North Korea’s military support for Russia’s war against Ukraine has entered a potentially more dangerous phase. Pyongyang has already supplied Moscow with artillery ammunition, missiles, launchers and troops. But the reported deployment of a North Korean missile unit to western Russia suggests that North Korea is moving beyond the transfer of weapons and personnel and may now be providing an organised operational capability.
As per Andrii Cherniak, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence, also known as GUR or HUR, the unit is already in the process of deployment to western Russia. It may possibly consist of around 120 ballistic missiles and six launchers, with some 90 North Koreans expected to work out of Russia’s Voronezh region. The unit may reportedly become part of the 112th Missile Brigade of Russia. The reported location of the base is around 150 kilometres from the Ukrainian border, meaning that the unit will become accessible to almost all parts of eastern and central Ukraine, depending on the types of missiles employed.
However, there is no confirmation of the report by Russia, North Korea or any other independent observers. Nonetheless, it fits in with the overall military relationship established by Moscow and Pyongyang since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
The development is important not only because of the number of missiles involved, but because it could give Russia access to additional trained missile crews, a fresh stockpile of short-range ballistic missiles and a partner willing to absorb political and military risks that Moscow may prefer not to carry alone.
What Ukraine says has been deployed
Cherniak told Reuters that North Korea had already delivered a fresh batch of 40 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles, together with personnel associated with the systems. He said the full structure of the deployment and its final missile total would be determined during high-level talks between Moscow and Pyongyang expected in September.
This formulation is important. It seems that the number of 120 missiles refers to the expected or projected capabilities of the unit and not the exact quantity already deployed in Russia. Similarly, it is possible that the number of six launchers refers to projected capabilities as well. There is no evidence in the available information that proves that all six launchers are operational or that the missiles are stored in one place or whether there has been any missile fired from this unit against Ukraine. KN-23 and KN-24 are short-range North Korean ballistic missiles used on the battlefield. Both types of missiles have proven challenging to the conventional air defence systems owing to their speed and maneuverability during certain stages of their flight.
Russia and Ukraine have accused each other of the use of North Korean ballistic missiles against each other before. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine, while speaking to reporters in July 2026, had claimed that Russia might have fired a North Korean-made missile at a village, killing five people from the same family. Reuters had described this case as the first use of a North Korean ballistic missile by Russia in almost a year of the war. As per Ukraine’s military intelligence estimates, Russia had received some 148 KN-23 and KN-24 missiles from North Korea as early as January 2025. Another estimation put the number of North Korean-made missiles in Russia at 150 or so since late 2023.
From ammunition to missile crews
North Korea’s involvement initially focused on supplying Russia with artillery shells and other conventional ammunition. The scale of those transfers has been described by Western governments and independent analysts as substantial, involving millions of rounds and thousands of shipping containers.
An assessment by the U.S. government in January 2025 stated that North Korea has sent over 20,000 containers of military hardware to Russia since December 2023. According to Washington, these shipments consisted of at least six million artillery shells and over 100 ballistic missiles. Additionally, another report from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency assessed that North Korea had shipped at least three million artillery shells, along with ballistic missiles and other military hardware. This disparity between the two figures is an illustration of different timescales and methods used for estimation rather than contradicting reports. This missile unit constitutes a qualitative shift.
A military cargo could be incorporated into existing Russian units, but a specialized missile unit would imply that a specific command structure, communications, logistical support, and other measures have been taken into account. The incorporation of such a unit into the 112th Missile Brigade would indicate that Russia plans to employ North Korean weaponry within its own military apparatus.
It would also allow North Korean personnel to gain direct battlefield experience. Their exposure could include missile targeting, launch procedures, Russian command systems, electronic warfare, counter-battery operations and the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defences. Such experience could later benefit North Korea’s own missile forces on the Korean Peninsula.
The troop dimension
North Korea’s military relationship with Russia expanded dramatically after the two countries signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty in June 2024. The agreement includes a mutual-assistance provision requiring the parties to provide military and other support if either country is attacked and enters a state of war.
North Korean military contingents arrived in Russia at the end of 2024, by the assessment of Ukrainian, South Korean, and Western sources. Ukraine claimed that the first contingent was approximately 12,000 strong, counting both officers and senior officers. A portion of those troops was subsequently transferred to Russia’s Kursk Oblast, where Ukrainian forces had managed to capture some territory during an incursion across the border. By 2025 and 2026, the number of North Korean forces involved in the war is believed to have increased to approximately 14,000-15,000 people, including combat and engineering units.
In early 2026, South Korean intelligence reportedly estimated that there were about 10,000 combat troops and 1,000 engineering personnel in Kursk Oblast or its vicinity. North Korean casualties have also been significant, but no exact figures can be given. Ukrainian and Western evaluations speak of thousands of casualties. According to Ukrainian sources, there were over 2,250 North Koreans killed and 4,800 wounded; British and South Korean estimates put North Korean casualties at over 6,000 people.
North Korea officially acknowledged in April 2025 that its troops had fought for Russia. Pyongyang described the participation as part of the bilateral treaty and claimed that its forces had helped secure the “complete liberation” of Russia’s Kursk region.
The missile deployment would therefore be the latest stage in a relationship that has already progressed from political support to ammunition deliveries, then to battlefield manpower and now potentially to direct operation of missile systems.
Pyongyang’s political calculation
Several factors make support for Russia beneficial to the North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. Firstly, there are opportunities to get economic aid, fuels and foods. Secondly, there are opportunities to get diplomatic aid and probably some advanced military technologies. There is an opportunity for the North Korean forces to gain experience in fighting in the modern conventional war using drones, smart munitions, satellite reconnaissance and multi-layered air defense system. Kim Jong Un has already shown his support for Russia. In his meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, he assured him of “unconditional support” for the activities of Russia in Ukraine. This phrase shows Pyongyang’s political stance. The North Koreans describe Russia’s aggression against Ukraine as a war with the USA and NATO, not an illegal aggression against Ukraine.
The relationship also gives Pyongyang greater diplomatic protection. Russia has veto power at the UN Security Council and has increasingly challenged Western efforts to isolate North Korea. Moscow’s veto in March 2024 ended the mandate of the UN panel that monitored sanctions against Pyongyang, weakening international scrutiny of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes.
Moscow’s military needs
The fact that Russia was able to maintain the high tempo of fighting due to the significant presence of a domestic industry producing defense-related products is true; however, it has had to meet ongoing needs for artillery shells, missiles, and people. The North Korean contribution to Moscow will help it maintain the pace of attacks and keep Russian supplies for future tasks. The possible addition of six launchers and 120 missiles is unlikely to make a difference in the overall picture of the war. Russia is in possession of large missiles arsenals and produces them itself. Nonetheless, North Korean missiles may be used as an addition to Russian arsenal during the intensive attacks or when Russia needs to save some more sophisticated missiles. The fact that Russia received such equipment from North Korea also has political value for Russia.
The Kremlin has generally avoided detailed confirmation of North Korean arms transfers. When asked in January 2024 about U.S. and Ukrainian allegations that Russia had fired North Korean missiles, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov responded, “No comment.”
That approach allows Moscow to benefit from the cooperation while limiting direct acknowledgment of possible violations of UN sanctions or responsibility for specific weapons used in attacks.
UN sanctions and legal concerns
North Korea has been subject to UN sanctions since 2006 because of its nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes. Security Council resolutions prohibit Pyongyang from exporting arms and prohibit UN member states from procuring military equipment, training or related assistance from North Korea.
The United States and European governments say the transfer of North Korean weapons to Russia violates those resolutions. A joint Western statement issued in January 2024 said the export of North Korean weapons to Russia
“blatantly violates multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions.”
The reported unit of missiles will exacerbate the issue as the presence of weapons here is complemented by military men and cooperation. In case of an attack by North Korean soldiers with missiles on Ukraine, it will be hard to define which state will be responsible for those strikes which are in violation of the international humanitarian law. Legality of each strike will depend on the target and context. Strikes targeting military objects will be legal if they comply with such concepts as distinction, proportionality, and precaution.
A wider escalation
Ukraine’s concern is not limited to the missile unit. President Zelenskyy has warned that Russia may seek as many as 30,000 additional North Korean troops. That figure refers to a reported future requirement rather than a confirmed deployment, but it indicates Kyiv’s fear that the Moscow–Pyongyang partnership could expand considerably.
Another benefit that the establishment of a missile unit in Voronezh may have is creating a precedent for other North Korean units in Russia. In case of success, Russia can demand more launcher, ammunition, air defence, and even special troops. Meanwhile, North Korea will be interested in acquiring new technology from Russia in order to improve its own ballistic missiles, satellites, and air defence. Concerning Ukraine, its main worry is that there may be more ballistic missile strikes on its cities, energy facilities, and military logistics infrastructure. For Western governments, the issue is that sanctions are getting weaker and a new military axis is being formed between Russia and North Korea.
