On July 6, 2025, the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) rolled out another round of precision strikes on entrenched Boko Haram enclaves in Borno State in the Operation Hadin Kai. The mission was against Wa Jahode and Loghpere rebel strongholds which had long been engraved into the rocky Mandara Mountains that divide Nigeria and Cameroon.
It is not the first time that Boko Haram uses this mountainous enclave in its tactical repertoire. They are strengthened over years to be a command, logistic post as well as refuge of senior JAS commanders. Satellites and other intelligence photography collected in the last month showed new mobility in the sector–reinforcements in, black flags flying over fortified huts, solar panels generating electricity to communicate, and human tracks in places that are normally uninhabitable. The picture was clear: Boko Haram was reorganizing for another offensive push.
Disrupting the Insurgents’ Infrastructure
Impact on Boko Haram’s Command and Logistics
The July airstrikes targeted critical nodes within Boko Haram’s operational ecosystem. According to Air Commodore Ehimen Ejodame,
“The mission neutralized several terrorists and destroyed logistics hubs vital to sustaining further attacks.”
These included fuel depots, armories, and tactical shelters. For a group reliant on remote terrain and irregular supply lines, the destruction of such infrastructure presents a real operational setback.
Yet disruption is not destruction. Past operations have shown that Boko Haram’s ability to adapt—by decentralizing logistics or relocating to nearby outposts—can reduce the long-term effectiveness of these strikes. It is unclear whether these losses will stall the group’s mobility or merely prompt it to shift strategy again.
Foiling Coordinated Attacks
The timing of the assault was not coincidental. Intelligence sources indicated a coordinated campaign by Boko Haram to disrupt Eid al-Adha celebrations in several Borno communities. With villages already preparing for festivities, the NAF’s air interdiction likely averted mass civilian casualties. The Nigerian military has described the strike as a preemptive measure to “protect lives and preserve national morale.”
This success speaks to an evolving synergy between field intelligence, aerial reconnaissance, and rapid execution. It also suggests that the military’s decision-making matrix is becoming more data-driven—though how consistent and scalable that approach remains under continued pressure is still uncertain.
The Terrain Challenge and Insurgent Adaptation
The Mandara Mountains: A Natural Fortress
The topography of the Mandara Mountains has proved a thorn in the side of Nigerian and regional military agencies. Protruded hills, dug out paths and dense valleys in the terrain facilitate easy disappearance of insurgents. Cloud cover and reduced lines of sight tend to compromise surveillance, whereas IED and ambush prevents ground operations.
This territory is a perfect playing field that Boko Haram has been playing in. The group has dug tunnel systems, hiding weapon caches and altitude as an early warning to coming air or land patrols. Any benefits received by the use of airstrikes have to face the facts regarding the physical conditions of insurgency warfare in a mountainous land where a single successful raid does not necessarily mean denying space engagements in the long term.
Resilience Through Tactical Evolution
Despite losses, Boko Haram retains operational flexibility. When its convoys are hit, it reverts to motorcycles. When leadership compounds are struck, mid-level commanders form smaller splinter units. A total of 252 Boko Haram attacks were recorded in Borno; November 2024 to April 2025; involving 380 military and civilian farm deaths. These assaults occurred in the form of suicide bombings in Maiduguri, hit-and-run attacks on outposts in rural areas.
This kind of data indicates one of the major predicaments on the need to neutralize fixed targets, but it is not enough. The group’s tactics, once focused on capturing territory, have morphed toward disruption and psychological warfare. Its shifting modus operandi—blending guerrilla strategy with digital propaganda—demands more than just bombs.
Civilian Safety and the Humanitarian Dimension
Balancing Air Power and Human Security
Although the Nigerian Air Force argues that civilian lives are paramount in every activity, the insurgents are located close to the populated areas creating inevitable worries. Boko Haram tends to hide in communities or close to them, employing civilians as human shields or as logistic channels. It renders the targeting without collateral damage especially tough.
In real time, the human toll of airstrikes, even accurate ones, may be difficult to quantify. Villages that were close to the July 6 strikes reported sounds and slight shaking, yet no death tolls were reported. Nevertheless, historical events thwarted the confidence that government interventions will work, particularly in regions where military coverage is weak or where Boko Haram provides economic opportunities.
Ground-Level Collaboration
Effective intelligence requires trust. Local informants, community leaders, and civilian task forces play a central role in pinpointing insurgent locations and anticipating movements. The military’s challenge is to foster collaboration without endangering these communities. Too often, informants become targets, and the absence of consistent military protection leaves them vulnerable.
NAF officials have recently acknowledged this gap and pledged more engagement at the local level. If such promises translate into real, sustained security presence, the informational advantage may shift further in favor of the state.
The Broader Context: Boko Haram’s Evolving Threat
A Fragmented but Lethal Organization
Boko Haram has transformed nowadays. Since Abubakar Shekau died in 2021 and ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province) took its place, insurgency has developed as a fragmented arc of factions having alternative ideologies and structures of command. Such divisions have not watered down its lethality though.
Recent intelligence proves that JAS and ISWAP sometimes work together on supply chains, and are in competition in regard to influence in northern Nigeria. The JAS enclaves were a specific target of the airstrikes in July 6 which have been gaining ground after a dormancy. This showing of force may weaken them in the long term, or may just continue the momentum against ISWAP, time will tell.
Regional Cross-Border Dynamics
The border facility of Nigeria and Cameroon gives Boko Haram a life line. Crossing of porous boundaries allows the group to evade air surveillance, hoard of goods, and sustain the operations even after devastating strikes. Military patrols in Cameroon have grown over the past few months, but due to the lack of integrated cross border command structures, there is a lack of coordination.
In 2025, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the African Union have urged the collaboration of the region once again but it has not gone that far. Unless the insurgents are able to move around freely in one country and whether there is ability to counter-strike in that country, the airstrikes on the side of the Nigerian citizens will have no complete effectiveness.
Technology, Intelligence, and Future Prospects
Advances in Surveillance and Targeting
The International deployment of Operation Hadin Kai denotes advantageous gains in the ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capacities of Nigeria. Use of high-altitude drones, satellite-fed heat mapping, and AI-based signal triangulation contributed to the successful location and destruction of Boko Haram’s command hubs in Wa Jahode.
Air Marshal Hasan Abubakar has listed amongst the recent investments in the Nigerian air force, in his statement, ongoing investments in the system of “battlefield intelligence” and “next-generation targeting systems,” and instructed that the range of domination that the Nigerian air force can exercise over the battlefield is now extended to previously unimaginable altitudes and geographies. It is in the process of achieving technological equality with Western and Israeli drone designs, although there are doubts about the sustainability of the product, the correctness of data interpretation and the ease of spoofing.
The Limits of Aerial Dominance
Despite recent successes, air power alone cannot win counterinsurgency wars. The terrain, population dynamics, and ideological roots of the insurgency all require long-term, multidimensional strategies. Poverty, disenfranchisement, and lack of basic services still feed recruitment pipelines for Boko Haram factions.
While the military delivers tactical wins, development agencies and political leaders must address the structural deficits. Otherwise, insurgency will remain not only a physical threat but a narrative one—one that airstrikes alone cannot silence.
Expert Perspective
Naija_PR has spoken on the topic in an interview with Channels Television, underscoring the complexity of relying solely on air power. The discussion emphasized that
“Strategic integration of ground intelligence, local collaboration, and psychological operations”
is needed to convert temporary battlefield success into long-term peace.
NAF fighter jets have neutralised dozens of terrorists in airstrikes on their logistics base near the Mandara Mountains in Borno State.
— Naija (@Naija_PR) July 7, 2025
Source: The Nation Nigeria
The Path Forward for Counterinsurgency in Borno
The Nigerian military has demonstrated that it can conduct precision operations in one of the most difficult terrains in the region. The July 6 airstrikes disrupted Boko Haram’s logistics and likely prevented mass civilian casualties. However, disruption is not elimination, and temporary setbacks for insurgents have historically been followed by tactical pivots.
What remains is a question of momentum—can Nigeria sustain its intelligence edge, deepen civilian cooperation, and deny insurgents access to both physical and psychological terrain? The answer will determine not just the trajectory of Boko Haram, but the viability of counterinsurgency in an era where threats refuse to remain fixed targets.
