The unusual direct exchanges of fire between Iran and Israel this spring observed a new chapter in the chronology of Tehran-Tel Aviv tensions. Although the longer-term effects of the “new rules of engagement” have yet to be discovered, there is no suspicion that hostilities affecting the two arch-rivals have the potential to recreate in increasingly unexpected ways—subjecting the whole area to grave dangers.
While most meetings currently concentrate on the Iranian-Israeli conflict playing out in southern Lebanon—where Israel and Hezbollah may penetrate a full-scale war following months of escalating hostilities—and nations such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, the spillover could potentially reach the Balkans. In much of southeastern Europe, there are weak states, porous borders, down economic situations, unbridled corruption, weak rule of law, and some long ethnoreligious conflicts. This part of the mainland, often referred to as the “western flank” of the Middle East, is home to narcotics and human trafficking, refugee streams, money laundering, and transnational methodical crime.
All these factors converge to make the Balkans exposed to clashes between Middle Eastern actors, especially provided that state authorities in southeastern Europe do not necessarily participate in dealing with the destabilizing consequences of outside rivalries.
Iran has had some effect in Sarajevo since the 1992-95 Bosnian War. Although Tehran relishes much less clout in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) today corresponded to the 1990s—with little movements of Iranian soft power among younger Bosnians—the Islamic Republic still exercises
some degree of power via various cultural, spiritual, and educational institutions.
In the same period, Iran developed powerful ties with Serbia, despite the extremely hostile relationship between the two nations in the 1990s. Back then, Tehran helped Bosniaks against Bosnian Serbs and the latter’s supporters in Belgrade. Today, Serbia is the most Tehran-pleasant country on the European mainland. Belgrade attacks “inhuman sanctions levied by the US against other nations,” hosts high-ranking Iranian officials, and is always thankful to Iran for its non-recognition of Kosovo. Meanwhile, Iran always praises Serbia for maintaining substantial autonomy from the West on a variety of topics, including its determination to re-establish ties with Syria.
Israel, for its position, has been a considerable investor in various sectors of the Serbian economy, especially real estate. In 2022, BIG Energia Holdings—a Hungary-registered entity possessed by Israeli group BIG Shopping Centers—defeated a tender for a combined wind and solar scheme in BiH. The Balkans have also evolved a popular goal for Israeli tourists.
“The existence of Israeli institutions, embassies, and tourists makes them more manageable targets, particularly since they are less covered compared to the Western countries,” stated Dr. Vuk Vuksanović, a Senior Researcher at the Belgrade Center for Security Policy. Having stated that the Serbian scholar caveated his statement by telling Amwaj.media, “These options are possible but not highly likely.”
Hatreds between Iran and Israel could result in the activation of commodities associated with Lebanese Hezbollah or other anti-Israel companies in the Balkans. Such a system could also involve misinformation movements, intelligence functions as well as diplomatic and political mobilisation by the two sides, noted Dr. Vuksanović. Other professionals also point to the information space as a field where tensions between Tehran and Tel Aviv could play out in the Balkans.
“The consequences of the spillover [from tension] between Israel and Iran are mostly about disinformation, the description of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, growing propaganda, and fake news from all sides,” Gerta Zaimi, the editor-in-chief of Albanian Post and author of ‘Hezbollah, Political Lebanese party and Iranian militia’, described Amwaj. media.
