The fact that ISIL remained well-functional as late as 2025 despite the universally-condemned nature of the group and persistent global counterterrorism efforts calls into further question how to counter decentralized, ideological threat. As formerly territorial caliphates ruled by the Islamic State are now gone, its affiliates have become active in fragile states, finding ways to attract followers by filling governance gaps and making use of technology to remain relevant.
This continuity poses an explicit threat to the capability of an international system to counter transnational extremist groups. Review of the Secretary-General to the Security Council in mid-2021 shows alarming shortcomings and lack of urgency in coordination and action planning – especially among the organizations tasked with responding to the problem on a global scale.
ISIL’s decentralized evolution and global footprint
The contemporary structure of ISIL has the form of a network of independent franchises, but not the form of a single chain of command. ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province) is one of the most powerful wings in Africa where it manages to work in Nigeria, Niger, and to some extent, Cameroon. ISWAP assault troops count up to 12,000 and the asymmetric warfare approach to their fighting can be explained by the change of strategies by the ISIL towards the focus on sustainability and local authority. On the same note, elements in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa are still carrying out coordinated Raids due to poor security structures in the regions.
Some insurgents of the ISIL in Iraq and Syria have been waging guerrilla-style attacks in the Middle East. A bomb attack in a Damascus church in the mid of 2025 that killed over 80 people was a show of the power to attack an iconic target and to disrupt peace activities. ISIL-Khorasan (ISIL-K) in Afghanistan whose fierceness is characterized by blatantly targeting ethnic minorities and international contingents is still spreading in the Central Asia region, where it is using terrain and local instabilities as ways of avoiding suppression.
Technological and psychological warfare
In addition to actual actions, ISIL pays more and more attention to the digital strategy. Through the use of artificial intelligence to distribute content and through encryption, it avoids detection, all the time attracting younger demographics who are disillusioned, across the world. Propaganda has also changed to include specific localized grievances such as economic marginalization in sub-Saharan Africa, and perceived western interference in Central Asia, which allow the recruiting and entrenching of ideologies.
Detention, rehabilitation, and future threats
There are around 34,800 members of the ISIL in the Syrian camps like Al-Hol and Al-Roj. Such populations consist of thousands of women and children, a major proportion of them being involuntarily brought. More than half of the detainees are children, so the camps form an explosive compound of humanitarian distraction and security threat. Coupled with the lack of proper deradicalization or reintegration programs, such facilities face the possibility of raising the next generation of radicals.
Newly witnessed UN-supported repatriation initiatives such as the almost 6,000 persons repatriated by five countries early in 2025 and Iraq’s ambitious force that repatriates 7,000 of its citizens, though commendable, are partial and short term. For reintegration programs, the legal systems are unstable and restrained by the state.
Legal and logistical gridlock
Refusal by many countries to repatriate its nationals has gone into creating a legal vacuum. Domestic jurisdictions deal with the problem of cumbersome evidence, and international law is weak to tackle foreign terrorist fighters. Such a stalemate poses problems to worldwide accountability initiatives and illuminates the non-existence of an international and legally-binding process that can be used to adjudicate crimes affiliated to ISIL.
Coordination shortfalls within the UN framework
Although the Counter-Terrorist Office in the UN provides a great facility of interaction, the real-time coordination continues to frustrate due to the conflicting priorities by the member countries. The tendency of strategic divergence also frequently stalls consensus, in that on the one hand militarized processes toward militarization often emphasized by the U.S. and Russia contrast with on the other hand EU-based development-oriented processes. Even in the event of agreements, there is a mixed bag during implementation that is diluted by regional wrangles and geopolitics.
Conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Yemen have turned into proxy battlegrounds where ISIL exploits divisions. The Security Council’s inability to enforce standardized responses or secure conflict zones has revealed its limitations in sustaining a unified front.
Intelligence sharing and financial disruption gaps
Nevertheless, ISIL uses illicit financial operations to finance its activities, in spite of frameworks created by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF); such illicit operations include smuggling and extortion, as well as transactions using cryptocurrencies. The failure to enforce consistently in the various jurisdictions will not allow these sources of revenue to be disrupted.
Equally, there is lack of intelligence sharing. Although bilateral agreements are in place, the UN system lacks a central repository of agreements and a mechanism through which the data exchange is to be facilitated among various actors in real time. This leads to lost chances of interception of possible attacks and elimination of working cells.
Toward more coherent counterterrorism governance
Filling the coordination gaps, will necessitate fresh efforts in treating counterterrorism as a shared, apolitical responsibility. There has been an increasing call to standardize international frameworks and to strengthen legal collaboration especially as there have been more attacks both in conflict and non-conflict areas. To maximize both legitimacy and long-term performance, higher-priority should be given to collective human rights principles even over security goals.
Implementation of a permanent and UN authorized rapid response task force, that could operate across different jurisdictions with host nation consent, may provide an enforcement gap fix. This kind of oversight model would need clear mandates, predictable financing, and tight controls to prevent its abuse.
Reintegration, not just repatriation
Rehabilitation and community reintegration programs must shift from ad hoc pilot projects to institutional priorities. States and UN agencies need to jointly invest in education, trauma care, and vocational pathways, particularly for children and youth held in detention. Without this, security investments may only postpone—not prevent—resurgent radicalization.
Adapting to the digital front
The counter-ISIL strategy must evolve alongside the threat. Investment in digital counter-propaganda, cyber-monitoring, and online disruption tools will be essential to prevent ideological spread and recruitment. Partnerships with technology companies, civil society, and academia can help create agile responses that target content without infringing on freedom of speech.
Sustained urgency and global accountability
The global community cannot afford to approach ISIL as a legacy threat. Its ideological adaptability, use of modern technology, and strategic exploitation of geopolitical gaps allow it to survive and, in some regions, expand. Security expert Secretary of State Noem noted that “ISIL’s resilience retains the upper hand; hence multilateral unity remains non-negotiable for global peace.”
Her remarks reflect the growing recognition that combating terrorism today is as much about governance capacity as it is about military force.
ISIL’s ongoing relevance raises difficult questions about the structures underpinning international security cooperation. The UN, while positioned to lead, remains constrained without broader political cohesion and operational authority. Whether the world can mobilize a more integrated and just response to terrorism will not only determine the fate of groups like ISIL, but also serve as a benchmark for the resilience of multilateralism itself in an era of global volatility.
