The 2025 territorial ambitions intensified drastically with a fresh military and political direction to establish control again in central and southern Somalia, which is driven by Al Shabab. In February, Operation Ramadan was an indication of a measured attempt to undo the previous victories of the government. The group had a growing pace as depicted in towns like Adan Yabaal which it was retaking in April following its loss in 2022. By mid-May, the militants had taken most of their pre-2022 strongholds within Middle Shabelle and lower Shabelle, capitalizing on the slow drawdown of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to take advantage of weakening security arrangements.
Their progress in the direction of Mogadishu strengthened the feeling of an imminent pressure on the capital. Roads transporting Mogadishu to Afgooye and Balcad fell under the constant encroachment, isolating districts that were used to regular flows of supplies. The people in these areas were thrown into further darkness as Al Shabab surrounded logistical routes that were the source of food, trade and humanitarian activities.
The government soldiers tried to stabilize the frontlines but clan militia such as the Ma’awisley in Hiran were often left to fight alone and this is why the lack of coordination was persistent. This looseness highlighted the fact that Al Shabab exploited the disintegration of the security system in Somalia.
Key territorial gains
The presence of Al Shabab was not just in the form of taking back towns, but also through enhanced dominance of the rural routes that are crucial to the economy of Somalia. At Lower Shabelle, there were scenes of aggressive invasions of Awdheegle and Afgoye, exerting even greater stress on agricultural societies and trade centers. The militants also continued to have a continuous influence in Lower Juba thus disrupting trade between Kismayo and the north districts.
Rural entrenchment strategies
The group was based on gradual rural superiority as opposed to massive urban conflicts. Checkpoints, night patrols and shadow governments maintained their control and enabled them to control movement in and out of agricultural areas.
Threats to Mogadishu’s perimeter
Al Shabab had reinforced its positions around Ceelasha Biyaha, which is less than 20 kilometers after the capital, raising the level of fear of new sieges. Periodic fire of mortar and probes augmented the fear that the group wanted to test the defensive perimeter of the capital before setting on bigger actions.
Environmental pressures shaping territorial control
Floods and drought cycles were enhanced up to 2025, which undermined the resilience of the communities. Al Shabab took advantage of such miseries by packaging themselves as adjudicators and minor welfare providers and established themselves at a point where the state authority was weak.
Recruitment and local dynamics
There was also a surge in recruitment that was associated with the deteriorating state of economies in the country. In the agricultural districts, young men who were experiencing increased levels of unemployment saw the Al Shabab organization as a way of earning a living and security. Clan loyalties also influenced the environment of recruitment whereby groups allied to Al Shabab on the basis of using the group to negotiate in local conflicts. Even though the use of coercion was paramount, the group became adaptive through the provision of selective incentives to solidify loyalty.
The economy was repressed and over-taxed slowly destroying the support of the civilian population, but the financial apparatus of the group was stable and guaranteed funding. The Somali forces had difficulties holding ground following military success because of poor administrative follow-through, which meant that Al Shabab could enter towns that had been defended by military operations weeks after they were abandoned.
Civilian toll in Somalia
In the year 2025, the human price of the Al Shabab territorial ambitions was still high. Displacement was the order of the day as the civilians were always provoked by bombardments, assassinations, and road closures. In Shabelle and Hiran regions, the markets experienced acute breakages with militants limiting the movements of the trucks and levying goods that exacerbated food insecurity, which was already increased by environmental shocks.
City centers were under their own threat. The siege of Mogadishu assisted in the increase of the number of directed bombings and sophisticated incursions. Civilian casualties were reported to have increased consistently between March and July, partly as a result of the group making increased use of the indirect fire in the disputed peripheries.
During the Al Shabab reign in rural regions, access to health and education declined very quickly. Organizations dealing with aids had trouble with movement restrictions and the United Nations reported that in 2025, humanitarian access restrictions were the tightest since 2020.
Displacement and humanitarian strain
More than 100,000 people have been displaced during the period between March and May alone and this is witnessed in Middle Shabelle alone as Al Shabab continued to conquer major outposts. People ran away to Mogadishu, Jowhar, overcrowded camps, which were already poor in sanitation, medicine, and money.
Pricing in the downstream districts was inflated through enforcement of trade routes. In certain towns, simple foodstuffs increased twofold because of payment of fees at multiple checkpoints and could not be afforded by a significant proportion of people. There were aid convoys which were often ambushed along roads connecting Beledweyne to Mogadishu, but appeared sporadically and with erratic frequency.
The involvement of the clan militias was aimed at creating safe zones in local areas, yet the secondary conflicts arose because of their actions and threatened civilians even more. Women and children suffered worstly, and they were deprived of maternal care, education, and healthy food.
Economic extortion tactics
Al Shabab formalized its tax regime in areas it controlled, obliging agriculture, livestock and business tax. The farmers were forced to give away part of their crops, at times to their subsistence. The zakat system that was presented as a duty of religion in the group turned into a kind of fiscal domination which financed the expansion of operations.
Anti-government blockades exacerbated misery. As people experienced fuel, medicine, and seed shortages, it reduced the long-term agricultural productivity. The traders who would go through these blocks were under a risk of either seizure of goods or even physical retaliations.
Spillover effects in neighboring regions
These aspirations of Al Shabab were felt across borders especially in Kenya where more attacks were experienced in Garissa, Wajir and Mandera counties up to 2025. In March, a dawn raid on the Somalia-Kenya frontier resulted in the death of six police reservists and in November the attack on an improvised explosive device on the Liboi-Kulan road led to the death of two officers. This showed increasing susceptibility of security patrols in remote border sections.
Ethiopia had to face less obvious impacts. Social groups along the Somali border started to face increasing displacement as families fled militant intimidation by those around them. Ethiopian security agents were in fear of the widening of militant supply lines in Jubaland with the potential to impact on the long-term stability within the Ogaden area.
During reductions in ATMIS, coordination at the regional level was delayed, which restricted cross-border intelligence, and helped to strengthen openness of transit routes in rural areas.
Strategic drivers behind aspirations
The territorial ambitions of Al Shabab became predetermined by the purposeful policy of isolating Mogadishu and regaining dominance in the countryside. The timing of operation Ramadan capitalized on the symbolic value of the holy month and the government focused on political reforms. Fiscal self-governance with extortion was used to finance the purchase of weapons, recruitment, and planning of operations.
Clan dynamics and shifting loyalties
Locally backed rebellions through clans opposing payment of taxes to Al Shabab offered temporary gaps to the entry of government forces. Nevertheless, the alliances came and went, which made Al Shabab negotiate settlements or split communities internally.
Limitations in international response
ATMIS troop reductions exposed critical vulnerabilities as Somali forces attempted ambitious offensives without the logistical foundation to sustain gains. International partners pushed for localized stabilization programs, yet inconsistent implementation left liberated areas without governance structures.
Impact of global militant networks
External affiliates influenced Al Shabab’s adaptability, providing ideological reinforcement and operational learning from theatres across the Sahel and Horn of Africa. United Nations sanctions renewed in February 2025 targeted maritime smuggling routes, but enforcement gaps allowed continued flow of supplies.
Long-term civilian ramifications
Prolonged militant control eroded social institutions across south-central Somalia. Education disruptions deepened generational divides, while long-term health outcomes declined due to chronic blockades. Neighboring states prepared for renewed refugee flows, anticipating economic and security pressures. Regional governments acknowledged that Al Shabab’s territorial aspirations could reshape border dynamics over the next decade if not countered through unified approaches.
As 2025 ended, the contours of Al Shabab’s expanding presence raised persistent questions about the durability of counterinsurgency strategies and whether emerging local partnerships or strengthened regional frameworks could alter the trajectory of civilian life in areas shadowed by their advance.
