As Syria’s internal dynamics changed rapidly, culminating in the collapse of Bashar Al-Assad’s government on December 8, 2024, China assumed a cautious perspective. Assad’s removal carries multiple unintentional consequences for China’s ties with Syria and the Middle East. These consequences will affect not only China’s strategic coalition with Syria but also its regional arrangement and triangular agreements with Iran and Russia in the Middle East.
Over the years, Assad was a faithful friend of China, and the Belt and Road schemes and humanitarian assistance have helped his reconstruction of Syria following the Arab Spring. China has always disagreed with levying economic sanctions on Syria, even when significant powers like the United States and European governments have taken unilateral steps. Beijing’s longstanding disapproval of damaging countries via economic pressure may present its ongoing financial support for Assad’s government.
Chinese state-owned firms have played a vital role in providing financial aid to Syria. A total of $415.98 million was traded between the two nations in 2022, including soap and essential oils exported by Syria and electrical machinery, equipment, and fabrics exported by China. However, the overall delivery of these financial packages has been slowed by the impact of American economic sanctions on Syria.
According to Chinese Middle East analysts, the fall of Assad failed a strategic partner of Beijing with the downfall of Assad. While the varying dynamics within Syria may delay a once-favorable strategic background, it is necessary to recognize that China’s assets in the Middle East have been diversified throughout regional areas and not concentrated in Syria for a decade. Clearly, when it comes to boosting the level of bilateral cooperation with China, Xi and Assad jointly declared a strategic alliance recently in the end of 2023 with China.
Beijing considers Syria’s continued instability as a problem for its schemes in the country. While the fate of China’s investments in Syria stays uncertain, there is an absolute and urgent need for development projects and humanitarian support for the new government and the Syrian people. This space for Chinese projects could strengthen China’s sight in the region as a whole without necessarily resulting in a substantial influence on its overall investment in the Middle East.
In order to reduce the influence of Assad’s fall, China must additionally crystallize its regional strategic alliances in regard to the new Syria. Chinese officials have always complemented bilateral ties with multilateral collaboration. Supporting Beijing’s ties with a new government requires changing its strategy, taking into account Syria’s latest national states and regional powers’ reactions to the latest leadership. Via a balanced agenda-setting instrument, Beijing will be capable of maintaining its arrangement with the new government while adjusting to the changing political landscape in Syria and the wider Middle East.
It is clear that China’s handling of the fallout from Assad’s government, in connection with other great powers and regional medium authorities, represents a substantial development with a triple impact on the whole area. Syria remains a critical element of China’s Middle East foreign approach, and any internal transformation will compromise the feasibility of closing the Middle East as a suitable region. The value is especially noteworthy as China has been investigating possibilities to play a better meaningful part in the region, presented by its mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as its participation in the Beijing Declaration sought to maintain Palestinian national unity.
