Turkey’s parliament has approved a landmark legal framework designed to advance the government’s “Terror-Free Türkiye” initiative and create a pathway for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm, dissolve and reintegrate eligible members into society. The 12-article law, passed on August 10 by 468 votes to 88, with six abstentions, is the most significant legislative step in Ankara’s latest effort to end a conflict that has killed more than 40,000 people since 1984.
This could form the basis of the legal framework for the conclusion of one of the Middle East’s oldest and longest-lasting insurgencies. But the ratification of the law doesn’t guarantee the arrival of peace. The most important elements of the law will come into force only after Turkish officials confirm that PKK has handed over its weapons, dissolved itself and has no other organizations functioning. This makes the whole process susceptible to the problem of verification, as well as the problem of Abdullah Ocalan and political rights of Kurds.
A historic but conditional vote
The law itself has been officially named the Law on Strengthening National Solidarity and Social Integration. Proponents of the government have been touting it as a national reconciliatory measure while its opponents have branded it a limited amnesty or pardon for PKK members. This distinction is significant politically. The law does not give unconditional pardon to all PKK members nor does it mean automatic release of jailed PKK members. On the contrary, it has established a conditional arrangement according to which selected individuals are allowed to benefit from the suspension of their prosecution, trial or even imprisonment.
The provisions of this law will be mostly applied to low-ranked PKK members who did not participate directly in killing or other serious offenses. Eligible PKK fighters who are currently residing outside of Turkey – particularly in northern Iraq – can now return according to certain legal conditions after the disarmament is officially confirmed. Leaders of PKK organization, persons convicted of serious offenses and people sentenced to aggravated life imprisonment are not eligible for this process. The proponents of the law say that peace process will not be successful without providing an option for return to civilians for combatants.
How the reintegration mechanism works
The legislation allows some proceedings involving PKK-related offences to be suspended for five or 10 years, depending on the severity of the alleged crime.
Investigations and trials involving offences punishable by up to 15 years in prison may be deferred for five years. More serious cases, including those carrying life imprisonment, may be postponed for 10 years. If an eligible individual does not commit another offence during the relevant period, proceedings may ultimately be discontinued or the sentence treated as completed.
While the amnesty framework is said to apply to a wide array of offences related to the PKK, such as membership, leadership, propaganda, knowingly aiding the organisation and financing terrorism offences committed on behalf of the PKK, it is not intended to grant amnesty for murder or other serious acts of violence. Thousands of individuals could be affected by the process. According to initial estimates, up to 3,500 PKK-related detainees may be eligible for amnesty, while others put the number of potential beneficiaries among former PKK fighters who could become reintegrated into society at around 4,000.
The numbers are just estimates since they will depend on the criminal record of each applicant and the classification of the offence. Moreover, a 17-member monitoring commission within parliament is expected to supervise the process politically and legally. The framework has been presented by the signatures of 360 lawmakers from six political parties, which implies that the sponsors wanted the amnesty process to be perceived as a cross-party initiative rather than a decree issued by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling coalition.
Disarmament remains Ankara’s red line
Turkey has made clear that legal measures will follow, rather than precede, verified disarmament.
The process is expected to involve Turkish security institutions, the National Security Council and an oversight mechanism involving senior government officials and intelligence authorities. The PKK, the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) and affiliated organisations must be shown to have ended their activities and surrendered their weapons and ammunition.
The National Security Council’s confirmation is particularly significant. The law will not operate fully until state authorities determine that the PKK has ceased to exist as an organised entity and that its weapons have been handed over. The decision must then be formally published in Turkey’s Official Gazette.
This sequence reflects Ankara’s concern that a symbolic weapons ceremony or a partial ceasefire could be reversed. Turkish officials want a verifiable and irreversible end to the armed structure before granting legal relief.
The PKK has already announced its decision to dissolve and end its armed struggle. It also participated in a weapons-destruction ceremony in northern Iraq in July 2025. But Turkey’s security establishment continues to face a practical question: whether the group’s declaration and symbolic disarmament represent full compliance or only the beginning of a longer process.
The issue is complicated by the PKK’s long-established presence in northern Iraq and its links with Kurdish armed organisations in Syria. Ankara regards several Syrian Kurdish groups as connected to the PKK, while those groups deny that they are simply extensions of the Turkish organisation. The new law is a Turkish domestic measure and cannot, by itself, settle the status of armed Kurdish groups operating in neighbouring countries.
Erdoğan’s political calculation
The process is politically significant for Erdoğan for several reasons. First, Erdoğan referred to the initiative as an attempt to destroy the PKK and establish peace and national unity. Upon submitting the bill, Erdoğan stated that it reflects a consensus reached by Turkish political elites. In addition, he emphasized that the process should be regarded as a national project of the state, not as an act of negotiation done in response to international pressure. Finally, the use of the term “Terror-Free Türkiye” indicates that the government prefers to talk about security issues and national sovereignty, rather than the problem of Kurdish autonomy. For Erdoğan’s AKP party, the process provides several opportunities.
First, it can lead to termination of the insurgency and, thus, to saving resources and ensuring greater stability for the country. Second, it may become an additional political channel through which to communicate with Kurds. Moreover, the termination of the conflict can give Erdoğan’s government an opportunity to resolve the long-lasting problem that all Turkish governments faced for more than four decades. However, Erdoğan should be careful because he will have to face opposition among nationalist voters if any concessions are made to the PKK.
Bahçeli and the nationalist role
The initiative would have been difficult to imagine without the support of Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Erdoğan’s coalition partner.
Bahçeli’s political background makes his involvement particularly consequential. The MHP has traditionally supported a hard-line approach to the PKK and has opposed concessions that could be interpreted as recognition of Kurdish separatist demands. His decision to endorse dialogue helped provide nationalist cover for an initiative that would otherwise have been vulnerable to accusations of weakness.
Bahçeli’s support does not mean that the MHP has abandoned its core position. The party continues to insist that the PKK must disappear as an armed and organisational force. Its backing is therefore tied to the principle that reconciliation can follow only after the state has established that terrorism has ended.
The vote also produced a striking political image when Bahçeli shook hands with lawmakers from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM). The gesture reflected the unusual political coalition behind the law, although it should not be mistaken for agreement on every aspect of the Kurdish question.
DEM seeks wider democratic change
DEM has welcomed the parliamentary vote but regards it as only the first stage of a broader settlement.
DEM co-chair Tuncer Bakırhan expressed hope that the process would continue in a positive direction. DEM lawmaker Ceylan Akça described the legislation as a historic threshold and said it should lead to “absolute and authentic equality.”
But the demands of the party go beyond the disarmament. The Democratic Society Movement wants reforms in the legal and political system with respect to the rights of Kurdish culture, freedom of expression, prosecution of non-violent political activities, and treatment of the Kurdish politicians and activists. This demand is an indicator of the main difference between Ankara and Kurdish political movement.
The government of Turkey has made its laws taking into consideration only the aspect of security, disarmament, and rehabilitation. Disarmament, according to the DEM, is inseparable from the democratic reforms and equality of citizens. In February 2026, the recommendations of the National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission of the Parliament of Turkey involved increasing freedom of expression, releasing some old or ill prisoners, and not prosecuting non-violent activities under anti-terrorism laws.
The unresolved Öcalan question
The most sensitive issue is the position of Abdullah Öcalan.
Öcalan founded the PKK and has been imprisoned since his capture in 1999. Although he remains isolated from ordinary political activity, his statements continue to carry influence among the organisation’s supporters. His February 2025 call for the PKK to dissolve and abandon armed struggle helped initiate the present process.
The new law excludes Öcalan from its reintegration provisions. It also excludes senior PKK leaders and people serving aggravated life sentences. As a result, the legislation does not provide for his release or a reduction of his sentence.
For Ankara, excluding Öcalan protects the government from accusations that it is freeing the founder of an organisation blamed for decades of attacks. For the PKK and many Kurdish activists, however, his exclusion creates a contradiction: Turkey has relied on his authority to encourage disarmament but has not granted him a formal role in carrying out the process.
PKK leaders have warned that the law could become a “dead letter” if Öcalan is not freed or given an institutional role. That warning suggests that disarmament may depend not only on legal guarantees for ordinary fighters but also on the government’s willingness to maintain communication with the imprisoned leader.
Opposition criticism and public trust
The Republican People’s Party (CHP), Turkey’s main opposition party, supported the measure despite reservations. CHP leader Özgür Özel said his party would back the process so that Turkey would no longer receive news of fallen soldiers.
The CHP’s position reflects a broader public desire to end the violence, but the party has also raised questions about transparency, oversight and the government’s control of implementation.
The nationalist İYİ Party opposed the law. During the debate, İYİ lawmaker Turhan Çömez asked,
“How can you negotiate with terrorists?”
He argued that the PKK had previously promised to disarm and that the state should not offer concessions before unconditional surrender.
This disagreement reflects the difficult politics of transitional justice. Families of Turkish soldiers and civilians killed by the PKK may view any suspension of criminal proceedings as an unacceptable pardon. Kurdish communities affected by military operations, mass arrests and restrictions on political activity may regard the same measure as insufficient.
A conflict with a heavy human cost
The PKK began its armed rebellion in 1984, demanding an independent state for the Kurds of southeastern Turkey. Their goals changed over time, now including political rights and culture for the Kurds. Over 40,000 have been killed since then in this conflict, according to data reported by Reuters. The casualties consist of Turkish security forces, PKK militants, and civilians, though the numbers may differ depending on the method used and the period being considered. This conflict has also led to destruction and severe economic loss. Resumption of conflict after the failure of an earlier peace process in 2015 resulted in destruction of more than 6,000 buildings, according to Turkish sources, with the cost of reconstruction coming close to 1 billion Turkish lira at the time. The failure of the previous peace process was due in part to mistrust between the two parties and the changing environment of the region.
