The destructiveness of the civil conflict in Sudan has reached a critical stage due to an increase in attacks and escalating tensions between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) group and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The civil war, which has been raging for almost two years, has evolved beyond the conflict between the two factions and is now too diverse to be characterized as a simple fight for dominance.
According to analyses, the RSF and the Sudanese Army carry on with their civil war operations in order to acquire political and military legitimacy. But throughout this time, the war’s repercussions have gotten worse all over Sudan, from Nyala to Port Sudan. Furthermore, it is evident that the war’s scope and character are changing due to the growing indirect involvement of outside parties like the United Arab Emirates.
Sudan’s period of severe hardship
The RSF has established a structure that has altered the trajectory of the civil conflict as a result of its recent consolidation of power in key areas like Nyala and Kordofan and its fierce drone strikes on Port Sudan. It is believed that the RSF also wants to create a parallel civilian government in Darfur, but its main goal is to undermine the Sudanese army and the present government. In fact, the RSF’s quest for political legitimacy is evident in the coalitions that were just announced in Nairobi, Kenya.
Sudan’s critical infrastructure is being deliberately attacked, as seen by the recent strikes on Port Sudan, which is located distant from the war in comparison to Khartoum. The RSF’s long-range, methodical drone assaults have altered the ground conflict’s dynamics. One crucial concern is how the Sudanese Army will react to the RSF’s air supremacy.
Furthermore, it is a truth that Sudan’s humanitarian catastrophe is still wreaking havoc. Malnutrition and illness risk have increased, particularly among youngsters, as a result of power outages, interruptions in the water supply, and the collapse of health facilities.
The increasing engagement of regional players is one of the main factors supporting the change in the nature of this conflict. These players’ impact has expanded beyond humanitarian assistance and diplomatic mediation. Instead, they have taken on a role that directly influences the political and military environment on the ground. The UAE is unique among these actors because of the extent and character of its involvement in Sudan.
According to a number of sources, the UAE’s involvement in Sudan is frequently seen as a continuation of its strategic positions in Somalia and Libya. The UAE’s historical military and commercial connections with RSF head Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as Hemedti, have been known to route Sudanese gold into Abu Dhabi markets. In exchange, the UAE has given the RSF financial backing and military hardware.
There is evidence of an air bridge carrying weapons from the United Arab Emirates to the border with Chad and subsequently into Darfur, according to open-source intelligence platforms such as Flight Radar. However, it appears that this supply route serves as a logistical support hub in the east, as evidenced by radar systems and bases recently built in Bosaso, in Puntland, a federal member state of Somalia. Official officials deny these assertions, but field reports and open-source flight data show otherwise.
Another example of this tactic is the drone support and weaponry that the United Arab Emirates sent to General Khalifa Haftar in Libya. This concept may be viewed as a component of a larger proxy strategy that uses local players to promote geopolitical goals and create regional balance.
Invisible battlefields: Digital conflict and secret logistics
The conflict in Sudan is currently being fought on several fronts, including online. A thorough examination reveals that the RSF has established a powerful propaganda network on social media. They switched to Telegram after being banned from Facebook and X, where they can reach tens of thousands of people to share their story. In addition, the RSF uses these platforms to provide humanitarian relief and create content that supports stability and legitimacy.
At the same time, they have used coordinated operations and phony accounts to undermine Sudan’s government, turning digital media into a battlefield. Foreign donors allegedly spend large sums of money to maintain these activities, according to observers.
Arms and manpower supply routes, however, continue to operate mostly in the background. The RSF is seen using Chinese-made weaponry and armored vehicles built in the United Arab Emirates in field photographs and satellite footage. Additionally, it has been stated that the SAF occasionally uses foreign mercenaries and obtains drones from allies like Egypt. These covert supply networks impede peace initiatives in addition to extending the conflict.
