Taiwan briefly reduced mobile internet speeds across the north on Thursday as part of a new civil-defense experiment designed to test how society would function during a major emergency. The 30-minute exercise, held from 2:30 p.m. to 3 p.m. local time, coincided with air-raid sirens, traffic restrictions and instructions for residents to move indoors or enter designated shelters.
It was the northern part of the first planned experiment in throttling mobile network service in Taiwan. There had been a similar test done in central Taiwan on Monday. Combined, these two tests involved 14 cities and counties, including the political, economic and technological hubs of the country. This was part of the Urban Resilience and Air Defense Exercise which was carried out simultaneously with the annual Han Kuang military exercise.
It was aimed at simulating a serious communication slowdown as a result of war, cyber attack, infrastructure damage, natural disaster or overload. This is an important distinction to make. Taiwan did not just cut off its population from communications. Instead, telecommunications companies were asked to throttle mobile data service while still trying to keep voice service, SMS, emergency communication and cell broadcasting intact.
The practical message was stark: in a crisis, citizens may still be able to send a text or make a call, but they may not be able to watch video, upload photographs, use mobile banking, scan a QR code or access cloud services.
What the exercise actually tested
This meant that the mobile network had been cut down to around 256 Kbps, which is equal to 0.256 Mbps. This figure is far lower than that which could normally be recorded for the use of 4G and 5G networks. This means that at such a low speed, only text-based applications will work, but anything more advanced like image-based websites, video conferencing, online payment systems and file transfer would take an exceptionally long time or not work at all. Therefore, the term “text-only speed,” mentioned in some accounts of the drill, needs to be interpreted as the way users experience such Internet rather than any sort of restriction placed on applications. Some web pages would still open successfully, but others would time out due to the low speed. In order to create uncertainty, certain types of communication had been selected, on which some data-dependent services were supposed to malfunction.
That list highlights the extent to which civilian resilience now depends on communications systems. A person may not need video streaming during an air raid, but a digital ticket, bank authentication code or QR-based identity check could become important when trying to travel, buy supplies or receive medical treatment.
The test also examined institutional preparedness. Taiwan’s Tourism Administration warned that official websites, online services and electronic payment systems accessed through mobile networks could be temporarily unavailable. It advised users to rely on fixed broadband or Wi-Fi where possible and avoid essential online transactions during the scheduled period.
The advice reflects a central feature of the exercise: authorities wanted citizens to identify their backup options before a real emergency. If mobile data becomes unreliable, families may need to rely on SMS, voice calls, home internet, landlines, battery-powered radios or previously agreed meeting points.
A drill visible in empty streets
The internet outage did not take place in a vacuum. Air raid alarms sounded throughout northern Taiwan, people were ordered off the streets and vehicles told to stop. The normally bustling intersections in Taipei and the surrounding area saw no traffic, as citizens sought shelter in designated locations and stayed put. The idea was to simulate the beginning of a military crisis. The deserted streets created a visual link between the readiness of the military and the actions of civilians.
As soldiers trained for battle maneuvers at other locations, the average citizen trained for sheltering, evacuation, and communications under difficult conditions. It has become increasingly crucial for the island’s military planning strategy. A military confrontation is not restricted to military sites and coastlines; it may entail disruptions of transportation, energy, hospitals, payment systems, telecommunication, and local governance. The Urban Resilience Exercise seeks to find out if civilian organizations can function while the military deals with the attack.
Taiwan’s 2026 Han Kuang drills were scheduled for approximately 10 days and nine nights. The exercises focused on decentralized command, preserving military forces, defending key infrastructure, countering landing operations, responding to blockade scenarios and sustaining resistance during a prolonged conflict.
The network-throttling component adds a new dimension. Earlier Han Kuang exercises concentrated mainly on military capabilities. The 2026 program placed greater emphasis on the civilian systems that would determine whether Taiwan could continue functioning during a crisis.
Why China is central to the scenario
While Taiwan’s leaders portrayed the exercise as a preparation for a number of contingencies, the broader context is the danger posed by China. China considers Taiwan a province of itself and has not disavowed the use of force to bring Taiwan under its sway. The Taiwan government denies China’s sovereignty claims over Taiwan and states that the island’s future should be determined by the people of Taiwan.
A clash with China would involve actions against communications without necessarily destroying all of the networks. Cyber warfare, jamming, sabotage, attacks on energy supplies and cutting of submarine cable links can all cut down the bandwidth available. A blockade or military quarantine could further hamper repair efforts as well as movement of technicians and replacements. In the case of Taiwan, a slowdown in the speed of the network will be particularly damaging because mobile broadband connections are needed for everyday commercial and governmental transactions. Even if voice calls and SMS remained possible, the inability of mobile broadband connection could result in confusion about services available.
That is why the exercise simulated throttling rather than a total shutdown. A complete outage is easier to recognize. A partially functioning system is more difficult to manage because users may continue attempting transactions, sending files or accessing applications without knowing whether the failure is local, temporary or widespread.
The government’s case for the exercise
Taiwanese officials argued that the disruption was necessary because resilience cannot be tested only in conference rooms. The public must understand what happens when mobile data becomes severely constrained, and government agencies must learn whether their own critical platforms can operate through alternative networks.
President Lai Ching-te acknowledged the inconvenience caused to residents and appealed for public support.
“We ask for your understanding and support, as this is a necessary drill,”
Lai Ching-te said.
The president’s message reflected the political balancing act surrounding the exercise. Taiwan wants to demonstrate readiness without suggesting that war is imminent. It also needs to normalize civil-defense preparation without creating panic or allowing every temporary network problem to be interpreted as evidence of an attack.
Authorities publicized the timing and affected areas in advance. That helped distinguish the exercise from a real communications failure and gave businesses, tourists, hospitals and residents time to prepare. The official tourism notice specifically warned that mobile access to government websites, online services and electronic payment platforms could be affected between 2:30 p.m. and 3 p.m.
The exercise also tested whether people would respond to official warnings. During a genuine attack or disaster, authorities may have only minutes to direct people toward shelters, restrict traffic and communicate changes in danger zones. A population that ignores sirens or remains dependent on online video and social media could be more vulnerable.
Criticism and practical limitations
The exercise also came in for criticism. Some critics wondered if it was possible for a planned slowdown of 30 minutes to reflect the kind of confusion in an actual attack. In an actual war, mobile networks would be destroyed, electricity could be down, satellites could be knocked out of commission and misinformation could run rampant all at the same time. A throttling test also does not mimic physical destruction. Telecommunications firms already knew that the test would happen, preparations were made and people were informed in advance. None of this applies to a surprise attack.
There is also the technical issue of whether 256 Kbps truly reflects an actual wartime scenario. An actual network would degrade in a patchwork manner, with some communities losing their connection while others remained connected. People close to active cell phone towers would still have connectivity, but people in hospitals or shelters in destroyed communities would be cut off from communications. Despite all these issues, the central Taiwan test revealed some important weaknesses. Some users reported being so disconnected that they could not even access browser pages or download images. Others reported problems with Internet communications applications.
That distinction matters for emergency planners. Preserving a network on paper is not enough if residents cannot access maps, authentication codes, medical records or government instructions. Authorities must test not only whether a signal exists, but whether essential applications can perform under severe restrictions.
The broader security signal
Taiwan’s mobile internet test sends two messages at once.
Domestically, it tells the public that national defense includes preparation for daily disruption. Citizens may be asked to shelter, stop driving, avoid unnecessary calls and use lower-bandwidth communications. Businesses are being encouraged to consider backup payment systems, alternative authentication methods and fixed-network access.
Internationally, it signals that Taiwan is expanding the definition of defense readiness. The island is not focusing only on aircraft, missiles and naval vessels. It is also examining how hospitals, local governments, supermarkets, communications providers and transport networks might operate during a prolonged crisis.
The exercise took place amid wider military activity. Taiwan practiced anti-blockade operations, coastal defense and responses to potential Chinese attack scenarios during the broader Han Kuang program. Reuters reported that 18 Chinese military aircraft and 11 Chinese naval vessels were operating around Taiwan between Wednesday and Thursday morning, underscoring the security environment in which the drills were held.
Still, the internet slowdown itself should not be interpreted as evidence that an attack was underway. It was a scheduled, controlled test conducted by Taiwan’s own authorities.
