In spite of subdued hopes, Sudan conference in London was a dissonant reality check. Similar to preceding forums that attempted to hype up a more collective effort to try to resolve Sudan’s two-year-old civil war, the conference gathered a mix of primarily Western, Arab and African nations that have interests in the Sudanese war, plus pertinent multilateral institutions.

In contrast to the previous Paris conference on Sudan last year, which mobilized more than €2 billion for Sudan, this one did not ask donors to make pledges (though the UK and the EU, co-host, did commit new aid packages to Sudan). 

Nor did the conference yield a joint communiqué: talks collapsed in the midst of a row between Arab powers on opposite sides of the conflict, resulting in a co-chairs’ statement instead. Attempts to set up a new contact group also came to nothing. The only solace many officials could offer was the hope that the paralysis itself might be galvanising. 

Negotiations on the draft communiqué were enlightening. Rival amendments to a single sentence were irreconcilable. Egypt and Saudi Arabia supported wording that invoked respect for state institutions, a veiled reference to the Sudanese army and de facto regime on one side of the dispute.

The UAE, the primary supporter of the opposing Rapid Support Forces (RSF), rebuffed that line and instead desired more robust language demanding civilian rule.

That diplomatic struggle revealed the stark reality that this war, initially a struggle for power between pillars of Sudan’s military junta, is now a regionalized proxy conflict. It pits Egypt and numerous other nations supporting the Sudanese army (also the UN-recognized government of Sudan) against the UAE support for RSF. Saudi Arabia, though ostensibly neutral, is also aligning very closely with the Sudanese army.

These tensions have undermined any efforts at resuming peace negotiations over the Sudanese military’s continued refusal to negotiate with the RSF – which the military asserts would give the RSF undeserved legitimacy. There have not been formal direct negotiations between the two sides since late 2023.

It is not clear which country or institution in the world could fill the gaps today dividing Sudan over the outside. There are few outside nations with broad enough influence over developments in Sudan (such as the U.S.) and they have not included stopping the war on their agendas. Even if they did, success would be no certainty. An American effort to isolate peace talks last year in Geneva failed when the Sudanese military boycotted the meeting.

The war will de-escalate only when the UAE (as the RSF’s primary sponsor) and Sudanese military achieve some thaw. There have been several concerted backchannel attempts along those lines without success. Those efforts have to be made.

The UK should be praised for investing its diplomatic capital in redirecting efforts to bring Sudan’s war to an end, even if the task is Sisyphean. The concern is that the world will turn its back on the dirty war instead.