United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken exposed that Iran has provided close-range ballistic missiles (CRBMs) to Russia, which he anticipates Russian forces will operate against Ukraine within a matter of weeks. At the same time, the US Department of the Treasury reported the imposition of further sanctions on Iranian and Russian individuals and entities, including Iran Air. These actions can hardly come as a shock to Moscow and Tehran and will not conform to get either to change practice.
The real query is how the Iranian transfer of CRBMs to Russia will impact the Russia-Iran association. Specifically: Does Russia’s reliance on Iran, first for armed drones and now for CRBMs, give Tehran a capacity of leverage over Moscow? And what would Tehran desire to get from Moscow with that leverage? Iran has long desired Su-35 fighter aircraft and S-400 air defence missile designs from Russia, according to reports, but Moscow has not yet given them.
There are many other Russian weapons designs and technologies that Tehran would like to acquire. If any of these turn up in Iran, this will be noticed as evidence that the transfer of CRBMs to Moscow is certainly a sign of increased Iranian influence over Russia. Moscow, though, will be reluctant to transfer weapons to Iran that would disturb its ability to maintain good connections with Iran’s rivals, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which could in favour result in their turning nearer to the United States and even Israel for backing. Clearly, Iran itself might not want this to occur.
Saudi-Russian partnership in the OPEC+ format, which maintains world oil prices relatively higher, conforms to Iranian interests too. Both Russia and Iran have to trade their oil at a discount due to Western sanctions, but if the Saudis finalise that Russia has evolved as Iran’s firm ally and so decide to raise oil production, the resulting lower oil prices would damage both Moscow and Tehran. And they understand that Riyadh has in the past been ready to flood the market and receive lower oil prices in order to hurt its rivals.
Further, while Tehran may desire Moscow to transfer Su-35s, S-400s, and other weapons systems and technologies, acquiring them immediately may not be the Iranian leadership’s immediate goal. The Islamic Republic usually does not take direct military activity itself but prefers to operate through proxies, such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi and other Shia militia forces.
Tehran, then, may notice Russia not so much as a significant power but as another proxy, whose readiness to fight against a common enemy profits Iran but allows it to bypass the costs of fighting that shared enemy itself. Ukraine, of course, does not pose a danger to Iran. But to the degree that the United States and other Western countries dedicate attention and resources to helping Ukraine, then they have less of these known for dealing with Iran.
