Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s efforts to ban the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reflect a shift in the United Kingdom‘s approach to defining, understanding and combating terrorism, extending the focus of counterterrorism laws beyond non-state actors. Traditionally, UK laws like the Terrorism Act 2000 targeted non-state actors, creating a legislative vacuum for groups that operate on the fringes of state institutions but engage in proxy violence and covert operations.
This law reform follows an understanding of threats that now transcend institutional divides. Hybrid forms of state-backed actors are increasingly involved in intelligence, ideological, and paramilitary operations. In promising new legislation in July 2026, Prime Minister Keir Starmer underscores an effort to bring regulatory responses into line with emergent security challenges.
Addressing gaps in existing terrorism laws
Current proscription powers have struggled to adapt to groups such as Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which simultaneously act as formal arms of a state and enablers of proxy militant activity. While UK courts have previously ruled elements of the IRGC’s activities as terrorism, it has not been formally proscribed and therefore lacks enforcement mechanisms.
Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of terrorism law, recognised these as “gaps” that enable state-connected entities to bypass the restrictions that apply to non-government entities. His proposals underpin the new regime, arguing that proscription powers should apply to state-sponsored groups where there is evidence of involvement in violence, intimidation or destabilisation.
Timing around parliamentary and security developments
The legislative process is closely linked to the parliamentary period following the King’s Speech in May 2026, framing the idea as part of a national security strategy. This timing shows how counterterrorism measures are being prioritised as part of broader institutional agendas, rather than an isolated response.
The timing is also a response to increased sensitivities in the wake of events such as the April 2026 attempted arson attack on a synagogue in northwest London. Investigations are ongoing, but the incident highlighted concerns about the capabilities of extremist networks and their potential ties to foreign states, building momentum for the legislation.
Evolving threat landscape and hybrid security challenges
The Starmer ban on IRGC needs to be seen in the context of the changing nature of the UK threat landscape, where the boundaries between terrorism, espionage and geopolitical competition have blurred. Intelligence agencies have consistently alerted us to the fact that state actors now use a blend of covert influence, cyber and proxy violence.
MI5’s surveillance of more than 40,000 individuals is a testament to the challenges. While the threat of Islamist extremism is still a core concern, the blending of state-backed activities with this threat environment adds complexity to risk calculations. For example, Iranian and Russian-related networks have been implicated in recent years for engaging in activities across various domains.
Proxy networks and operational ambiguity
State-backed entities like the IRGC may operate through a network of proxies, allowing plausible deniability while enabling strategic coordination. These proxies can perform a variety of tasks, including fundraising, recruitment and even operations planning, often through transnational platforms or within diaspora communities.
This blurriness makes it harder to enforce existing legislation, which relies on organisational structures and attribution. The UK government seeks to alleviate this problem by extending proscription powers to state actors, enabling earlier and more effective intervention.
Integration of espionage and terrorism frameworks
This new bill also signals a blurring of the lines between counterterrorism and counter-espionage. Historically, legal responses dealt with these issues separately: terrorism laws responded to violent non-state actors, while national security laws responded to espionage.
But hybrid threats have blurred this distinction. The proposed approach aims to merge these frameworks, allowing a more comprehensive response to hybrid actors. This development is in line with developments since 2015, when European governments began to reevaluate legislation and policies in response to changing threats associated with the conflict in Ukraine and the Middle East.
Political consensus and stakeholder responses
The Starmer initiative to ban the IRGC has attracted the support of various political and community stakeholders, underscoring a high level of agreement about reform. Official statements suggest that the new legislation is not an ideological shift, but a response to evolving challenges.
Starmer highlighted the need for the initiative, saying legislation is needed “to implement necessary actions” against hostile states. This approach casts the bill as a practical approach to perceived dangers.
Government rationale and policy continuity
The initiative is consistent with the Labour Party’s earlier announcements before the 2024 election, promising to clarify the legal status of the IRGC. In 2025, Home Secretary Yvette Cooper announced the government’s adoption of Jonathan Hall’s recommendations, affirming policy continuity.
This is also evident in the alignment of the new legislation with existing initiatives like Martyn’s Law, which was enacted in 2025 and targeted security measures for public spaces. These measures are part of a comprehensive approach to enhance resilience, both physical and institutional.
community perspectives and societal impact
Community organizations, particularly within the UK’s Jewish population, have welcomed the move as a long-overdue response to concerns about state-linked threats. Phil Rosenberg described the legislation as fulfilling demands that have gained urgency in recent years, especially amid rising incidents linked to geopolitical tensions.
At the same time, civil liberties advocates are likely to scrutinize the implementation of these powers, particularly regarding definitions and thresholds for proscription. The challenge lies in ensuring that expanded authorities do not inadvertently encroach on legitimate political expression or academic engagement with foreign policy issues.
Implications for UK counterterror architecture and global alignment
The UK’s new proscription powers for state-linked groups mark a key development in its counterterrorism framework, with far-reaching implications. Through equalisation of penalties for supporting these groups with those for non-state terrorist groups, the new laws aim to establish a consistent enforcement approach.
This includes the possibility of up to 14 years’ imprisonment for membership or providing material support, and increased powers for freezing assets and restricting travel. These powers are designed to cut off funding and support for state-backed activities in the UK.
Enforcement capacity and institutional adaptation
The success of the new regime will rely on the ability of enforcement authorities to put these powers to use. This involves the establishment of criteria for designation, collection of admissible evidence, and the cooperation between intelligence, law enforcement and court systems.
History has shown that transparency and consistency in designation decisions will be essential for credibility. Parliamentary oversight is designed to bring decisions under scrutiny, minimising the potential for politicisation.
International coordination and precedent setting
The Starmer move on the IRGC also places the UK on the frontlines of international efforts against state-sponsored terrorism. The US and Canada have already designated the IRGC or its parts, providing a basis for improved intelligence cooperation and collective action.
Through its own measures, the UK enhances its capacity to work with partners to monitor and counter transnational networks. It also helps shape the global norms around how to deal with state-backed entities involved in coercive and violent actions.
Balancing security imperatives with legal safeguards
The key challenge for the proposed legislation is striking the right balance between effective security measures and legal safeguards and human rights. The expansion of proscription powers to state-related groups brings up issues of jurisdiction, proof and support.
Jonathan Hall KC’s proposed framework highlights the need to preserve the existing criteria and process for designations, so that decisions are made on the basis of evidence of involvement in harmful activities, rather than political motives. This aims to maintain legitimacy while increasing the powers of the system.
However, the nature of hybrid threats implies that laws will need to be flexible. The blurring of the lines between counterterrorism and national security measures is part of an ongoing “recalibration” following domestic and global events after 2015.
As the UK pursues these reforms, the implications go beyond its target, the IRGC. The new laws indicate an awareness that the nature of conflict has changed, and states must recalibrate their approach to defining and addressing threats that transcend traditional borders. It remains to be seen whether this recalibration will offer a sustainable framework for other democracies facing similar challenges, based as much on future developments as the intentions of the July 2026 proposals.
