The recent Russian test launch of the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, known colloquially in Western circles as “Satan II,” has once again drawn international attention to Russia’s nuclear aspirations. Called by President Vladimir Putin “the most powerful missile in the world,” the Sarmat is a crucial component of Russia’s efforts at strategic modernization, aimed at replacing the Soviet-era SS-18 Satan.
Given that it has been said to have a range of more than 18,000 kilometers as well as the capability of carrying several nuclear warheads or hypersonic glide vehicles, the Sarmat is set to be a game changer in the field of deterrence at a time when relations between the East and West have deteriorated. However, in view of satellite photographs and expert opinions that have revealed its failures before, including a major one in 2024, the recent test brings up serious questions.
Second successful test launch of Sarmat ICBM. The first one was in April 2022. Deployment to begin this year. Website: https://t.co/nQhodFRO2Z Substack: https://t.co/pDXQdekZUb pic.twitter.com/Rjd6C0bUTo
— Pavel Podvig (@russianforces) May 12, 2026
Development History and Technical Specifications
The Sarmat missile system can be traced back to the early 2000s when the Russians needed a replacement for their reliable SS-18 missiles. Contracts for the development of the missile system were signed between the Russian government and the Makeyev Design Bureau, as well as NPOMash, in 2011, marking the end of research and development efforts for that year.
The missile is a three-stage liquid-propellant behemoth that measures about 35.3 meters in length, and its diameter is three meters. The rocket also has an astonishing mass of 208.1 metric tonnes on launch. Its payload capacity can carry up to ten tons, consisting of up to ten heavy nuclear warheads, sixteen lighter nuclear warheads, or even a combination of countermeasures, plus the Avangard Hypersonic Boost-Glide systems, which Putin has said are unrivaled.
The development process was plagued by overly ambitious schedules from the start. Initially, Russia aimed for deployment by 2018, with an order for 50 missiles, but difficulties led to delays until at least 2021. The first test of the silo launch in December 2017 revealed weaknesses in the launch mechanism, although further tests in March and May 2018 were considered successful. By October 2023, Putin declared the project almost finished, with then-defense minister Sergei Shoigu referring to the Sarmat as “the backbone of Russia’s land-based strategic nuclear forces.” These figures make the Sarmat a “heavy” ICBM that can achieve sub-orbital trajectories of more than 35,000 km in range, thus increasing accuracy and defense evasion.
The 2024 Catastrophic Failure: A Wake-Up Call
No event underscored the Sarmat’s troubled path more starkly than the September 2024 test at Plesetsk Cosmodrome, 800 kilometers north of Moscow. Satellite imagery from Maxar Technologies, analyzed by experts, revealed a 60-meter-wide crater and extensive silo damage absent in prior images. Geneva-based analyst Pavel Podvig, head of the Russian Nuclear Forces project, described it bluntly:
“All indications it was a failed test. It’s a big hole in the ground. There was a serious incident with the missile and the silo.”
Timothy Wright of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) pinpointed the likely culprit: a first-stage booster failure shortly after ignition, causing the missile to plummet back and explode.
“One possible reason that the stage (booster) did not ignite correctly or encountered a catastrophic mechanical malfunction, leading the missile to fall back into or land very near the silo and explode,”
Wright explained. James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace echoed this on social media, calling the before-and-after images
“very persuasive that there was a big explosion.”
This marked the fourth consecutive test failure, straining the SS-18s’ extended service life and fueling doubts about program viability, even as analyst Nikolay Sokov predicted Moscow’s persistence.
The Kremlin blocked attempts at investigation, citing an inability to talk about it to the mute Ministry of Defense while Ukraine continued to escalate its attacks. Putin has often referred to Russia’s “biggest and most advanced nuclear weapons arsenal” to discourage any foreign assistance. This failure would have been more geopolitically sensitive because of Putin’s rhetoric.
2026 Test Launch: Putin’s Bold Assertions
Fast-forward to May 2026, and Russia heralded a purported success. On May 11-12, outlets reported a test-launch confirming
“the correctness of the design and technological solutions incorporated into the system,”
per Strategic Missile Forces Commander Sergey Karakayev. Putin, addressing the results, projected confidence:
“This is the most powerful missile system in the world, not inferior in power to the Voyevoda missile system… The total power of the warhead delivered by this missile exceeds the power of any existing most powerful Western analogue by four times.”
He emphasized suborbital capabilities for over 35,000 km range, doubled accuracy, and invulnerability to defenses, positioning Sarmat to replace some 40 Voyevoda missiles by year’s end.
This came days after Putin declared Ukraine hostilities “winding down” at a Victory Day parade—sparse on heavy arms for the first time in decades. Framing Sarmat within a 2018 “superweapons” suite—including Avangard (27 times sound speed), nuclear-armed Onik missiles (5,000 km range), Poseidon drone (radioactive tsunami potential), and Burevestnik nuclear cruise missile—Putin justified escalation:
“We had to take into account the necessity of securing our strategic safety in light of the new reality and the imperative to maintain a strategic equilibrium and parity.”
With the U.S.-Russia arms treaty lapsed in February 2026, unleashing unregulated arsenals after 50 years, these claims stoke arms race fears.
Strategic Implications and Global Tensions
The Sarmat’s saga mirrors Russia’s nuclear triad overhaul under Putin since 2000: hundreds of new ICBMs, nuclear submarines, and bomber refits, spurring U.S. upgrades. Designed to evade shields Russian strategists fear could embolden preemptive strikes, it bolsters Moscow’s “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine. Yet, delays erode SS-18 readiness, and failures like 2024’s invite skepticism. Wright noted such mishaps
“will at least delay its already postponed entry into service even further and at most could raise doubts about the program’s viability,”
while Podvig and Acton stress persistent commitment amid rival design competitions.
For the West, Sarmat embodies hybrid threats: hypersonic integration amplifies unpredictability, suborbital paths challenge intercepts, and payload flexibility overwhelms defenses. As Ukraine nears resolution per Putin, nuclear saber-rattling persists, compelling NATO vigilance. The missile’s single prior success before 2026 underscores resilience, but experts caution against overhyping unproven systems.
Expert Perspectives: Between Hype and Reality
Analysts like those at CSIS’s Missile Threat project provide sober benchmarks, listing Sarmat as “in development” with 10,000-18,000 km range and MIRV/glide options. Podvig’s project tracks nuclear forces, affirming the 2024 blast’s severity without doomsaying the program. Sokov, a former arms control official, bets on continuity: Russia favors designer competition over sole reliance on rivals like the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology.
Putin’s rhetoric—
“the aggregate of the Sarmat individually targeted heads surpasses that of any Western equivalent by more than four times”
—serves deterrence, yet contrasts empirical stumbles. As combat duty looms by late 2026, verification via independent telemetry remains elusive, leaving the world to parse claims against craters.
Nuclear Modernization Race
Sarmat fits Putin’s post-2022 Ukraine playbook, where nuclear hints curbed Western arms flows. With Avangard deployed, Onik striking conventionally, and Poseidon/Burevestnik nearing fruition, Russia counters perceived U.S. dominance. The treaty’s end liberates warhead growth, but economic strains and sanctions test sustainability.


