The rivalry between the Shia and Sunni is one of the longest lived divisions in the Islamic world. Historically it is an offshoot of a disagreement over the proper successor to Prophet Muhammad but nowadays its expressions are strongly influenced by geopolitics.
In the 21st century regional powers like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey among others have exploited sectarian identities to exercise authority, influence, and even control strategic terrain of fragile states besides other events like projecting their power. Once mostly theological, it has in the meantime become an instrument of political competition, proxy warfare and alliance turns.
The sectarian divide has ceased to be an issue of doctrine only; it is a geopolitical tool used by those states that comprehend its value in mobilizing, polarizing and dominating in and between populations as well as foreign theatre of hostilities.
The Historical Roots Of Shia And Sunni Conflict
The formation of the Shia Sunni conflict has dated back to the 7th century, when Prophet Muhammad died. Succession wrangles resulted in the formation of two key sects namely, Sunni Muslims described as those who accepted the appointment of Abu Bakr as the first caliph and Shia Muslims who believed that they should have continued to lead the community through Ali who is a cousin and son in law to the Prophet.
This initial point of departure has developed over the centuries into a theological and political divergence. Along with the times when there was coexistence, the rift increased with dynastic conflicts, colonial exploitation, and state-building activities, especially in the 20th century.
Iran And Saudi Arabia As Sectarian Power Centers
In the contemporary Middle East, Iran and Saudi Arabia have come out as the most apparent and dominant state players who are fanning the flames of sectarian differences. Iran, a Shia dominated nation, has pitched itself as the guardian of Shia communities in the region- Lebanon and Iraq to Yemen and Bahrain. Its policies towards the likes of Hezbollah and its role in post-Saddam Iraq have re-ordered the variables of power in the region.
Following the execution of prominent Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr in 2016, tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia reached a new peak. In response to accusations that Iran was escalating sectarianism in the region, then Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif defended his country’s regional posture as politically strategic rather than religiously divisive. In an interview with Der Spiegel in January 2016, Zarif stated,
“We do not want to engage in a sectarian war. This is what our Saudi neighbors are trying to depict.”
His remarks highlighted Tehran’s broader narrative that it was responding to instability rather than provoking it, despite growing Iranian involvement in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen through Shia-aligned militias.
At the Munich Security Conference in February 2016, then Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir dismissed Iran’s claims of non-sectarian intentions and directly accused it of destabilizing regional politics through sectarian proxies. He stated,
“Iran is the single most belligerent actor in the region… It is the only one involved in sectarianism in the region.”
Proxy Wars As A Reflection Of Sectarian Rivalries
Multiple conflicts spread across the Middle East are proxy wars between the leading powers of the Shia and Sunni conflict. Anwendung Iran and allies like Hezbollah were supportive of the rights of the Shia-Alawite regime through the support given to Assad, whereas opposition fighters were Sunni majority-supported by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Gulf states. In Yemen, Iran’s support for the Houthi rebels counters Saudi-led military operations aimed at restoring a Sunni-aligned government.
Iraq, formerly ruled by the Sunnis is a country that has experienced a post 2003 Shia political upheaval by receiving Iranian support. The latter has resulted in an increasing Sunni disenfranchisement, giving rise to extremist groups, such as ISIS that then appeal, in part, to anti-Shia hate rhetoric in order to enlist their following.
Although the immediate causes of these conflicts are political the nature of conflict takes on roots on identity and survival issues on local populations as sectarian language is used to interpret them.
Changing Geopolitics And The Decline Of Sectarian Unity
The changing geopolitical situation is slowly jerkiing the usefulness of sectarian discourse. The small Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are in the process of redefining their foreign policies not only vis-a-vis Iran but also with regard to the overall stability in the region and economic diversification.
Turkey is a Sunni-majority country, although its approach has been more nationalist and self-interested, supporting both Sunni and non-Sunni forces depending on its utilitarian reasons. Even Qatar which funds groups on both ends of the sectarian spectrum when it satisfies its political interests.
Iran is also facing indicators of strategic restraint, wherein regional consolidation is prioritized over expansion after economic pressure, protests and re-engagement with Saudi Arabia in 2023.
The Role Of International Powers And Global Order
The struggle between Shia and Sunni is also influenced by the national activities of foreign actors. The policies promoted by the United States, Russia, China and European countries are all involved in the region and ignite a fire of sectarian differences either inadvertently or intentionally. The U.S. alliances with Sunni Gulf monarchies and the Russian support of Shia-aligned leaders such as those of Syria have earned their enmity rather than patched up differences.
Sectarian loyalties are further buttressed by the global competition over such aspects as oil routes, arms sales, and counterterrorism alliances as much as these often cross sectarian boundaries.
Shifting Narratives And The Future Of Sectarian Politics
Recently, the evidence of exhaustion was observed among the populations that happened to be in the middle of the sectarian clashing conflicts. Grass roots movements have been driven by an explicit rejection of the sectarian politics in Iraq, Lebanon and even parts of Syria. These movements ask governance, accountability, and national unity in question of religious identity.
Meanwhile, the possibility of change in the course of the tensions toward tolerance between enemies such as Iran and Saudi Arabia indicates that there might be a changing pattern of coexistence. Although such initiatives are tenuous, they presage a possible de-radicalization of sectarianism as a state policy.
In case this future policy focuses on inclusive governance, economic interdependence, and mutual security, the role of sectarianism in regional geopolitics should have finally started to dwindle.
Conclusion: Sectarianism As Strategy, Not Theology
The Shia-Sunni tension does not exist only due to historical reasons but also due to the imperative of the involved actors to retain a strategic use. Once a marker of belief rather than power, sectarian identity has become a means to an end: a way of gaining leverage instead of an attribute.
However, sectarianism may no longer be the most effective means of gaining control given the emerging global threats, like the climate crisis, economic downturn, and generational dissatisfaction. The point to note is not whether or not regional powers have influenced this conflict, but whether they want to relinquish it in support of stable conditions.
