At the end of 2025, Somalia has not yet left the complicated security situation field, where the al-Shabaab insurgency has been reborn. Following a rather successful pivot to focusing on land control in the periphery in 2022-2023, the militant organization has now surged back to capturing vital ground in the South and the Center of the country. It has stepped up its activities in the Shabelle River Valley, which is of such extreme logistical value as it links Mogadishu with Ethiopia over two strategic highways and rich agricultural lands.
The ability through its fighters to demodulate the transport lines linking Beledweyne, Jowhar and Balad towns has made these strategic government areas inaccessible to the federal authorities and the relief organizations. Having gained greater control in villages in the states of Hirshabelle and Galmudug not only increases the resources that they have, but they are also able to execute coordinated attacks on different fronts.
This new-found vigor has partly been explained by internal divisions of the Somali state. Some of them who initially sided with the federal government have pulled out of the frontlines due to poor payment and logistical support by the federal government, as local militias and clan elders complain about slow payment by the federal government. The resultant vacuum has seen Al-Shabaab occupy the vacuum created with regard to governance and security positions within reclaimed areas to strengthen their control.
Government and international military responses
Offensive operations and territorial control
Due to the step-up by al-Shabaab, Somali National Army (SNA) has retaliated against the militants with a series of counter offensives in Hirshabelle and Galmudug that are aided by elite Danab forces and international partners. According to the government sources, villages like Bulo Gadud and Run Good in middle Shabelle were recaptured, as well, and that more than 400 militant fighters have been neutralized ever since January 2025.
But these conquests have not been very easily maintained. The government troops have lacked the capacity to anticipate revenge attacks on forward operating bases and, indeed, a deadly suicide bombing on July 2025, at the Jaalle Siyaad Military Academy in Mogadishu killed five people, including two senior officers, despite the advances in tactics.
In January this year, the Damanyo military base was attacked by al-Shabaab militants whilst conducting a mass recruitment exercise, which left dozens of people dead and training franchises within SNA seriously disrupted.
US and Ethiopian support
AFRICOM has stepped up drone strikes in Middle and Lower Shabelle, targeting al-Shabaab commanders and training camps. In March, US forces confirmed the killing of Bilal Abdullahi, a senior logistics coordinator, in Beer Xaani.
Ethiopia has also resumed cross-border operations to pre-empt militant incursions into Somali Regional State. This is after al-Shabaab incursion into Ethiopia in 2022 that showed just how the al-Shabaab was willing to increase its theatre of battles outside Somalia. Joint operations between Ethiopian forces and the Somali forces along Dolow and Mustahil have run interference on the supply lines, but not technically to an extent that the group can limit its reach in the region.
Political fragmentation and security challenges
Fractured federalism and local discontent
The federal system of Somalia, however, still causes interference between the Federal Member States (FMS) and Mogadishu, especially Jubaland and Puntland. The issues of revenue sharing, commanding system in the armies and the coming elections have slowed down concerted efforts to battle against the militants.
This political squabbling is not only slowing down creation of collective security policies but also demoralizes on duty soldiers. Other units state they receive nothing for months, with others deprived of the basic medical and logistic support. This undermines civil-military links and leaves the communities to believe that the government forces are unreliable and partisan.
Donor fatigue and diplomatic shifts
It is in the midst of these internal problems that the Somalia nation is also facing reduced international focus. As people around the world look at the crisis in Sudan, Ukraine and Gaza, the lengthy war in Somalia is risking slipping off donor priorities. Analysts observe a dramatic reduction in the amounts that the western world spends on regimes and restructuring in the newly liberated regions.
This shift can be observed in Somalia as the country has steadily relied on Gulf partners and Turkey to provide military support, which has its own strategic dangers unless accompanied by change inside the country through inclusion.
The threat to Mogadishu and national stability
A near-miss in the capital
Even the assassination of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in March 2025 when he was on his way to perform prayer in a mosque in Mogadishu revealed that al-Shabaab had the capacity to break high-security efforts. It shook the population, the attack embarrassed the workforce in the government security services even though the president survived.
This surge of activity by the group in Lower Shabelle and domination of road networks towards the capital evokes the danger of encirclement. Although it is still unlikely that there will be a full-scale invasion of the Mogadishu city owing to the heavy fortification and the high number of international troops, the impact of such closeness has generated fear in the minds of the people who live within that area and those who invest there.
Persistent insecurity in southern corridors
Marka and Afgooye reports show that tax imposition, mobile courts, and provision of basic services by the al-Shabaab is continuing in the areas that they control. These are roles that help the group to have legitimacy to the disenfranchised population, especially the ones that have been forgotten in the state institutions.
The security belt of Mogadishu, which was to serve as a shield to the capital against such influence, is getting more porous. Consequently, business operators and humanitarian agencies are now at an increased risk whenever they have to travel beyond capital.
Humanitarian and civilian impact
Displacement and civilian casualties
UN estimates show that over 180,000 civilians have been displaced in the fighting that has broken out in 2025. Numerous people have escaped the Middle Shabelle and Lower Juba which have been destroyed by the clashes destroying the homes and agri infrastructures. Baidoa and Kismayo camps are overcrowded, without clean water and sanitation.
Casualties of civilians have escalated with more than 600 deaths during the attacks by the al-Shabaab since January. Suicide bombings along with ambushes and indiscriminate shelling are the common sources of attack.
Economic disruption and loss of services
The war has wrecked the weak economy of Somalia. Those living in Hirshabelle say that their harvests and market access is lost when roads are closed. The mobile banking services that are required in the rural locations are being withdrawn in regions occupied by the militants who are opposed to modern financial systems.
Human rights organizations emphasize that military campaigns will need to be accompanied by stabilization efforts in which destroyed schools, clinics and roads in a region are rapidly reestablished. Otherwise, liberated zones will most probably be recaptured by extremists.
Regional and international dimensions
Ethiopia’s stake in Somali stability
Al-Shabaab’s operations along the Ethiopian border are viewed as a direct challenge to Addis Ababa’s regional security doctrine. Following the 2022 incursion, Ethiopian forces increased troop presence near Dolow and Mustahil, while reinforcing intelligence-sharing with Somali partners.
However, Ethiopia’s internal instability—including ongoing tensions in Amhara and Tigray—could distract its capacity to assist Somalia over the long term. Additionally, border disputes between Jubaland and Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State add complexity to joint operations.
The role of key international partners
The United States remains a central military partner, focusing on airstrikes and counterterrorism training. Turkey provides weapons, military education, and oversees the TURKSOM base in Mogadishu. The UAE has resumed support for Somali coastguard units, emphasizing maritime security.
Despite these contributions, international engagement has shifted toward short-term tactical support rather than long-term political stabilization. Experts warn this imbalance will hinder durable peace.
Balancing military action and political solutions
Structural limits of force alone
This trend is a very important observation in the case of Somalia in 2025 in that the military advances are failing to bring with them political stability. Numerous experiences of boundary changes demonstrated how without including local governance there can be no sustainable victories.
Military success needs to be accompanied by political change, local inclusive councils and greater justice systems, said the experts. Weeks after operations, a number of liberated towns still lack a civilian government and this gives a chance to reorganize militants or further give them the apathy syndrome.
Reintegration and reconciliation
It is necessary to respond to the grievances that trigger the insurgency. The rivalries of clans, the inconsistencies of land ownership and regional rivalry commonly become the recruiting points of al-Shabaab. Ex-fighter reintegration programs are poorly financed and organized, which leads to security liabilities.
The Somali civil society organizations promote reconciliation meetings particularly in the newly liberated districts. Such forums could seal these rifts and give societies an interest in post-conflict governance.
Somalia’s critical political juncture
The political class in Somalia is confronted with a test as parliamentary and local elections slated at the end of 2025 are coming. Electoral wrangles in the past cycles led to violence and deadlocks that diluted unity in the country. In case such conflicts explode in this year, then it would avail opportunities to the militants to acquire larger grounds.
To prevent paralysis, the federal government should consider the first priority of electoral integrity, security delivery and power-sharing dealings with FMS. It is not clear whether this leadership can combine all the institutions of the country and all the actors that operate in a region.
The next few months should present the fortunes of Somalia either moving towards relative peace or getting even fragmented. What is at stake is beyond Mogadishu since the Horn of Africa is still strategically located in the eyes of the larger powers. What happens in Somalia might define regional security architecture and it could determine how well international counterterrorism works in coming years.
