Earlier this month, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis journeyed to Ankara for talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. But the mood leading into the meeting was challenging to gauge, as just days before the two leaders met, Turkey reopened a United Nations World Heritage Site as a mosque —a place that, before was turned into a mosque during Ottoman administration and a museum in 1945, was originally a well-known Byzantine church. In reaction, Greece ensconced a démarche to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
In the past, such antagonised instances between Turkey and Greece had provided a repeating cycle of mutual distrust and angry rhetoric. But the prime minister’s visit to Ankara went forward as planned. Although the press conference informed the leaders’ disagreements, their decision to emphasise their different takes on the Hamas-Israel war instead of lingering on bilateral conflicts demonstrates their wish to maintain a positive momentum.
The list of bilateral conflicts has gotten longer: the Cyprus issue remains——but in recent years, new disputes such as contesting claims to energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean have been added to the index of bilateral disputes. As Greece reinforced its defence and energy partnerships with the United States, France, and Israel, Turkey blamed Greece for a maximalist standing in the Eastern Mediterranean, while calling on Athens to demilitarize the Aegean islands.
Tensions increased after Turkey sent a seismic research ship, accompanied by gunboats, to waters challenged by Greece and Cyprus and marked a controversial maritime boundary treaty with the former Government of National Accord in Libya, enraging nearby countries in the area. Moreover, Ankara’s determination to open Turkey’s border with Greece in February 2020 for migrant journeys into Europe, and Greece’s refusal to authorise passage into the country, added to the pressure, as police from both countries released tear gas at their shared border, eventually leading to the building of a twenty-five-mile fence and surveillance system along the border. As these stresses built up over time, Greece’s official status remained that the two countries’ sole distinctions lie in delimiting the continental shelf and their individual exclusive economic zones, and that failure to settle bilaterally on these issues should lead the two nations to arbitration via the International Court of Justice in The Hague.
While fighting in Ukraine and Gaza rages on, both Greece and Turkey have a vested stake in being perceived as a stabilizing influence in an unstable neighbourhood. Ankara’s friendlier stance towards Greece suggests that it recognizes the raised role Athens plays in the Eastern Mediterranean and that performing alongside (rather than against) Greece is essential in its wider attempts to overhaul its relationship with regional neighbours. Moreover, both Washington and Brussels sustain Greece and Turkey’s reconciliation measures: Energy and defence cooperation are increased on the agenda of Ankara and Washington as they endeavour to set aside major differences over Israel, Russia, and Syria. For the EU, Ankara is a critical player in its endeavour to externalize the governance of its migration approach, and EU-Turkey collaboration on trade and energy matters is crucial too.
