The reports coming out midway through 2026 present a worrying scenario wherein the Iranian government is growing more fragmented within itself, with an influential but small group of hardliners going to all lengths to derail any tenuous negotiations between Iran and the United States. This is not just a case of a disagreement in policy but a coordinated effort by IRGC officials and pro-aggression legislators to obstruct cooperation and maintain a confrontational stance against the United States.
The hard-line campaign has already resulted in new confrontations, missile and drone strikes, and a rising sense of uncertainty on the part of Gulf countries that have been dragged into the increasing internal power struggle in Tehran.
The news line you have cited—“the radical Iranian hardliners are bent on sabotaging a deal with the US, a small but influential hardline faction has intensified efforts to sabotage a potential deal with Washington, creating more security issues in the Gulf”—is not mere speculation.
This is an example of a behavioral pattern that analysts both in the West and within the region consider to be characteristic of Iranian politics: a radical and extremist group within Iran, led by members of the Revolutionary Guards, is undermining all attempts at reaching a deal between the United States and Iran. At this point, the only issue is not whether the undermining occurs, but rather how much they will undermine the process before triggering a crisis in the region.
The Hardliners at the Center of the Storm
The crux of this plot revolves around a network of hardliners who have previously shown their capability to influence Iran’s foreign and national security policy positions. Ahmad Vahidi, the leader of the IRGC, is one such individual whose close associates constantly thwart efforts by moderate members of the government to pursue a flexible negotiating stance with America.
According to the US‑based Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Vahidi and his allies have “prevailed” in internal debates, ensuring that Iran’s approach to the United States remains “maximalist and uncompromising.” This means any concessions or de‑escalation steps are treated as unacceptable, even when they come from senior negotiators within the Iranian system.
Alongside Vahidi, a group of hardline members of parliament are amplifying the sabotage campaign through political and rhetorical pressure. Figures such as Saeed Jalili, Amir Hossein Sabeti, Ali Khezrian, Hamid Rasai, and Morteza Mahmoudi are reported to be campaigning against Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the Iranian Parliament Speaker and the main face of Iran’s negotiations with the West.
Such MPs are not just dissidents but are also making use of legal and media measures against the validity of engagement as a whole. This includes moves like impeachment of Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s Foreign Minister, and opposition to the leadership of Ghalibaf on the grounds of adopting an inflexible stand vis-à-vis Washington.
The reason for the danger posed by this radical group is its lack of marginalization. It is placed at the nexus point of the Iranian security and legislative systems and can therefore wield influence over any negotiated agreement. The control of the IRGC in the Iranian military and quasi-military organization structure implies that even if a civil negotiating group comes up with a common ground with the Americans, the radicals will always find ways of blocking, undermining, or bypassing the agreement.
How the Sabotage Is Playing Out
The sabotage of the Iran-US agreement is not one move but an entire strategy comprising politics, media, and military communications. The first tactic involves the lack of flexibility during negotiations.
It seems that hardline elements associated with Vahidi have been preventing pragmatic members of the government from adopting a flexible approach toward Iran’s negotiation stance, specifically concerning ceasefire conditions and restrictions on missile and drone operations in the Persian Gulf region. Such inflexibility effectively prevents Iran from taking the necessary reciprocal actions that would be required for any deal with Washington.
Secondly, there is a media and public opinion campaign aimed at delegitimizing compromise. Individuals associated with the IRGC and members of parliament are using state television as well as social media networks to present any form of concession to America as betrayal of Iran’s revolutionary values.
The message that comes out of this campaign is that Iran needs to exert maximum pressure on its adversaries, including America and its allies in the Gulf region. Such a perception may gain ground among some Iranians who had already protested for attacks on the US and Israel in the past.
Thirdly, there is the element of military signaling and provocations that are used to discredit any proposed deal. Following an announced ceasefire agreement between Iran and the US, Iran has been reported to launch missile and drone strikes against one of its Gulf partners who is thought to be the UAE as well as a fresh clash in the Gulf. According to some analysts, this is not mere tactics but an attempt to signal from the hardliners that they do not have intentions to comply with any agreements that demand restraint of their military operations. It is evident that the hardliners are more concerned with protecting their power than anything else.
Lastly, there are internal pressures that involve efforts at impeaching or marginalizing the negotiators. According to media reports, the hardliners have attempted to impeach Abbas Araghchi and are contemplating ways of impeaching Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who is the primary proponent of engagement with the West.
Such political maneuvering creates an unstable environment for negotiations, where no negotiating party can act in a confident manner. That the hardliners can use the law-making process to destabilize the executive branch’s foreign policy agenda shows that they are deeply entrenched in the system.
Gulf Security Under Threat
The effects of this sabotage strategy are apparent in the Gulf region, as security conditions have worsened. One of the direct consequences is the outbreak of a new conflict in the Gulf. An outbreak of violence between the United States and Iran in early May 2026 dampened the hope of an early settlement, and even brought to mind the specter of an escalating conflict. The occurrence of such an outbreak despite the existence of a ceasefire agreement implies that this hardline group not only resists negotiations but actively undermines them.
Furthermore, provocations by the hardliners have led to mistrust in any agreement that would emerge from the negotiations. The Gulf countries, who have always had concerns about the expansionist tendencies of Iran in the region, now view the activities of the hardliners as a sign that Iran cannot be considered a dependable partner. The attack on the UAE with missiles and drones, despite an earlier ceasefire agreement, has caused panic among the Gulf countries, convincing them that Iran is taking advantage of a “hesitant” US policy towards the issue.
The most worrying aspect might be the disruption in shipping and even the threat of blockades. Hardliners have been seen as a potential threat in this regard by analysts for years. The recent acts and rhetoric from Iran have once again raised these concerns, and it is quite possible now that the shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf region will become the target again. The success of the hardliners in derailing negotiations between Tehran and Washington will increase the chances of such scenarios as the regional strategy of Iran will remain with the hardliners.
Key Statements and Stances
The hardline sabotage tactics have elicited intense responses from Iranian and foreign policymakers alike. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, under pressure from his hardline counterparts, has lambasted them for their tactic of undermining the negotiations process. Ghalibaf believes that the extreme faction within Iran could put the nation at risk in its future because they might pursue a strategy that yields no benefit. In effect, Ghalibaf is conveying the message that the hardline faction in Iran is not only a threat domestically, but internationally too.
Officials in the United States and Gulf-based analysts have similarly warned about the situation. The Gulf state allies are described by them as “fearing an emboldened Iran” that would find escalation helpful for political purposes, particularly if Washington is seen as backing off from its stance. Some reports have suggested that the United States may be preparing for greater security measures or alliances aimed at preventing the sabotage by Iran in the Gulf region.
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), in particular, has been quite vocal on their evaluation of the hardliners’ importance. As stated by the ISW, Ahmad Vahidi’s triumph in the political fight means that Iran’s stance toward the US will be “maximalist and uncompromising,” making future talks more difficult to conduct. According to the ISW, the hardliners’ impact on the government will also reduce the probability of reaching a durable agreement, as they are ready to go back to war instead of conceding anything significant.
The Broader US–Iran Dynamic
The actions of the hardliners can be better analyzed in light of the overall dynamics between the United States and Iran. At present, the discussions are regarded as negotiations that occur after the end of hostilities, aimed at ensuring a cessation of escalations and limiting military operations on either side in return for some lifting of sanctions, or even security assurances. President Donald Trump, in his second term, aims to use the hardline position of his government against Iran to ensure concessions from the Iranian government while holding firm on matters of security in the region.
The central demand from the hardliners’ side is to retain the maximum pressure and paramilitary instruments. This includes the capacity to maintain missiles and drones along with the ability to rely on proxy groups in the region. Their rationale lies in the idea of resistance against foreign powers, especially America, being the defining feature of the Islamic revolution in Iran. The hardliners have leverage within the IRGC and other Iranian security organizations, which allows them to push this agenda even against the state’s national interest.
There is also a widespread skepticism about deals within Iran. Both hardliners and some “moderate” voices warn that Washington’s own hawkish factions may deliberately undermine implementation, a concern that hardliners exploit to rally domestic opposition. This skepticism creates a self‑fulfilling prophecy in which any deal is undermined from the start, either by hardliners seeking to protect their own interests or by US officials using the deal as a pretext for further pressure. The result is a cycle of escalation and mistrust that benefits no one but the hardliners.
What Comes Next?
The efforts by the hardliners in derailing any agreement raise pertinent issues regarding the relationship between Iran and the US and security in the Gulf region. First, one major issue that arises from such attempts by the hardliners is whether they would succeed in ensuring that any deal agreed upon cannot be put into practice. If they do, it seems very likely that what would follow next is open warfare characterized by confrontation in the Gulf and attacks against Gulf partners that could escalate into a larger conflict.
The second question is whether the United States and its Gulf partners can find a way to counter the hardliners’ influence without triggering an outright war. This may involve building broader security arrangements, strengthening alliances with regional actors, and using diplomatic and economic tools to isolate the hardliners. However, these efforts will face significant challenges, as the hardliners have deep roots in Iran’s security and political institutions and enjoy a base of support among segments of the Iranian public.
The final question is how Iran’s internal politics will evolve in the wake of this sabotage campaign. The hardliners’ success in blocking flexibility may embolden them further, leading to even more aggressive postures. Alternatively, it could provoke a backlash from pragmatists and moderates who see the hardliners’ actions as a threat to Iran’s long‑term stability. The outcome of this internal struggle will have profound implications not only for US–Iran relations but for the entire Middle East region.
In the meantime, the hardliners’ sabotage of the US–Iran deal serves as a stark reminder of the complexities of Middle East politics. In a region where power is fragmented and interests are deeply intertwined, even a small faction can have an outsized impact on the course of events. The hardliners’ ability to undermine a potential deal and generate new security issues in the Gulf is a testament to their influence—and a warning of the dangers that lie ahead.
