The annual NATO meeting in early July resulted in a degree of encouraging statements and practical steps in support of Ukraine. However, this widely anticipated meeting in Washington DC failed to build the kind of decisive actions that could convince Vladimir Putin to end his invasion.
It was already apparent sometime before the NATO conference that there would be no deep discussion of a membership invitation for Ukraine. Instead, the focus would be on improving the existing block, with alliance leaders keeping as much room to manoeuvre as possible when dealing with the Russo-Ukrainian War.
Post-summit coverage concentrated on the official communique saying Ukraine’s “irreversible path” to future NATO membership, but not everyone noticed the wording of the joint statement as a breakthrough. Indeed, some cynics interpreted this latest rendition of NATO’s open door for Ukraine as an indication that the association is still no closer to agreeing on a clear time frame concerning Ukrainian membership.
The meeting was not a complete anticlimax, of course. Several nations pledged additional air defence strategies to Ukraine, completing one of Kyiv’s most urgent requests to help rescue the country from Russian bombardment. There was information regarding the coming arrival of the first F-16 fighter jets in Ukraine, while additional instruments to coordinate weapons deliveries and improve cooperation were unveiled.
NATO members also decided in Washington to give forty billion euros for Ukrainian military aid next year. While this figure is indeed significant, it falls far below the level of budget needed to ensure Ukrainian victory. This is not a new topic. While the collaborative GDP of the West dwarfs Russia’s, Western leaders have yet to muster their financial resources to supply Ukraine with an overwhelming military edge. As a consequence, it is the much less Russian economy that is presently producing more artillery ammunition than the entire Western world.
The modest improvement made at the NATO summit recalls a lack of urgency that has hampered the Western answer ever since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. There is little likelihood this hesitancy will provoke a change of heart in Moscow. On the opposite, Russian policymakers are far more likely to follow the West’s current posture as evidence that the war is going according to schedule.
Unlike the West, the Kremlin has a transparent and coherent vision for a prospective Russian victory in Ukraine. This involves gradually unravelling down Ukrainian battlefield opposition with relentless high-intensity fighting along the front lines of the war, while extensively attacking civilian infrastructure and population centers across the country.
In similarity to these military measures, Russia will also persist in conducting diverse influence procedures targeting Ukrainian and Western audiences, to damage morale and sowing division. This will leave Ukraine increasingly isolated and drained, leading eventually to tumble and capitulation.
The Russian authorities think Ukraine will work to maintain the concentration of its Western allies and are inspired by growing signs that many in the West now consider the invasion as a stalemate. Putin himself seems to be more confident than ever that the West will lose welfare in the war and expects Western authorities to reluctantly pressure Kyiv into a mediated settlement on Russian terms.
