War on Terror Vets who were used to rotating on the deserts of Iraq and the mountains of Afghanistan are now being put to the test in one of the toughest places on earth in the Arctic. In early 2026, the U.S. Army Special Forces units are to be engaged in northern Sweden to undergo intense retraining in winter warfare, which is a doctrinally significant shift in the operations of these units, as they are no longer going to conduct counterinsurgency but instead perform operations in cold weather across multiple domains.
The shift is an indication of a wider reevaluation of the Pentagon, which started to gain pace in 2025. Having spent 20 years since the last war on irregular warfare in dry environments, U.S. planners shifted the emphasis to peer competition in polar areas. The Arctic is ceasing to be regarded as a periphery theater and is becoming a strategic frontier due to the impact of climate change, the rivalry of resources, and the renewed militarization of Russia.
Approximately, 100 soldiers of the allied NATO took part in the Swedish training cycle. The appeals of Scandinavian teachers were placed on a recognition that U.S. troops had to learn experience of countries that have considered survival in the Arctic as a basic, not a specialized, skill.
Winter warfare retraining reshapes special operations doctrine
The retraining exercise was focused on skills re-ramification. Those operators, who were used to heat mitigation and maneuvering in the city had to unlearn their basics and learn how to survive in the cold using their own device rather than depending on terrain.
Teachers even used the setting as a major enemy. According to one trainer who observed in the exercise,
“Cold incapacitates faster than contact with an enemy.”
That perspective alters operational sequencing: survival precedes engagement.
Hypothermia prevention and fieldcraft
The prevention of hypothermia was made the new standard competency. Multi-layered garmentation systems, waterproofing, and never standing anywhere were drilled into. The discipline of thermal management was harder than thought by even the experienced War on Terror Vets.
The use of fire building, which is usually a support skill in deployments to the desert, became a mission critical skill. The operators were tested with the use of little materials and putting on gloves in temperatures as low as minus 20 degrees Celsius to ignite heat sources. The drill demonstrated the extent to which combat effectiveness can deteriorate due to such simple mistakes by exposing the military to biological agents.
Individual overnight camping modules also put a strain on resilience. The participants made improvised snow shelters and kept the core temperatures under their control using wearable sensors. The information obtained is informing new Arctic survival guidelines, which will be distributed in the Army in later 2026.
Ice immersion and mental conditioning
Crossing of streams Ice plunges under operating load. The task did not involve theatrical stamina but, physiologically, it involved being conditioned at the expense of being shocked. Soldiers shifted to immersion to weapons handling training as quickly as possible, muscle memory training, even when their limbs were numb.
The amalgamation of the exposure to stress and the live-fire sequences is based on the experience of the Scandinavian armies. Finnish and Norwegian teachers insisted on calmness in case of environmental shock as a determining factor in Arctic interactions.
Weapons adaptation in extreme cold
There was a continuous challenge associated with reliability of weapons. Rifles of standard issue had thickening of lubrication and optic fogging. Ice exposure and recovery of simulated malfunctions were to be done by teams immediately as in ambush recovery when there would be winter.
Another tactical weakness also appeared in battery degradation. Communications equipment consumed more power than expected and the units had to conserve transmission windows. The incident intensified the necessity of acquisition of cold-weather-specific equipment, which is currently being considered in the defense budget process of 2026.
Strategic Arctic imperatives drive the transition
The retraining program is in line with the new Arctic Strategy issued by the U.S. Army in 2025. That document gave priority to multi-domain readiness in the north of the latitude of 60 degrees and the requirement to have the special operations agility in the challenged polar terrain.
The Arctic accumulation of Russia has been the geopolitical backdrop. The city of Moscow has a large system of Arctic bases and the largest fleet of icebreakers in the world. As ice melts, its High North infrastructure has been increased since 2022 to guarantee shipping routes and reserves of hydrocarbons due to longer navigable seasons.
Resource competition and shipping lanes
It is estimated that the Arctic has large proportions of undiscovered oil and natural gas deposits. The melting of sea ice has been providing access to areas of the Northern Sea Route over greater periods of time annually, changing business calculations and military logistics.
In the case of NATO members, access and the freedom of navigation have turned into a common priority. In 2025, exercises that tested interoperability errors in Scandinavian and the U. S. forces involved exercises such as the Arctic Forge in Finland and Norway. The objective of the 2026 Swedish training cycle was to have those gaps reduced.
NATO integration and Sweden’s role
Integration programs were fast-tracked with the accession of Sweden to NATO in the year 2024. Having U.S. Green Berets in Lapland forests is evidence of Stockholm attempting to install allied forces into its established winter war doctrine.
February, 2026 joint drills within the framework of the Arctic Sentry increased the co-ordination between Denmark, Norway, Finland and the US. These were practice exercises on distributed operations, people recovery and acquisition of targets in snow-filled conditions.
In the case of War on Terror Vets, the transition type is adjustment of unconventional warfare skills to terrain where movement is in feet-per-ski-convoys instead of in vehicle convoy.
Operational hurdles reveal systemic gaps
In spite of this, retraining has been enlightening about structural limitations. The sustainment architecture of the U.S. is still aimed at temperate and desert-based settings. Arctic logistics demand forward stock, special vehicles and infrastructures.
Mobility and endurance constraints
Mobility of the ski was physically challenging even to those at the elite level. Even the pulling of 50-kg sleds on the snowy fields made the process slower and raised caloric requirements. The Finnish teachers, who are used to lifelong winter training, are used to winning over the American teachers in timed drills.
Such differences are operationally critical. The ability to conduct reconnaissance and quickly respond missions in dispersed theaters of the Arctic is affected by speed and stamina.
Sustainment and infrastructure imbalance
The US does not have Russia with its large fleet of Arctic icebreakers and forward depots. It was found by exercises that there was excessive dependence on the air resupply, which was subject to weather and electronic interruptions.
In 2025, Congress authorized the purchase of more Arctic-qualified vehicles and infrastructure modernization. Defense analysts however warn that the capability gap with Russia will have to be closed over a multi-year period instead of being a one-interval appropriation.
Doctrinal evolution beyond counterinsurgency
Re-training War on Terror Vets means more than environmental readjustment, this is a recalibration of doctrine. Counterterror raids, and training partners forces in weak states became the brand name of the Special Forces. The operations in the Arctic require the coordination of operations with the traditional forces and naval resources in a great-power conflict environment.
Hybrid threats also make planning more challenging. The incursions under the sea, computer sabotage against the Arctic infrastructure, and the confusing presence of militia require layered responses. Special operations units can be assigned with reconnaissance and unconventional preventive service in areas of low population density, where attribution is still unclear.
Traditional performance measures at the beginning of 2026 testing show significant improvement. The survival rates when solo were increased as compared to 2025 pilot programs and the scores on interoperability with Nordic units improved. The cold was as inimitable to human enemies as of the battles, according to embedded reporting, which heightened the centrality of the environment to the theater.
Yet readiness remains iterative. Institutional culture shaped by two decades of desert warfare does not pivot overnight. Training pipelines, procurement decisions, and alliance coordination must align to sustain momentum.
As Arctic sea lanes widen and strategic competition intensifies, the question extends beyond whether Green Berets can master skis and sleds. It centers on whether a generation forged in counterterror campaigns can redefine its operational identity in a theater where geography dictates tempo and endurance shapes deterrence. The coming winters may reveal whether adaptation is episodic or foundational in reshaping U.S. special operations for an increasingly frozen frontier.
