The US is about to launch yet another nuclear-powered carrier in the Middle East region despite the fact that President Donald Trump keeps saying that the economic muscle of the country, not just its military capability, will finally determine the fate of this months-old confrontation with Iran. This happens against the backdrop of the imminent departure from San Diego of the USS Theodore Roosevelt to operate in the region for a period of no less than seven months, thus replacing the USS George Washington.
In the same breath, Trump has framed the administration’s sweeping sanctions campaign as the decisive instrument, telling Al Jazeera that
“our financial strength is unbelievable, and those things are going toward a very big victory,”
while adding that the war
“will continue for as long as necessary”
with no timetable to resume peace talks.
This dual-track strategy—carrier rotations to signal resolve and an escalating “economic onslaught” to strangle revenue—defines Washington’s current posture. It also underscores the political logic behind the administration’s messaging: that sanctions are not merely punitive but war-winning.
The deployment: what is moving, where, and for how long
The Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), which is based in San Diego and part of the Nimitz-class carrier group, is expected to be deployed to the 5th Fleet region in the coming weeks, and the planners are ensuring that the crew is ready for an at least seven-month deployment and possibly up to eight months. The carrier will be transporting about 5,000 sailors and embarked air wing as a mobile strike package able to sustain air warfare operations, maritime security activities, and deterrence patrols in the Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, and adjoining regions. This is another rotation in what is clearly a highly planned handover of the carriers. The USS George Washington was only just handed the responsibilities from the USS Abraham Lincoln the week before, and now the Roosevelt is due to relieve the George Washington to ensure there are no gaps in coverage.
What is significant about this particular timing is how much pressure it places on sustaining the nearly continuous carrier operations in the Middle East in the six months since the start of the war against Iran. As U.S. officials admit, this is taking a toll on the sailors, and regional allies are observing keenly any indication of a gap being left in the Pacific as the carriers are stationed in the Gulf. The message is clear for the stakeholders: Washington plans on maintaining a high-end strike capability forward deployed as it relies on secondary sanctions and sectoral determinations to strangle Iran’s funding capacity to fight the war.
Operation Economic Outcast: the sanctions architecture behind Trump’s claim
The backbone of Trump’s assertion that sanctions will win the war is a newly branded campaign: Operation Economic Outcast, unveiled by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on August 24. In a Treasury Department rollout, Bessent described the initiative as an “economic onslaught” designed to
“sever every economic lifeline that sustains this tyrannical regime until Tehran stands alone.”
In the administration’s fact sheet and statements, it is abundantly clear that total isolation is the objective: denying networks procurement for nuclear and missile technology, disrupting cyber-enabled funding, and, most important, pressuring the flow of oil and petrochemical revenues that finance the regime. The latest round imposes restrictions on nearly 60 firms, individuals, and vessels worldwide that help Iran’s procurement efforts and revenue-raising operations. More importantly, the secondary sanctions have expanded the scope of sanctions and issued new sectoral determinations under Executive Order 13902, including digital assets, technology, gold, aviation, and shipping – five critical sectors identified by the United States as those that sustain Iran’s pressured economy.
Administration officials have also made it clear that any entities that engage in money-laundering activities in favor of Iran could be expelled from the U.S. dollar system, meaning that this policy is directed at third-country banks, brokers, and trading companies. The total volume is significant. According to data released by the Treasury, more than 1,000 Iran-related persons, ships, and airplanes have been sanctioned since President Donald Trump started his second term, which gives the administration an opportunity to say that the financial blockade is now sufficient to change Tehran’s calculations. In this regard, sanctions as a winning war strategy is not just a rhetoric move but a deliberate description of economic warfare that is supported by military deployments.
The political message: “very big victory” without a timetable for talks
Trump’s public remarks on August 27 sharpened that message. Speaking to Al Jazeera, he said the United States is “achieving a very big victory” as the conflict nears six months, but he offered no endpoint and explicitly rejected the idea of an imminent return to negotiations. He told the network the war
“will continue for as long as necessary”
and that there is no timetable to resume peace talks, even as oil prices fell and diplomatic initiatives gained momentum in the Gulf.
That stance aligns with the administration’s broader narrative that time and economic pain are on Washington’s side. By coupling the carrier deployment with the sanctions rollout, the White House is signaling that it can sustain military pressure while ratcheting up financial isolation, and that it will not be rushed into a deal by short-term market moves or mediation overtures. At the same time, the rhetoric is calibrated for domestic and allied audiences: the promise of a “very big victory” through financial strength offers a politically palatable path to claiming success without committing to a specific endgame.
Diplomacy in the shadows: Qatar’s push and a Hormuz deadlock
Despite Trump’s insistence that there is no rush for dialogue, Gulf diplomacy is ongoing. On August 27, the prime minister of Qatar, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, visited Tehran in order to restart negotiations, among which the proposal of creating a temporary shipping route through the Strait of Hormuz in order to ease tensions that continue to be a threat for the free flow of oil throughout the world. Both Iranian and Omani officials also have plans for the creation of a temporary shipping corridor in the strait after incidents with oil tankers and the increase of military presence there.
However, the American position on the matter is more relaxed. The White House officials have already stated that they are “not in a hurry” regarding the start of negotiations despite all mediator attempts to break the deadlock around Hormuz. This contrast – the active role of Gulf countries in the dialogue and the strategic patience of the US – results in a rather complicated situation, in which the breakthrough may happen because of regional agreements despite the uncompromising position of Washington. In addition to that, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said that reaching an agreement with Iran is “impossible” due to their leaders being “savages.”
Operational strain and the wider strategic picture
The decision to send the Theodore Roosevelt for at least seven months, with preparations for eight, is not just about presence; it is a recognition of the toll that continuous carrier operations are taking on the force. U.S. officials have pointed to the strain of extended deployments on sailors and the need to manage rotations carefully to avoid burnout and readiness gaps. At the same time, allies in Asia have expressed concern that keeping multiple carriers in the Middle East could create vulnerabilities elsewhere, particularly in the Pacific, where U.S. force posture is already stretched.
From a strategic standpoint, the administration is betting that the combination of sustained carrier air power and an expanding sanctions web will gradually erode Iran’s capacity to sustain hostilities, whether through direct military means or via proxies and revenue-dependent networks. The risk, of course, is that economic pressure hardens positions, incentivizes workarounds, or triggers escalatory moves in the Strait that could draw the carrier into a crisis it was meant to deter.
What to watch next: carriers, sanctions, and the Hormuz flashpoint
There are three variables that will make or break Trump’s claim about sanctions winning the war. One is the carrier rotation: The U.S. may be able to continue uninterrupted strikes without overextending its carrier group if the arrival of the Theodore Roosevelt ensures this possibility. Two is the sanctions regime. Whether secondary sanctions or sectoral determination prove to be effective will hinge on the issue of enforcement, compliance by third countries, and the disruption of the flow of oil, shipping, and finance faster than Iran is capable of adjusting. Three is the Hormuz hotspot: Any crisis there that involves the closing of or blockade of the Strait will stretch the limits of the economic offensive and carrier deterrent mission.
