In the hours following his inauguration, President Trump spent his time wielding his authority on a range of foreign policy matters. Among the surfeit of actions given just that day, he inscribed an executive order (EO), “Designating Cartels and Other Organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists.”
This executive order mandates the secretary of state, in talk with the secretaries to make a recommendation concerning the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and/or Specially Designated Global Terrorist designation of any cartel or other association under this designation within fourteen days.
Should the Trump government prefer to utilize the FTO designation on main Mexican cartels, it may have consequences that have not been fully assessed. For instance, US corporations working in Mexico will need to resolve whether their procedures may provide material help or help to the cartels, a largely defined standard that substantially extends the scope of damages for violations. Also, insurance firms providing services to those US companies with an existence in Mexico may review their premiums and whether they desire to further deliver services at all.
Mexican asylees could claim they are escaping terrorism if they feel intimidated by the cartels. Lacking clear direction from the Trump administration, financial establishments may also find themselves in a bind as they aim to evaluate whether financial movement involving Mexico may operate afoul of the material support provision.
The scope of what may be confined under material support, from accommodation to firearms to expert guidance or assistance causes compliance difficult, especially as there’s no blacklist or other instrument against which US businesses may screen to consider if their funds or assistance involve cartel members. As such, the repercussions from an FTO designation of key Mexican cartels may be more comprehensive than intended.
It has been explored previously that the FTO authority could be used to designate cartels by both the executive and legislative authorities. However, prior reflections have not resulted in motion under the FTO authority due to the expected knock-on effects.
Rather, for example, the Biden government gave EO 14059, “Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons Involved in the Global Illicit Drug Trade,” which has been employed to assess sanctions on over four hundred people and organizations engaged in the global illegal drug trade. Depending on these sanctions, authority and other economic, health, and enforcement mechanisms may have helped to reduce fentanyl and other opioid-connected overdoses and casualties.
Opposing the international drug business is a purpose with which the Trump and Biden governments seemingly align, though their techniques for pursuing this purpose differ. Given the extent of the issue and the influence illicit drugs have on American societies, creative processes are certainly deserved. However, new techniques and their broader consequences should be thoroughly assessed before deployment.
