Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa entered 2025 with a complex agenda shaped by his past as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the founder of al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. Now presiding over a post-Assad transition, he has attempted to reframe Syria’s counter-terror positioning while questioning the legitimacy of Western interventions. In a December 2025 interview with Ariana News, al-Sharaa argued that US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq reflected political agendas rather than long-term security commitments. His message centered on the claim that external powers had failed to eliminate extremist threats, while Syria under his administration was prepared to confront remaining ISIS cells.
The critique came just weeks after the UN Security Council lifted terror sanctions on November 5, 2025, enabling Syria’s interim government to engage diplomatically for the first time in over a decade. However, the change took place with the incorporation of thousands of ex-HTS fighters, including foreigners, into the new military framework in Syria. Authorities established that as many as 30 percent of those fighters who assisted in overthrowing Assad in late 2024 were non-Syrians, Uyghur, Uzbek, Tajik, Turkish, and Jordanian militants who were advanced to high positions.
Such developments provided an inconsistent context to the censure that al-Sharaa directed to the West in its counter-terror campaigns. U.S. forces still have approximately 900 soldiers in eastern Syria, aiding the SDF-led by Kurds to counter the residual ISIS, which al-Sharaa described as illegitimate. He demanded SDF structures to be dissolved, as they were at the center of victory against the ISIS caliphate, highlighting the conflict between the inner political thoughts in Syria and the hereditary militant groups.
Al-Sharaa’s HTS Origins And Evolution
Al-Sharaa is a trailblazer and his path started with the initial insurgency against the U.S in Iraq where he engaged in combat against the U.S and has since formed the Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda. His subsequent split with ISIS and Ayman al-Zawahiri was perceived as a strategic realignment and not a re-alignment of ideology. By 2016, HTS had changed its name to centralize its control of Idlib, ruling the province with a selective strategy of global jihadist alliances. As of as recently as 2022, U.S. actions were still targeting ISIS personalities within HTS-controlled territory, which undermined the argument that HTS had lost transnational ambitions.
The al-Sharaa attempts to rebuild the Syrian forces in the areas of HTS were boosted in 2025. His proposal to integrate foreign fighters was justified as a temporary necessity for national stability, yet intelligence assessments noted that the networks supporting these fighters remained active. This duality structural reform on paper and jihadist continuity in practice has deepened skepticism among Western and regional observers.
Governance Record In Idlib
In Idlib, HTS developed a governance model balancing repression with selective co-optation. Although the group suppressed individual jihadist formations that were threatening its control, it also condoned or encouraged regional militant activities including its open celebration of attacks by Hamas in October of 2023. Following the capture of Aleppo in November 2024, al-Sharaa hosted Christian and Kurdish leaders in an effort to appear to make war unbiased, although European monitoring missions still sought to verify claims of war crimes under HTS rule.
These contradictions are what influence the present judgment on the validity of al-Sharaa as a criticizer of the Western counter-terror failures. His own company has a history of most of the same malpractices that he blames on external players.
Western Counter-Terrorism Contexts Challenged
The notion by Al-Sharaa that U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Iraq was conditioned by geopolitical needs, repeats arguments of Syrian leaders. The promises made by Taliban to ensure that the region was not a haven to foreign militants expanded after the withdrawal of Afghanistan in 2021. Organizations like the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) openly operate in Kabul, which is the opposite of Taliban guarantees and makes parallels with the HTS own model of containment-not-elimination.
As of 2016, the U.S. troops reduced ISIS in Iraq, but remnants of the group remained in the border zones that had borders with Syria. Al-Sharaa used these realities to criticize the success of Western intervention, whereas those opposing claimed that the HTS system had the same drawbacks.
U.S. Policy Shifts Toward Syria
The visit of Al-Sharaa to Washington in November 2025 indicated the re-strategization of the problem of American policy towards the strict isolation of the Assad years. Analysts observed that such involvement was against a lack of U.S. presence in Afghanistan, and it cast doubt about conflicting strategic priorities. A CSIS report determined that an early withdrawal by the U.S. troops might lead to an ISIS re-emergence threatening the stability of the region and the security of the Gulf states.
China was also reserved in its attitude towards Syria and Beijing used the existence of Uyghur fighters belonging to TIP as an excuse to not offer any official diplomatic assistance. This reluctance highlighted the international uncertainty generally on the validity of the new leadership in Syria.
2025 Developments In Syrian Transition Risks
The months following Assad’s fall saw escalating factional tensions in areas newly brought under interim government control. Syrian military units led by former HTS commanders faced accusations of selective enforcement, particularly in Sunni-majority regions with competing militias. The promotion of ex-foreign fighters amplified concerns that Syria’s security apparatus was becoming structurally dependent on jihadist personnel.
Ongoing Human Rights Scrutiny
UN investigative teams reported continued evidence of HTS-linked abuses, ranging from detentions to targeted disappearances. Although al-Sharaa framed these as isolated incidents carried out by rogue elements, the persistence of such reports complicated Syria’s push for broader sanctions relief.
Diverging Terror Narratives
Al-Sharaa publicly rejected comparisons between Syria’s transition and Afghanistan’s Taliban model, emphasizing Syria’s “societal pluralism” as a safeguard against ideological capture. Yet his critique of Western counter-terror operations did not address the parallels between HTS’s origins and the insurgent groups that destabilized Iraq and Afghanistan for decades.
Implications For Regional Counter-Terror Frameworks
Al-Sharaa’s position calls for a unified Syrian military capable of preventing extremist safe havens. At a superficial level, this vision aligns with Western objectives. However, the integration of foreign fighters, the endurance of HTS networks, and the group’s selective endorsement of regional terrorism undermine confidence in Syria’s ability to deliver sustained security.
International Policy Dilemmas
Western policymakers evaluating Syria’s new leadership confront a complex choice between engagement and containment. The HTS case diverges from prior post-insurgency transitions, but the Taliban precedent remains instructive. States supporting Syria’s stabilization must weigh the risks of empowering a governing structure built partly on militant networks.
Sanctions And Diplomatic Realignments
Since the delisting process is ongoing until 2025, the inconsistencies between the international names of HTS and its participation in governance make coordination at the international level difficult. Certain governments in Europe prefer conditional involvement which is linked to the human rights standards whereas others believe that premature normalization would legitimize extremist groups.
The dynamic nature of Syria is indicative of the conflict between the political ambitions of al-Sharaa and the history behind the organization of which he was previously the leader. His attack on Western counter-terror policy supports the confusions of the Syrian transition as much as the failures of interventions in the past. The answer to this question could be whether al-Sharaa can balance his jihadist roots with the needs of the state leadership, and defining whether Syria will stabilize or create new avenues towards the militant resurgence that is still dominating the security discourse in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond.
