On 9 April, the Colombian government made a decision President Gustavo Petro had vowed long to eschew: going back to fumigating coca. There are now more coca crops, the precursor to cocaine, than ever before. Bogotá is being pressured by Washington to turn the tide before October, when the White House has to decide whether to certify Colombia’s efforts to cooperate with the war on drugs.

The fumigation dilemma illustrates how the Trump administration’s tough stance places Latin American nations in a dilemma. Aerial spraying is prohibited in Colombia, yet Petro is the first president to have halted manual fumigation.

Not complying with U.S. demands to resume could lead to disastrous sanctions and budget reductions. But an enforced campaign of coca eradication, even with the assurance of a low dose of the herbicide glyphosate by the government, will increase local violence, erode confidence between rural communities and the military, and pose health risks.  Petro is trying not to have a disastrous outcome by opting for an undesirable alternative.

Colombian concerns are warranted. If the U.S. decertifies Colombia, the consequences would be the instant cessation of about $70 million of U.S.-Colombia annual military cooperation; termination of training programs and credits to finance the purchase of defence systems; and possible new tariffs and sanctions. When Colombia was decertified the last time, in 1996, Washington went so far as to lobby against giving it development aid and international financial institution loans.

Cutting off a quarter-century of co-operation would appear to be against U.S. interests, considering the magnitude of Washington’s security alliance with Colombia. In recent times, Washington has certified the nation annually through agreements to enhance on a range of security metrics.

But one of the top Colombian military officials reported, “everything is working against us” this time. It has been easy for the Trump administration to make an example of Petro, the left-wing president who has engaged in a dispute with the White House over immigration and tariffs. The threat to cut military ties “is looming over us like a giant club, at a moment when security is more complicated than ever,” the official reported.

Petro’s plan to destroy 30,000 hectares this year (compared to the previous administration’s target of 130,000 under the previous conservative government) won’t be enough to appease Trump. But it will be enough to increase confrontation in Colombia.

Forced eradication places poor coca farmers between armed groups who compel them to grow the plant and government troops who seek to destroy it. Past efforts led to shootouts between civilians and the military. At other times, civilians are coerced by armed groups to encircle and essentially hold soldiers hostage until they agree to leave. Soldiers have been killed in the past by landmines planted around coca fields by armed groups.

Fumigation will also not affect the thriving world drug market. The supply chain is elastic and will shift to meet supply gaps. Most likely, it will be Washington’s demands that Colombia’s conflict-ridden communities will pay for.