In the disputed South China Sea, there is a new and fast developing construction campaign taking place by China that is focused on the Paracel archipelago. The new construction effort includes not only an artificial island on Antelope Reef but also several strategically important installations on neighboring Yagong Islet. What makes this construction effort particularly significant is the fact that it is following years of quiescence on the Paracels. The new development appears to be aimed at increasing military and coercive pressure in a highly disputed maritime passageway. Given its speed, scale, and design, it seems that China does not limit itself to improvements of existing facilities but tries to build a system of air, naval, and surveillance assets which might complicate scenarios for Taiwan and the wider Indo-Pacific.
The focal point: Antelope Reef’s transformation
At the centre of this buildup is Antelope Reef, called Lingyang Jiao in Chinese and Đá Hải Sâm in Vietnamese, a structure in the Crescent Group of the Paracels that up until the end of 2025 was mostly underwater at high tide. According to satellite analysis conducted in August 2026, China finished the first phase of building an artificial island of approximately 1,490 – 1,500 acres in length of about six kilometres. This was made possible by aggressive dredging that moved one million tons of sand and coral in less than a year; a pace that experts call “breakneck” when compared with previous building up processes in the Spratlys. There are already quite many infrastructure developments taking place at Antelope Reef. An enlarged lagoon acts as a deep water harbour equipped with a wharf measuring around 680 metres, which will be used for harboring warships, coast guard vessels and logistics ships.
Photos taken in mid-August show a China Coast Guard ship that is already docked at the newly built pier, which proves that the facilities are fast transforming into fully operational ones. In addition to the harbour, there is also a helipad, administration buildings, living quarters, internal roads and at least two concrete production units – all of which clearly indicate a permanent settlement on this area and not just a temporary construction camp. However, the most important feature currently being developed at Antelope Reef is a stretch of the coastline, which is more than three kilometres in length, and that is graded to serve as a base for a military-grade runway of approximately 3,000 meters. Earthworks on the runway base in mid-August were reported to be completed only halfway without any poured concrete yet, but the length and positioning make the objective obvious enough. With such a runway fighters, maritime patrol aircraft and even bigger planes can be based on Antelope, thus expanding the scope of Chinese air power in the northern part of the South China Sea.
Strategically, Antelope’s location amplifies its significance. The reef lies approximately 160 nautical miles south of Hainan Island, home to the PLA Navy’s key Yulin base that hosts aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, and about 200 nautical miles east of Da Nang in Vietnam. This places Antelope within easy striking distance of vital sea lanes that carry a large share of global trade and energy shipments, while also situating it as a potential forward node for operations related to any future Taiwan contingency. Analysts have noted that a fully operational Antelope base would enable China to project air and naval power further south, while adding another layer of surveillance and anti-access capability that could complicate efforts by the United States and its allies to reinforce Taiwan or operate freely in the South China Sea.
Yagong Islet: a smaller piece with outsized implications
While Antelope Reef dominates headlines due to its scale, simultaneous construction on the much smaller Yagong Islet, also known as Yagong Reef, underscores the integrated nature of China’s approach. Yagong lies about 14 kilometres northeast of Antelope within the same Crescent Group of the Paracels, an area under Chinese control since 1974 but still claimed by Vietnam. Commercial satellite imagery captured by Vantor on August 17, 2026 shows a new three-pronged structure on Yagong that analysts assess is likely an early-warning radar or observation facility linked to the larger Antelope project.
According to Vantor, the construction works on Yagong began in March or April 2026, the last images showing that the new buildings were erected by mid-August. The fact indicates that Beijing is taking concerted steps by developing Antelope into a major outpost and creating smaller and specialized outposts around it in order to expand the range of sensor monitoring and improving targeting data for air defense and anti-ship system. Security researchers who analyzed the images described the new buildings as resembling radar or early warning stations seen on other Chinese facilities in the South China Sea.
As Collin Koh, a security researcher based in Singapore told Reuters,
“it’s most likely a radar station, if I can make an educated guess,”
whereas Damien Symon, a tracker of open-source military affairs, said it could be a radar station though it was not completely clear yet. The assumptions of the security scholars are consistent with the overall Chinese behavior in the region when small islets and reefs are being installed with sensors and communication devices which feed into the greater system of command, control and intelligence. Thus, in the light of the current situation, the new installation on Yagong Island must be considered not as a separate project but rather as the supporting installation for the Antelope outpost.
Beijing’s narrative: civilian purposes, strategic ambiguity
Just as in previous island-building exercises, Beijing has been prudent in presenting its activity in the Paracels through a civilian perspective. Chinese state media and publications such as the Global Times have referred to the construction on Antelope Reef as
“improving the living conditions for residents and fishermen in the area”,
including providing services such as weather forecasting, fisheries protection, and scientific research among others. This rhetoric is in line with the long-held stance by China to refer to its South China Sea infrastructure as dual-use facilities which provide both public good functions and serve the purpose of improving its military capabilities.
In any case, there have been no official Chinese confirmation on the creation of a military base on Antelope. The Chinese defence ministry has not provided any response to media inquiries regarding the installation. This ambiguity provides Beijing the diplomatic space to continue with its infrastructural expansion in the region. Through the civilian functions being provided by the installation, China hopes to deflect international criticisms and make difficult for claimant states as well as outside powers to use the UNCLOS to mount legal challenges against the Chinese installation.
Regional reactions and the broader claimant landscape
The current construction takes place in an environment characterized by a number of overlapping sovereignty claims, making the South China Sea region historically one of conflict. Although China has possession of the whole Paracel archipelago, Vietnam lays claim to the islands and has recently increased its construction within the Spratly Islands. The Antelope station is viewed by Vietnamese experts and officials as part of a greater campaign by China to establish its domination over the northern part of the South China Sea, securing a strategic edge that will come handy during future crises.
Besides Vietnam, other claimants to the South China Sea include the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei, all claiming different parts of the region. The Paracels are claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan, whereas the Spratly Islands are claimed by all five claimants. None of these countries has been able to keep up with China’s construction pace in terms of size and speed, with many of them having in recent years concentrated more on improving their existing stations than embarking on major reclamation programs.
Strategic implications: from local outposts to regional leverage
The combination of Antelope and Yagong is much more than another fortification system for islands; this represents a shift in the strategic thinking of China concerning the use of the South China Sea. In this case, analysts predict that the Antelope will become a multi-function base able to host radar, anti-aircraft systems, anti-ship missiles, air and naval operations. If we combine this large base with smaller units like Yagong, we may receive a network that will include all intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems to coordinate the actions of defensive and offensive forces in a large area. The network approach allows China to conduct A2/AD – anti-access/area denial strategy to increase the cost and risks for the foreign state operating in the South China Sea. Practically speaking, a functional Antelope will help PLA to observe and resist military and civilian movements not only in the small zone but in the northern part of the South China Sea. Moreover, this base will be used as a starting point to conduct operations near Taiwan. Analytically, Antelope complicates the reinforcement of Taiwan by the USA and its allies because this gives Chinese air, naval and missile forces another point of departure.
The timing of this build-up is also significant. It comes amid heightened tensions over Taiwan, growing U.S. security cooperation with the Philippines and other regional partners, and ongoing legal and diplomatic friction over China’s expansive maritime claims. The 2016 UNCLOS tribunal ruling, which rejected the legal basis for China’s “nine-dash line” claims, remains a point of contention, with Beijing continuing to assert historic rights while framing its activities as civilian and lawful. The new installations at Antelope and Yagong reinforce the reality that, regardless of legal rulings, China is shaping the facts on the water in ways that increasingly reflect its strategic preferences.
