MI5 and police is already strained by threats of Russia, China, and transnational terrorism.
Critics cite that although the government of the UK has rightly taken due action in diplomatic response to the Iranian nuclear ambitions, it has been under-allocating resources to domestic response to the IRGC proxy activities. The limitations of the budget and the changing geopolitical interests have acted against active long-term planning creating loopholes to fill which Tehran still finds use.
Broader Societal And International Implications
The approach of the IRGC does not only pose a threat to the infrastructure and security of the UK but also disrupts societal unity and democratic integrity by using specific psychological and civic campaigns.
Impact on targeted communities
The main human intervention is experienced among the vulnerable diaspora groups. The British Iranian Diaspora are continually surveilled, harassed and even threatened. A number of local leaders have complained about consistent threats which were assumed to be related to IRGC supporters.
Likewise, cultural centers of both Jewish and Israeli communities in London and Manchester have been facing higher levels of threat as well as occasional vandalism, which further coincides with the peaks of online hate correlated to pro-Iranian rhetoric. This helps in creating a chilling effect in civic life and social interactions that weaken confidence in the local police force and in intercommunal relations.
Transnational cooperation and policy integration
Tehran’s covert operations in the UK are mirrored across Europe. Germany, France, and the Netherlands have all recorded similar infiltration attempts, pointing to a coordinated IRGC doctrine extending across NATO territories. The UK’s capacity to respond in isolation is thus limited.
Joint intelligence sharing through Five Eyes and strengthened cooperation with EU security services have helped identify cross-border operatives and shared funding streams. But gaps remain, particularly in legal harmonization and extradition frameworks. The necessity for multinational counter-hybrid strategies has never been clearer.
This person has spoken on the topic, summarizing the evolving IRGC threat to UK national security:
Their observations reinforce that the Iranian strategy is one of continuous, low-visibility subversion rather than singular, high-casualty events. The very fact that this ambiguity has prevailed over time makes the presence of the IRGC in the UK a singular destabilizing factor.
This new front of counterterrorism in the UK brought by the IRGC covert operations of influence has not been based on dramatic actions but rather on the silent disruption, ideological grooming and penetration of a specific community. This development needs to see the UK take the step beyond the conventional intelligence models toward more extensive policy alignment, long-term community resiliency initiatives, and a recognition of hybrid warfare as a characteristic of 21st-century security risk factors. The way in which the UK navigates such issues in the next decade could be a defining factor on whether its democratic institutions and system of public safety will succeed or fail over time as geopolitical processes transform in the year 2025 and beyond.
