The prevalence of violent extremism in West Africa is a result of the demand of radical terrorist groups which are prepared to take advantage of the institutional weakness in the region. Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP) are some of the armed groups that have taken advantage of the failure in governance to establish their dominance.
Violence attributed to these organisations has grown by over 250 percent in the last two years. They are operating in more transnational ways, with their activities not only affecting the Sahel but spreading into the coastal states of West Africa whose governments are losing the control over violence and instability.
The humanitarian situation in the region is worsening due to extremist groups that keep destabilizing communities and weakening the state as they develop illicit economies that support their insurgency.
The Nexus of Weak Governance and Terrorist Financing
Corruption and State Fragility Fuel Expansion
Corruption, poor penetration beyond the capital cities and lack of adequate public service provision undermine governance in much of West Africa. Large stretches of border areas are poorly policed with a whole population remaining undermined and vulnerable to the actions of non-state actors.
Vacums in power when states become unable or unresponsible enable extremist groups to effectively govern as de facto governments. They offer food, security as well as informal justice systems, hitherto the province of states to provide.
Chad, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have had more than 25 successful coups in between 1960 and 2025 respectively. The latest round, largely in Mali and Niger, has yet again undermined governance that has disrupted coordination of security throughout the Sahel, as well as undermined trust in formal institutions.
Exploiting Illicit Economies for Revenue
The financing of the militant Islamists in West Africa is carried out through various illegal activities like trading in gold, selling of arms, and smuggling of drugs. Such economies thrive in areas where the law enforcement is lax or is working in collaboration and where the state supervision hardly exists.
Organizations such as ISWAP and JNIM have designed an organized system of taxation euphemistically referred to as “zakat” and it is imposed on the locals. In exchange, they provide protection and stability those governments can often be more consistent with, than national governments.
Insensitiveness of local financial institutions to discover suspicious transactions has been singled out severally by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Such a lack of control permits the continuous circulation of finances within the informal channels and remittance mechanisms.
Climate Change and the Dynamics of Recruitment
Environmental Stress as a Risk Multiplier
The climatic change is destabilizing a volatile region. Constant droughts, land degradation and floods are diminishing the access to water and agricultural productivity. Such efforts break communities and cause migration especially on the part of pastoral communities.
This scarcity is used by extremist groups. In exchange for their loyalty or conscription, they provide the displaced or poor people with basic resources, access to lands or access to security. To a number of people in these vulnerable communities, siding with insurgents is part of a survival formula.
Transhumance had been destroyed by the conflicts and environmental degradation, something that has magnified the conflict between pastoralists, and agriculturalists. This tension has been used by violent militias to stoke up conflicts based on identities and procure recruits among the disadvantaged.
Governance Failure in Climate Adaptation
The governments in the region have not been successful in reducing climate risks or making adaptation investments. The failure to provide long-term displacement or scarce resource solutions has provided seedbeds to extremist narratives.
In cases where the state resorts late or not at all in responding to the disaster, the insurgents take over to provide quick relief to the areas plunging them further in their control of the regions. Another weapon in their arsenals is climate insecurity because they can use the natural crisis to their strategic issues.
Widening Regional Instability
Cross-Border Violence and Escalating Insecurity
The Sahel violence can no longer remain confined in its core nations. More than 450 reported acts of violence directed by Islamist militants happened in or close to the West African coastal states in 2025 alone.
There was a twice as high number of deaths in Benin and 69 deaths recorded in Togo due to attacks based on extremism. These figures show an increased tendency to infiltrate the already un-touched regions, a phenomenon that endangers the local trade, transit corridors, and even sustainable peace.
The cost in human lives is enormous. In Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, more than 12.7 million individuals are food insecure currently. Children have been deprived of education, as thousands of schools have been shut and healthcare is practically absent in most areas controlled by armed forces.
Decline of Multilateral Security Responses
The security arrangements in a region are becoming less useful. This has created a large security vacuum occasioned by the disintegration of the G5 Sahel, and the evacuation of Minusma peacekeeping forces. Political wrangling, inadequate funding and poor coordination have undermined the Accra Initiative and the Lake Chad Basin Multinational Joint Task Force.
As France and other western players continue going down in terms of military deployment, others such as Mali and Burkina Faso have resorted to other options including Russia. These partnerships are however transactional based and have not yet resulted in any lasting peace being achieved.
Criminal Networks and Financial Invisibility
Merging of Terrorism and Organized Crime
The relationship between terrorist groups and organized criminal networks in West Africa has become symbiotic. Revenue generation through smuggling, extortion, and human trafficking provides the financial lifeline insurgents need to survive and expand.
These operations often target marginalized communities, forcibly recruiting youth and imposing restrictive rules on religious and social life. While their actions are framed under religious doctrine, the primary motivation remains territorial control and revenue collection.
The 2024 U.S. Treasury National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment noted that ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates across Africa rely on regional financial facilitators, enabled by corrupt officials and unregulated transactions.
Limited Capacity for Financial Oversight
Financial institutions in the region remain unequipped to deal with terrorism financing. The use of mobile money, cash transactions, and informal banking channels like hawala systems makes it difficult to trace and intercept illicit flows.
Recent efforts in Somalia to sanction al-Shabaab financiers highlight how deeply embedded such networks are in everyday commercial life. West Africa faces similar challenges, but without the institutional muscle to confront them head-on.
Global Reactions and Regional Insights
International Observations and Warnings
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has consistently warned that illicit economies are enabling conflict in the Sahel. These networks, which include human and drug trafficking, are central to the operations of extremist groups.
The UN Deputy Secretary-General recently addressed the Security Council, emphasizing:
“When financing development regresses, when fragile institutions are matched with weak governance, the deadly tentacles of terrorist groups spread rapidly.”
This warning is echoed by the African Union Peace and Security Council, which has declared the situation not merely a security issue but a developmental and humanitarian crisis.
Local Voices from the Region
Nayna Patel, a regional analyst, addressed these challenges in her recent interview with Al Jazeera. She remarked,
cisanewsletter.com“The resilience of extremist groups in West Africa is directly tied to the weakness of state institutions and the failure to address the root causes of vulnerability. Until governments can provide security, basic services, and economic opportunities, extremist financiers will continue to thrive.”
Since the signing of the 2022 CoHA, EDF has continued to occupy territory within 🇪🇹. 🇪🇷n military commanders & their agents within 🇪🇹 continue to profit from a conflict economy,including through human trafficking,kidnapping,& illicit gold mining—The Sentry https://t.co/Dv0nZhpqqR
— nayna (@Nayna_2011) July 1, 2025
These insights highlight a growing consensus: defeating extremist financing requires not just military intervention but structural reform and good governance.
Toward Stability and Long-Term Disruption of Financing
Institutional strength, accountability and strengthening civil societies are feasible sustainable measures. It is not likely that we can win the war on extremist funding by sending in security forces.
The key steps are international collaboration in combating financial opacity, tighter guidelines on the export of gold and actualization of anti-laundering legislations. Social grievances, youth unemployment and inclusive governance should also be provided by governments.
The West African case is a reality check of what occurs in the absence of development, climate responsiveness, and state legitimacy coming together. As the problem of regional instability increases, a comprehensive reaction is being heard with ever greater emphasis.
The challenge will be on whether these states can regain sovereignty or relinquish even more to insurgents who prosper where there is no governance during the coming decade.
