A reception was held at the Chinese embassy in Niamey in February 2025 to welcome China’s first defense attache to Niger, Colonel-Major Chen Xuming. During his meeting with the Nigerien ambassador Jiang Feng and top military chiefs, including Sani Kache, secretary-general of the defense ministry, Chen pledged to work with them to implement the Global Security Initiative – The framework for Chinese international security cooperation – “to expand and deepen cooperation between the two militaries.”
As part of his speech, Jiang vowed that China would “support Niger in strengthening its security capabilities and in the fight against terrorism and cross-border crime in order to preserve the peace and security of Niger and the region.”
China’s support for Niger’s military junta reflects a broader trend. In the Sahel, a semi-arid zone south of the Sahara, China is similarly assisting the military governments in Burkina Faso and Mali to enhance their military capabilities. This aligns with a geopolitical shift where China steps in to fill the gap left by departing French and US forces, as part of a strategic initiative aimed at safeguarding its interests in Africa, experts suggest.
One reason behind Chen’s appointment is to redress the balance of military attaches, as China has fewer in Africa than Africa does in China, according to David Shinn, a China-Africa specialist and professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.
“As Niger has ended security ties with France and the United States, China has stepped up arms sales, which is an added incentive to assign a military attache,”
Shinn said.
China has significant investments in Niger’s oil sector. PetroChina, a subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), built a 2,000km (1,243-mile) pipeline to take oil from the landlocked country to Seme, an Atlantic port in neighboring Benin. CNPC has invested more than US$4 billion in Niger’s petroleum industry, and PetroChina owns two-thirds of the country’s Agadem oilfield.
In addition to crude oil, Niger is home to Africa’s highest-quality uranium ore, making up about 5 percent of global mining output. For many years, uranium from this source has supported France’s nuclear energy sector, but now China is seeking to acquire that supply to enhance its own energy production plants. Beijing has also sought to strengthen military relations with the juntas in Burkina Faso and Mali, where Chinese firms have recently secured contracts to provide military supplies equipment.
For instance, Burkina Faso has recently received essential supplies from China North Industries Group Corporation, known as Norinco, the largest weapons manufacturer in China. In January, the nation received a substantial number of armoured vehicles produced in China, following last year’s delivery of equipment that featured VN-22 armoured vehicles.
China’s efforts in West Africa, particularly in the Sahel, occur as France’s influence wanes following the military takeovers in Mali and Burkina Faso that expelled French troops, allowing Russian-associated Wagner Group mercenaries to occupy their place.
Similar to other countries in the region, Mali is experiencing insecurity in certain areas as it combats militant groups. China has repeatedly expressed its desire to be perceived as a comprehensive partner for Africa, which encompasses military and security collaboration.
China exercised caution to avoid sensitive issues for the French, but with France’s exit, these concerns dissipated. Consequently, this has allowed Beijing to increase its presence and influence in the region.
It’s significant to observe that while France was retreating, China did not immediately intervene. This indicates that Beijing is progressing at its own pace, not merely responding to France’s exit, but instead capitalizing on the moment to further its own interests in the region.
